

Romanian Political Science Review

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STUDIA POLITICA

Romanian Political Science Review

The end of the Cold War, and the extinction of communism both as an ideology and a practice of government, not only have made possible an unparalleled experiment in building a democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, but have opened up a most extraordinary intellectual opportunity: to understand, compare and eventually appraise what had previously been neither understandable nor comparable. *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* was established in the realization that the problems and concerns of both new and old democracies are beginning to converge. The journal fosters the work of the first generations of Romanian political scientists permeated by a sense of critical engagement with European and American intellectual and political traditions that inspired and explained the modern notions of democracy, pluralism, political liberty, individual freedom, and civil rights.

Believing that ideas do matter, the Editors share a common commitment as intellectuals and scholars to try to shed light on the major political problems facing Romania, a country that has recently undergone unprecedented political and social changes. They think of *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* as a challenge and a mandate to be involved in scholarly issues of fundamental importance, related not only to the democratization of Romanian polity and politics, to the "great transformation" that is taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the make-over of the assumptions and prospects of their discipline. They hope to be joined in by those scholars in other countries who feel that the demise of communism calls for a new political science able to reassess the very foundations of democratic ideals and procedures.

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ARTICOLI

Young People and Political Activism in Moldova: Why Online Mobilization is Not Enough for Democratic Consolidation

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Abstract

The election of a socialist and pro-Russian candidate in December 2016 as president of Moldova marked a new turn in Moldovan politics. This election contrasts with the pro-Western attitudes of the previous government. Governing instability in Moldova and changing international orientations of many prominent political actors, as emphasized by this article, are partly due to political alternative victories of parties supported by different social groups. Focusing on young people activism, this article underlines the differentiation between the political success of pro-Western parties, made possible by the street protests of April 2009, and the political failure of December 2016. The findings of this research may add a new explanation to Moldova's permanent instability. The factor we emphasize here is the change in political values, attitudes and actions due to profound generational transformations. Since democracy is a life-long learning process, a continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to the varying political environment, different generations rely not only on different past experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different meanings given to rights and freedoms, social standards and economic conditions.

Keywords: Moldova, street protests, elections, young people, democratization.

Introduction

Moldova has found itself for many years at the crossroad between European integration and democratization and more authoritarian and non-

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democratic regimes specific to some post-communist countries in the region, especially to Russia and Belarus. The fragile balance between timid democratization and an undemocratic oligarchical regime is a key figure, which makes Moldova an unconsolidated, unstable, and partial democracy. The aim of this article is to shed light on the causes of the fragile balance, and more specifically on the social forces that shape the timid democratization. It intends to address the issue of young people's activism and to assess its importance for the fragile democratization in Moldova, where successive efforts for democratic consolidation have been undermined by more authoritarian episodes, and pro-European association measures are quickly counterbalanced by pro-Russian attitudes and policies. Focusing on young people, the article underlines the contrast between their strong activism using social media channels and their inconsistent off-line mobilization when it comes to voting, as well as their scant voluntary engagement.

The argument this article puts forward is that the weakness of the democratization process is explained by the opposition, on one hand between groups of young people, which become more and more politically active and visible, and on the other hand the rest of the population, which constitutes a more nostalgic electorate for the good old days of past socialism. The tension between a more westernized and civically active youth and more nostalgic pro-communist older people seems to heavily influence the Moldovan political regime. Whereas the former are more visible in street protests and have proved capable to overthrow the Communist Party rule in April 2009, the latter express their political opinions at the polls. Merely visible, the latter form the bulk of an electorate sensible to social and economic issues, voting for the Communist party as the expression of the reminder of Soviet socialist times. The opposition between those two kinds of electorate is not accidental. As shown by solid survey data, the political split between the Communist party in power in 2009, and the young activists mobilized using the new social media, is by and large due to solid discrepancies between shared social and political values. In other words, the crucial protest outburst against the Communist party rule during the spring of 2009 is triggered by profound structural tensions.

At the same time, the successful protest on the 5th of April 2009 was not necessarily the turning point in Moldovan politics, but more a significant oscillation in regime type characteristics and stability, as it has been shown by the election of a Communist candidate as president in 2016. By focusing on the social forces that manifested during those days and on the social changes taking place since then, the current research may offer a more profound knowledge of the ongoing tensions and of the more recent configuration of the Moldovan political space. The online mobilization continues to be effective on the ground following the events in spring 2009, with young people supporting various candidates, including the Communist party candidates. However, the weak electoral participation of politically Western oriented young people undermines the chances of pro-Western political parties. This is in contrast with the

Communist party, which did not rely heavily on this kind of activists, and which is electorally supported by more conservative, especially less young nostalgic people. The conclusion is that young people, active on social media and fighting for a regime change, have to get engaged in politics on the ground, to be active in secondary organizations, which would impact the overall political culture on the long-run. Finally, they have to be electorally active, and thus be part of the general process of learning that democracy implies.

Regime Transformation and Post-Communist Democratization

During post-communism, transition outcomes are unpredictable. On the one hand, the political competition between elites and the distribution of power between the former communist and the new democratic elites would decide the path, with either non-democratic or democratic outcomes when the power is unequally distributed, and with unstable, unconsolidated, partial democracy, when the equal distribution of power between the old regime elites and its challengers occurs.¹ On the other hand, not all citizens desire that their country turns into a complete democracy, fearing social costs that would exceed all political benefits. In other words, two logics are intertwined during transition, a political competition between actors, and long-lasting economic and social structures working as a constraining path dependency.² Democratization, seen as a process that offers a predictable outcome should, therefore, be replaced by “regime transformation”, since the final outcome of this transformation is not known.³ This is especially true for the early stages of transition, when the competition between competing elites is not yet decided and when citizens have no clear idea about the process and its plausible outcomes. In Central and Eastern Europe, the regime transformation has mostly lead to consolidated democratic states, while in the former Soviet area most of the new regimes that emerged are partial and unstable democracies, in fact hybrid regimes that combine democratic and non-democratic features, with formally democratic institutions as multiparty elections set up in order to cover a profoundly authoritarian domination, which disregards human rights and abuses civil liberties.⁴

¹ Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” *World Politics* 54, no. 2 (2002): 212-244.

² Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change,” *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (2007): 908-926.

³ William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures,” *International Political Science Review* 22, no. 4 (2001): 303-320, 304.

⁴ Joakim Ekman, “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analysing Hybrid Regimes,” *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 1 (2009): 7-31.

From a perspective that takes complex processes into account, we emphasize the importance of citizens' support for democracy. We acknowledge that a democratic transition is more complex than initially assumed, combining a large array of internal and external factors that shape the regime transformation. Without disregarding external factors, we focus here on citizens' democratic values as a crucial asset for democratization.⁵ On the one hand, it is necessary that several generations assimilate and practice democracy in order to have a consolidated democratic regime. On the other hand, it is by no means necessary that all particular transitions end in full democratic settings, meaning that full democratization might not be the final point of the transition between political regimes. Depending on the democratic lessons learned and on competing incentives, the new democratic regime might not be at all as permanent, stable or stationary as one might expect. This is to say that citizens may offer their support for the new democratic regime by continuously updating, modifying and balancing their initial beliefs, through a large series of successive experiences during the whole transition period.⁶ This type of evaluation is quite opposite to an idealistic definition of democracy, meaning that citizens make their mind by actually comparing real, vivid regimes, by comparing the existing democracy with the previous non-democratic regime. This may eventually impact on the definition they give to democracy itself, since the label of democracy may cover not only democratic values and procedures, civil rights and political freedoms, but also economic and social rights that have been emphasized by the former socialist regime.⁷ Returning to the previous regime or supporting another type of non-democratic regime (a strong leader or a military rule) is not at all a fiction, but the outcome of competing support strategies for regimes that have been already experienced by the people from a particular region.

⁵ Christian Welzel, "Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy," *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 4 (2007): 397-424.

⁶ Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian W. Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

⁷ Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Remembering the bad old days: human rights, economic conditions, and democratic performance in transitional regimes," *European Journal of Political Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 155-174; Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany," *International Political Science Review* 22, no. 4 (2001): 363-378; Daniel Stockemer and Greg Elder, "Germans 25 years after reunification – How much do they know about the German Democratic Republic and what is their value judgment of the socialist regime," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, nos. 2-3 (2015): 113-122.

Moldova between East and West

Like other countries from the former Soviet area, Moldova experienced a mixed transition, where steps towards Western styled democratic regime transformation were soon followed by decisive setbacks, turning Moldova into an unstable, democratically unconsolidated, hybrid regime. As it was the case in Ukraine,⁸ citizens and political elites are undecided, balancing between post-Soviet semi-authoritarianism and democratic openness, between Soviet nostalgia and the faith in Western integration.⁹ This balance that keeps Moldova in an uncertain state may polarize society and fuel diverging political solutions, especially when one notices the rather complicated geopolitical situation that severely impacts on Moldova's statehood, with Transnistria turning into a *de-facto* state.¹⁰

The balance between Western integration and Soviet nostalgia is fueled by political uncertainty and social deprivation. It is worth mentioning that former Soviet citizens evaluate the legacy of communism and the benefits of post-communist transition differently, making the decision to head towards East or West much more difficult than it was for citizens of former communist states from Central and Eastern Europe.¹¹ This is especially true today, when Russia itself managed to find a way to overcome the former communist regime settings and continue modernization under new circumstances, while keeping the memory of good old days alive.¹² The current Russian modernization, being far away from the model of liberalization of market economy and full democratization, conceived as the revival of a great power based on its own political culture,¹³ is today an alternative to the more classical post-communist transition experienced by Central and Eastern European countries. Based on a different paradigm than the Western democratic model, Russian modernization

⁸ Neil Munro, "Which Way Does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations Toward Russia and Western Europe," *Problems of Post-Communism* 54, no. 6 (2007): 43-58.

⁹ Theodor Tudoroiu, "Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest for democracy," *Democratization* 18, no. 1 (2011): 236-264.

¹⁰ Oleh Protsyk, "Federalism and Democracy in Moldova," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 21, no. 1 (2005): 72-90; Oleh Protsyk, "Secession and hybrid regime politics in Transnistria," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 1-2 (2012): 175-182; Theodor Tudoroiu, "The European Union, Russia, and the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict," *East European Politics and Societies* 26, no. 1 (2012): 135-161.

¹¹ Vladimir Gel'man, "Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet Regime Changes in Comparative Perspective," *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 2 (2008): 157-180.

¹² Karen Dawisha, "Communism as a Lived System of Ideas in Contemporary Russia," *East European Politics and Societies* 19, no. 3 (2005): 463-493.

¹³ Markku Kivinen and Terry Cox, "Russian Modernisation – a New Paradigm," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 1 (2016): 1-19.

is taken into account by citizens from other post-Soviet republics, excluding the Baltic States, which already have chosen the exit from state socialism, integrating the political and economic Western system.¹⁴

The impact of social transformations during transition on persistent Soviet nostalgia should not be underestimated.¹⁵ As mentioned above, the evaluation of democracy by ordinary people means not only subjectively measuring its performance, but comparing it with alternative regimes. From this perspective, Moldovan citizens not only have the opportunity to compare their post-communist transition with the past Soviet performance, but with the current Russian performance as well. From the first years of the post-communist transition, the support for the new democratic regime in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States was marked by a downward trend, which was consistent during the first decade of regime transformation.¹⁶ This was mainly due to citizens' dissatisfaction with the economy and the performance of state institutions. Compared with the micro-economy of the households and the macro-economy of the socialist states which were fully engaged in modernization processes, the post-communist social and economic situation is contrasting by the erosion of the social safety net, the strong decline of living standards and the social shock brought in by permanent unemployment and severe poverty.¹⁷ Moreover, these more personal threats to living standards have been accompanied by deep transformations at a more general, societal level. The first decade of transition has brought in an outburst in corruption and state-capture,¹⁸ with a serious increase in both ordinary crime and organized crime.¹⁹

In Moldova, the alternative to the democratic transition, as it was experienced during the first years of post-communism, is therefore appealing.

¹⁴ Rainer Kattel and Ringa Raudla, "The Baltic Republics and the Crisis of 2008-2011," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 3 (2013): 426-449.

¹⁵ Liudmila Mazur, "Golden age mythology and the nostalgia of catastrophes in post-Soviet Russia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 57, no. 3-4 (2015): 213-238.

¹⁶ Christian W. Haerpfer, "Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1992-2002," *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 4 (2008): 411-432.

¹⁷ Pamela Abbott, "Cultural Trauma and Social Quality in Post-Soviet Moldova and Belarus," *East European Politics and Societies* 21, no. 2 (2007): 219-258; Ivan T. Berend, "Social shock in transforming Central and Eastern Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40, no. 3 (2007): 269-280.

¹⁸ Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Corruption, the power of state and big business in Soviet and post-Soviet regimes," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): 147-158.

¹⁹ Ichiro Iwasaki and Taku Suzuki, "Transition strategy, corporate exploitation, and state capture: An empirical analysis of the former Soviet states," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40, no. 3 (2007): 393-422; Leslie Holmes, "Crime, organised crime and corruption in post-communist Europe and the CIS," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 2 (2009): 265-287.

Russia managed to improve its status of great power, following decades of setbacks, and has the opportunity to propose its own economic and social model today. Russia not only managed to avoid political trouble, as experienced by other former Soviet republics in the aftermath of “colored revolutions”,²⁰ but it successfully managed to prevent or destabilize countries,²¹ for example Georgia and the Ukraine, where such revolutions have occurred.²² Moreover, Russia currently offers the former Soviet republics the promise of a new political space, defined by special economic and cultural ties under the large umbrella of an Eurasian Union.²³ We therefore understand the competitive definition of democracy²⁴ as an open game between at least two major regime proposals, between democracy and its alternatives, a dictatorship, a military rule or a technocratic regime, or a combination of them, under the form of a revived Soviet-style regime.

Age Groups and Types of Political Activism

Despite its feeble civil society, weak democratic institutions, important social problems and structural development obstacles, Moldova did not turn into an authoritarian regime following its independence in 1991. By the contrary, Moldova is more pluralistic than many post-Soviet states. Against all odds, Moldova is a case of pluralism “by default”,²⁵ where the political competition is mainly due to government polarization and state incapacity of monopolizing political control. As a failed authoritarian regime, Moldova is at the same time an unstable, undemocratic, hybrid regime. The balance between democratic progress and authoritarian consolidation is due to a series of factors, ranging

²⁰ Taras Kuzio, “Regime type and politics in Ukraine under Kuchma,” *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 38, no. 2 (2005): 167-190.

²¹ Nicolay Petrov, Maria Lipman and Henry E. Hale, “Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 30, no. 1 (2014): 1-26; Robert Horvath, “Putin’s ‘Preventing Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 1 (2011): 1-25; Ammon Cheskin and Luke March, “State-society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political and social contention,” *East European Politics* 31, no. 3 (2015): 261-273.

²² Valery Silitsky, “‘Survival of the fittest’: Domestic and international dimensions of the authoritarian reaction in the former Soviet Union following the colored revolutions,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 3 (2010): 339-350.

²³ Michal Wawrzonek, “Ukraine in the ‘Grey Zone’ Between the ‘Russkiy Mir’ and Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 28, no. 4 (2014): 758-770; Mitchell A. Orenstein, “Geopolitics of a Divided Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 29, no. 2 (2015): 531-540.

²⁴ Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*.

²⁵ Lucan A. Way, “Weak States and Pluralism: The Case of Moldova,” *East European Politics and Societies* 17, no. 3 (2003): 454-482.

from ethnic divisions,²⁶ to elite antagonism and individualism, in the context of the quest for political and national identity.²⁷ The factor we emphasize here is the change in political values, attitudes and actions due to profound generational transformations. In other words, democracy is a life-long learning process, a continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to the varying political environment. In the process, different generations rely not only on different past experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different meanings given to rights and freedoms, social standards and economic conditions. Therefore, it is by no means surprising that their political action would vary accordingly, including their support for the new democratic regime or for a non-democratic alternative.

In the context of democratic transition in post-communist Europe, young people have not been at the heart of the scholarly investigation from the very beginning. It is true, they have not been a priority for parties and governments either. Young people continue to be seen, in modern democracies, as ambivalent when it comes to set up their political engagement profile. On the one hand, they are seen as more reluctant to participate in politics, as less engaged than their predecessors, as less interested in political matters. On the other hand, their essential involvement into more recent democratic or “color revolutions” made them a key element in both opposition and government political strategies.²⁸ Young people are either an important asset for democracy, or potentially harmful contesters who could undermine authoritarian political regimes and who have to be seriously contained.²⁹ As their Western counterparts, they are either seen as disengaged and disenfranchised,³⁰ or engaged into more sophisticated new forms of political participation.³¹

²⁶ Federica Prina, “Linguistic Justice, Soviet Legacies and Post-Soviet Realpolitik: The Ethnolinguistic Cleavage in Moldova,” *Ethnopolitics* 14, no. 1 (2015): 52-71.

²⁷ Julien Danero Iglesias, “An Ad Hoc Nation: An Analysis of Moldovan Election Campaign Clips,” *East European Politics and Societies* 29, no. 4 (2015): 850-870.

²⁸ Taras Kuzio, “Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions,” *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 365-386.

²⁹ Maya Atwal, “Evaluating *Nashi*’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 5 (2009): 743-758; Julie Hemment, “Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? *Nashi*, Youth Voluntarism, and the Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 56, no. 6 (2009): 36-50; Maya Atwal and Edwin Bacon, “The youth movement *Nashi*: contentious politics, civil society, and party politics,” *East European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2012): 256-266.

³⁰ Shakuntala Banaji, “The trouble with the civic: a snapshot of young people’s civic and political engagements in twenty-first-century democracies,” *Journal of Youth Studies* 11, no. 5 (2008): 543-560.

³¹ Yaojun Li and David Marsh, “New Forms of Political Participation: Searching for Expert Citizens and Everyday Makers,” *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (2008): 247-272; Jeffrey Scott Juris and Geoffrey Henri Pleyers, “Alter-activism: emerging cultures of participation among young global justice activists,” *Journal of Youth Studies* 12, no. 1 (2009): 57-75.

Judging by their political action, young people in post-communist Europe seem to differ from their predecessors. They seem to engage less in conventional action and to favor a more unconventional political action, such as mass rallies, boycotts and street protests, by using new, unconventional communication channels. In a very narrow span of time, they practically seem to have condensed the Western experience of changing patterns of political action. It is worth noticing that it took rather long time to Western citizens to move from the classical types of political action (voting and party membership) to unconventional participation.³² And this is not specific to post-communist countries. It has been well documented, that people who engage in civic and political activities, in both developed and developing countries, are frequent users of social media. The means by which social media can influence collective actions are providing mobilization information and news not available in other media, facilitating the coordination of demonstrations, allowing users to join political causes, and creating opportunities to exchange opinions with other people.³³

However, the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation, especially that driven by on-line mobilization, should be regarded with caution. On the one hand, the rapid expansion of political activities forces the re-evaluation of the way political participation is defined. In this context, neither nominal, nor deductive analyses seem to help evaluate the modes of participation, pushing toward the extensive use of purely subjective definitions. That is why scholars make efforts to revise and refine conceptual problems, by providing systematic criteria in order to establish valid measures.³⁴ Despite this effort, doubt persists about some forms of participation, especially regarding digitally network participation and its political or non-political character. Defining political participation thus remains a task of pinpointing an elusive target.³⁵ On the other hand, the values, motivations and political resources of young people change in a way that makes clear distinctions less effective. The motivation of protesters in the streets of Chişinău might be related to deep frustration regarding the inertia of the political system and the lagging in adopting more democratic measures. At the same time, young people in

³² Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (London: Sage, 1979); Pippa Norris, Stefaan Walgrave and Peter van Aelst, "Who demonstrates: anti-state rebels, or conventional participants? Or everyone?" *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 2 (2005): 251-275.

³³ Sebastian Valenzuela, "Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behavior: The Roles of Information, Opinion Expression, and Activism," *American Behavioral Scientist* 57, no. 7 (2013): 920-942.

³⁴ Jan van Deth, "A conceptual map of political participation," *Acta Politica* 49, no. 3 (2014): 349-367.

³⁵ Marc Hooghe, "Defining political participation: How to pinpoint an elusive target?," *Acta Politica* 49, no. 3 (2014): 338-341.

Moldova might also experience disaffection with institutions and actors of representative democracy, making them more likely to favor political decision-makers over elected representatives.³⁶ Therefore, they would emphasize decision-making by citizens and thereby display a preference for participation in referendums, public consultations or street protests. Although the mobilization thesis argues that access to digital technologies has the capacity to draw new participants to the social life, especially younger citizens, studies offer mixed results, regarding technologies facilitating reinforcement and mobilization of only particular user groups.³⁷

The move made by young people in Moldova is in contrast with the generally low civic and political engagement, as it was recorded all over Central and Eastern Europe.³⁸ Therefore, their engagement in the contentious politics of “color revolutions” and the means they use to get mobilized mark a serious split between political generations. What we notice today is the gap between values and repertoires of action of different age groups, based on different socializing conditions. This split is visible in political matters, with younger generations rather inclined toward Western democratic procedures and values and older generations, rather inclined toward Soviet nostalgia, which is regarded as the revival of a political system, which was capable of providing consistent social and economic benefits. But the split is also visible in proper terms, meaning that the public visibility and social influence of age groups vary according to the repertoires of action. The more vocal, radical protest manifestations turned young people into a group that counts in politics. Their ability to mobilize through social media channels, by avoiding classical mass-media channels often controlled by the government, compensates their numbers, making them to apparently dominate the public space. Their protest may change the political agenda, or at least focus the public attention on the issues they support, making them visible in the public space in countries from the region.³⁹ But when it comes to the classical forms of political action, especially voting, they are outnumbered. Thus they fail to impose their political views, having to respond to the new political settings generated by elections, by engaging in a new

³⁶ Sergiu Gherghina and Brigitte Geissel, “Linking Democratic Preferences and Political Participation: Evidence from Germany,” *Political Studies* 65, no. 1, (2017 special supplementary issue): 24-42.

³⁷ Florian Hartleb, “Political participation today: a radical shift, but with positive or negative outcome?,” *European View* 16, no. 2 (2017): 303-311.

³⁸ Marc M. Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gabriel Bădescu, Paul E. Sum and Eric M. Uslaner, “Civil Society and Democratic Values in Romania and Moldova,” *East European Politics and Societies* 18, no. 2 (2004): 316-341.

³⁹ Toma Burean and Gabriel Bădescu, “Voices of discontent: Student protest participation in Romania,” *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 47, nos. 3-4 (2014): 385-397.

succession of protests.⁴⁰ This is the apparent mechanism we emphasize here, a deep contradiction between political outcomes of different action strategies, embraced by people from different generations. Finally, this might explain the frustration and disappointment of young people in Moldova, who are reluctant to vote, but who are still politically active on the unconventional realm of politics. With no significant electoral victory, their protests only add to Moldova's political and social instability, since the protests of young people have no force to permanently lead the country towards the West.

It is not implied that all young people are Western oriented, as they bear completely distinct values from their predecessors. As shown in the data analysis below, the difference between age groups differs in respect to the political issue described by the items from the questionnaires. The difference is bigger when it comes to critically assess the performance and prestige of the former type of communist rule than it is when the political activism is measured. The same applies to the comparison of the sources of political information, with young people using the internet for getting informed about politics and older generations using rather newspapers and television as the main political information source. Knowing this, it is not surprising to notice that there are large shares of conservative oriented and Soviet nostalgic young people in Moldova, and that there are many young people getting mobilized in support of the Communist candidates.

However, the evolution of Moldova's situation seems to confirm the mechanism of differentiation between young people and other categories, especially taking into account their propensity for unconventional forms of political participation and the new style of political mobilization. Whereas young people do not vote in large shares and do not participate in voluntary associations,⁴¹ including political parties, they engage in politics in the form of street protests. By their political action, they even managed to turn down the results of the elections held on the 5th of April 2009, won by the Communist Party (Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova – PCRM) and to force new elections on the 29th of July the same year. Their protest from the 6th and 7th of April, directed against the PCRM's victory with almost 50% of the casted votes, is similar with other anti-system demonstrations in the region and often called a "Twitter revolution", due to large mobilization through SMS sent by cellphones and through social-media channels,⁴² in order to avoid state-owned mass media controlled by PCRM. What PCRM has initially expected, namely another comfortable electoral victory following the previous 2001 and 2005 elections,⁴³

⁴⁰ Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse, "The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 4 (2016): 556-687.

⁴¹ Bădescu, Sum and Eric M. Uslaner, "Civil Society and Democratic Values."

⁴² Danero Iglesias, "An Ad Hoc Nation," 854.

⁴³ Luke March, "Power and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union: The Communist Parties of Moldova and Russia," *Party Politics* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341-365; Luke March and

which transformed their shares of votes into a solid majority of parliamentary mandates, turned into a political defeat when confronted with thousands of young people gathered in the central square of the capital Chișinău to protest against the alleged electoral fraud.

In 2009, it was not only the parliamentary majority necessary to support the government at stake, but a special majority required to elect the president, namely three fifths of the deputies, 61 of the 101 parliamentary seats. Since PCRM won only 60 seats, it failed to automatically appoint its own candidate. However, the emotion triggered by the protest that took place following the elections led to a long period of uncertainty, failed presidential elections, snap parliamentary elections, unstable parliamentary majorities, three successive interim presidents from 2009 to 2012, and to the election of a non-affiliated president between 2012 and 2016. When the popular election of the president was put in place in October 2016, PCRM candidate Igor Dodon won the second round of the elections with more than 52% against Maia Sandu, the candidate of the Alliance for European Integration (Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană – AIE), a broad alliance of parties opposing to PCRM.

The electoral strength of the Socialist Party, the PCRM successor, was decisive, and the foreign policy of Moldova shifted once again, with a renewed interest for close collaboration with the Russian Federation, adding a new switch to Moldova's indefinite balance between East and West. The success of the PCRM candidate was due, among other factors, to a mobilization of young people, grouped under the umbrella of a youth association called the "Young Guard". They were active in many social, cultural and educational projects and worked as a youth branch of the party. Following the 2016 presidential elections, the political landscape has fragmented, with the governing Democrat Party (Partidul Democrat din Moldova – PDM) distancing itself from its previous allies from the AIE and forming in 2108, with the help of several former PCRM MPs, the biggest party group in parliament. Following the February 2019 parliamentary elections, PDM won a third of the parliamentary mandates and started negotiations for a new governing coalition.

Methods and Data

Are young people really different from older generations? Do they differ by their shared values, or by the repertoires of political action? How do they assess the Soviet past? In the context of the 6th and 7th April 2009 protests, how did they get mobilized and how do they evaluate the political crisis? A valuable series of surveys (Public Opinion Barometers – POB) conducted in Moldova at the request of the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) will be used for this purpose.

Graeme P. Herd, "Moldova Between Europe and Russia: Inoculating Against the Colored Contagion?," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 22, no. 4 (2006): 349-379.

It is not easy to evaluate all those research items in a comprehensive manner, but in this case, all those aspects have been gathered in two separate surveys, which measure their evolution in time. The first survey was conducted in November 2009 by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys from Chişinău, using a representative sample for the electoral population of 1118 respondents.⁴⁴ The second survey was conducted in October 2016, before the presidential elections, by the Center for Social Investigations and Marketing CBS-AXA, on a representative sample for the electoral population in Moldova counting 1109 respondents.⁴⁵

Generational Differences and Regime Support

The alternatives to democracy underlined by Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer⁴⁶ are a strong leader, who does not bother too much with political parties and elections, the rule of the military, and a technocratic regime, formed by specialists who decide about public issues.⁴⁷ Although the support for the last option, namely the technocratic government, may cover the public need for efficiency and the sincere hope for fairness, it is a non-democratic alternative still, because it avoids confronting with citizens' opinions and preferences. As mentioned above, those alternatives form the counter-definition of democracy, imagined as a competitive regime. All those alternatives are not only plausible, but already experienced in various degrees and forms by citizens from post-communist societies. Those non-democratic alternatives have been used by the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) in the early 1990s,⁴⁸ and replicated in numerous other surveys conducted in various countries from East Central Europe.⁴⁹

Another alternative is plausible in Moldova, which has not been mentioned by NDB, namely the revival of the Soviet Union. This alternative is possible under the political configuration of the current Russia-Belarus-

⁴⁴ Institutul de Politici Publice Chişinău, Barometrul Opiniei Publice – noiembrie 2009, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://ipp.md/old/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=450>.

⁴⁵ Institutul de Politici Publice Chişinău, Barometrul Opiniei Publice – octombrie 2016, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://ipp.md/old/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=804>.

⁴⁶ Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 4 (1996): 553-581.

⁴⁹ Neil Munro, "Russia's Persistent Communist Legacy: Nostalgia, Reaction, and Reactionary Expectations," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 22, no. 4 (2006): 289-313; Piret Ehin, "Political support in the Baltic states," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 38, no. 1 (2007): 1-20; Dragoş Dragoman, "The origins of political support for democratic governance in post-communist Romania. Testing the social capital hypothesis," *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* XII, no. 4 (2012): 637-656.

Kazakhstan Union or in another format. It is meant here, that the return to a revived Soviet Union and a socialist state is by far more plausible in Moldova than it is in other post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. As already mentioned, Soviet nostalgia mainly relates to the social benefits and the economic conditions provided by the regime, ranging from specific housing conditions, food supply, and the medical assistance to the educational system, the pension system or the job availability, by including more general conditions as public order or living standards. Therefore, many Moldovan citizens regret the breakdown of the past Soviet regime. They support the return to the previous regime and to state socialism and, if given the chance, even cast a vote in a referendum for the inclusion of Moldova in a revived Soviet Union (see Table 1).

The revival of the former Soviet Union, seen as a non-democratic alternative, is supported by citizens in accordance to political attitudes, economic influences and human capital. Unsurprisingly, Moldovan citizens willing to return to the previous Soviet-style regime are especially those who really experienced this political regime. In this respect, supporting the non-democratic alternative is very much a remembrance of “good old days”. The consistency of the support in time, when we compare the 2009 and the 2016 surveys, is also remarkable. The regret for the breakdown of the Soviet Union is constant, as is the willingness to cast a vote in a referendum for including Moldova into a revived Soviet Union.

What seems to count is not only the generational differences, which are not a surprise,⁵⁰ but their transposition into political preferences and forms of political action. Alongside Soviet nostalgia, another political attitude is the expectation for Moldova's position in the international arena, with the competing prospects for either EU integration, or the membership in a political union lead by Russia. Those external choices turn into political preferences, with Soviet nostalgic people voting with PCRM and the supporters of the EU integration voting mainly with AIE.

As mentioned above, Soviet nostalgia is strengthened by the current social and economic situation, marked by deprivation and uncertainty. Therefore, the subjective evaluation of the current household situation, as well as the estimation for future living standards could influence the support for this alternative. Finally, human capital is important in shaping attitudes toward political regimes since it could be seen as resources people can use in the social environment, resources that can be exchanged for economic resources. Education, gender, age and ethnicity are important for the way people conceive and relate to political regimes. This set of factors is tested for evaluating the

⁵⁰ Richard Rose and Ellen Carnaghan, “Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11, no. 1 (1995): 28-56.

support for the return of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 2009 and 2016 surveys (see Table 2).

The revival of the former Soviet Union, as plausible non-democratic attitude, is supported by citizens with clear political attitudes, those who observe how things in Moldova head in a wrong direction and those who vote with PCRM. Regarding their economic evaluations and their resources, they are not the winners of the post-communist transition. On the contrary, those who would like to see the Soviet Union back again are exactly those people who experienced the difficulties of transition and are the least satisfied with their living standards (see Table 2). They are the least fitted to win the social competition, because they lack personal resources that could be exchanged, namely they are undereducated, older people and less integrated into the national framework, being part of ethnic minority groups. It is worth mentioning that Moldova still experiences a more complex transition than other former communist countries, since nationhood and state-building have been added as new challenges to the more classical political and economic transition, encompassing democratic institutional design and free market regulations.⁵¹ Moreover, Moldova still has to define nationhood by solving the difficult issue of ethnic identification with ethnic Romanians and the existence of a separate Moldovan nation, in a context marked by the secessionist de-facto state of Transnistria, which works forging a separate identity.⁵² Those who desire the revival of the Soviet Union and state socialism are therefore those who least benefitted from Moldova's independence, national identity building and market oriented economy.

Political Preferences and Political Action

With generational differences in evaluating the current democracy and the past communist regime, it is not surprising to see that political evaluations are expressed by different forms of political action and by different political preferences. Young people, defined by the sampling stratification of both surveys as people aged 18-29 years old, are still interested in politics, with no significant differences between youngsters and the elderly. What differs a lot are the communication channels that make the political information available.

⁵¹ Taras Kuzio, "Transition in post-communist states: triple or quadruple," *Politics* 21, no. 3 (2001): 168-177.

⁵² Vladimir Solonari, "Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova," *East European Politics and Societies* 16, no. 2 (2002): 414-445; Magdalena Dembinska and Julien Danero Iglesias, "The Making of an Empty Moldovan Category within a Multiethnic Transnistrian Nation," *East European Politics and Societies* 27, no. 3 (2013): 413-428.

Whereas in 2009 television was the most important source of information for almost everybody, the expansion of internet in Moldova made young people largely rely on it when it comes to inform themselves about politics. This is not surprising, since the internet has become the main source of information for any given aspect of life, including social and political matters. In 2009, according to the first survey used in this paper, 22% of young people declared the internet as the most important source of information, compared with very few older people relying on internet for getting informed. In 2016, according to the other survey we use here, almost 50% of young people indicated the internet as the most important source. Using the serial data collected by the Public Opinion Barometers (two surveys every year), it is to be noticed that the daily use of internet, for all age groups combined, increased from 24% (POB – May 2010) to 50% (POB – April 2016). At the same time, television remained the most important information source that ordinary people, all age groups combined, rely on. Accessing TV for political information displays a maximum of 91% during the electoral campaign in 2009 (POB – March 2009) and a minimum of 78% before the electoral campaign in 2016 (POB – November 2016). However, the importance assigned to this information channel changed dramatically for young people, who dropped TV as the main information channel (66.9%, POB – November 2009, to 36.1%, POB – October 2016). Young people turned to internet instead not only to get connected, but to get informed as well, as shown in the Table 3.

The internet use is strongly related to the age of users, in part because of their ability to use new devices and to connect them to the internet. This technical and cultural aspect also translates into a differentiation in content access and, finally, into political preferences. When asked in November 2009 about the political neutrality of the state-run Radio and TV broadcasting company, only 28% of young people agreed with it, compared with 40% of people aged 60 years old or more. At the same time, 35% of the young people questioned indicated that PCRM benefited of preferential news exposure, compared with only 7% of people aged 60 years old or more. The same difference can be stated when it comes to assess political parties' access to Moldova 1, the main state TV channel. Almost 27% of young people mentioned that the access was strictly permitted only for PCRM, with only 8.5% of people aged 60 years old or more agreeing with the statement.

The exposure to different informational content by the use of different information channels, therefore getting access to unrestricted news and political opinions, only increased young people's feelings that elections, in general, are not at all free and fair. In fact, 55% of young people questioned in November 2009 agreed with this, compared with only 28% of people aged 60 years old or more. This might explain why young people contested in the streets the elections held in early April 2009 and why they mobilized to protest by means

of new media, which were not supervised by any government agency. As in other contentious movements in the region, social media and various internet sites at least favored the activation and facilitated the role of already constituted social networks during effective mobilization, by diffusing information and framing protest claims.⁵³ In this respect, the protest mobilization in Moldova can easily be labelled as a “Twitter revolution”, due to the large scale use of social media in covering the events and helping mobilizing young people.⁵⁴ Not surprisingly, young people and older people point towards different political forces in charge of the political turmoil triggered by mass protests in April 2009, with almost 40% of young people blaming PCRM and almost 28% of people aged 60 years old or more blaming AIE in response.

However, the succession of several ad-interim presidents, as well as the election of a non-affiliated president between 2012 and 2016, somewhat eroded the differences between age groups regarding the evaluation of free and fair elections. In 2016, a share of 79.8% of young people and 73.2% of people aged 60 years old or more labelled Moldovan elections as unfair. The repertoires of political action however have not changed. As already acknowledged, the use of internet among young people may strongly facilitate protest mobilization.⁵⁵ In turn, protest as a new form of political activism is embraced especially by young people. This biased selection of protesters by special internet exposure strengthens the differences in public visibility. Whereas older people express themselves mainly by conventional forms of participation, young people politically engage rather through new forms of political action. Whereas the latter seem to be the first to burn stages in political learning and expression during transition,⁵⁶ the former are still attached to forms of participation that have been prohibited during communist times. This is by no means limited to Moldova, but a common figure in post-communist countries.

Quick on-line protest mobilization of young people tends to collide with more conventional voting and party membership of older people, in a general context marked by low levels of participation.⁵⁷ Protest activism was measured by the 2016 Moldovan survey as an aggregated scale of six distinct activities, namely signing a petition, taking part in legal street rallies and strikes, taking part in illegal street demonstrations and strikes, occupying public buildings or

⁵³ Dan Mercea, “Towards a Conceptualization of Casual Protest Participation: Parsing a Case from the Save Roşia Montană Campaign,” *East European Politics and Societies* 28, no. 2 (2014): 386-410; Olga Onuch, “EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 62, no. 4 (2015): 217-235.

⁵⁴ Danero Iglesias, “An Ad Hoc Nation.”

⁵⁵ Valenzuela, “Unpacking the Use.”

⁵⁶ Samuel H. Barnes, “The Changing political participation of postcommunist citizens,” *International Journal of Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2006): 76-98.

⁵⁷ Jeffrey A. Karp and Caitlin Milazzo, “Democratic Scepticism and Political Participation in Europe,” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 25, no. 1 (2015): 97-110.

factories, blocking streets, and finally, going on a hunger strike. The protest scale is correlated, in the Moldovan survey, to the use of internet sites as main source of information (Pearson $R = .099$, $p < .001$, $N = 1093$). This only confirms why and how young people manage to overpass state-media, very often controlled by the government, by relying on an alternative information channel. Protest could be influenced, therefore, by political preferences, attitudes regarding the personal welfare and by rather structural, heavy factors, as education, gender, residence, ethnicity or age (see Table 4).

As shown in the Table 4, political attitudes are essential in shaping protest activism. Those who protest do not vote with the Communist party and they reject the revival of the former USSR and of state socialism. They are more educated, and mostly live in cities. Since education is generally related to urbanization, when the urban residence predictor is removed from the statistical model, education becomes a salient issue in making a difference between those who protest and those who don't. The findings fit in the broader picture of young activists who protest. This type of activism tends to replace the more classical forms of political action, under the general influence of new communication patterns and specific information exposure.

Conclusion

Young people's sudden outburst in condition of political stress, street protest and overt government contestation may be in contradiction with the electoral legitimacy acquired by political parties through fair or less fair elections. This issue only adds to the political instability in Moldova, where more visible, active and highly vocal young people managed to contest parliamentary elections in April 2009 in order to force the indirect election of a pro-European president (by the parliament), only to be once again defeated at polls in 2016, with the Socialist Party (former PCRM) victorious presidential candidate largely voted by older people. This permanent instability not only undermines clear cut foreign affairs options, but democratic consolidation as well. In fact, regime choice and foreign political orientations are closely related in Moldova. The non-democratic alternative to incipient democracy is by no means a theoretical possibility, but a living political regime, under the form of a revived Soviet Union. The possibility of such a revival is closer to reality today than it was after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, due to Russia's efforts to modernize, and to restore its regional influence and its global status of a super-power.

The return of a Socialist president to power in 2016 highlights the uncertain democratization and the fragile change made by street protests back in 2009. Despite some political advances towards democratic stability and pro-

European commitments, despite stronger political and economic ties with the European Union set up under more favorable circumstances by the pro-European governments, the election of Igor Dodon as president marks a new turn in Moldovan politics. The favorable circumstances generated by street protests have been overturned by solid structural factors. One of these factors is the generational gap. As underlined in this article, the differences in regime support are due to different political options. Different political options are connected with different styles and repertoires of political action. Young people not only display different attitudes, but they get politically mobilized by different agencies. Street protests make their voice heard, but this is not enough. Although mass rallies make young people seem a political force that has to be taken into account, their reluctance to get engaged in more conventional forms of participation is a serious weakness. There is no surprise that they are outnumbered at polls. It is true, their electoral fragility is due to a large series of structural factors pertaining to ageing and migration, yet their lack of involvement in conventional political action is a serious obstacle for democratization. Besides protesting, which is largely contextual and intermittent, young people have to be involved in secondary organizations, which could turn to “schools of democracy”⁵⁸ in the long run. In Moldova, however, participation to voluntary associations is scant.⁵⁹ A stronger civil society would help consolidate democracy, by making young people and other citizens engaged in collective actions that could overpass internal divisions in Moldova. Moreover, a stronger civil society could, on the long run, decisively turn Moldova from appealing non-democratic alternatives. With young people only contextually mobilized in mass rallies, and for short periods of time, democracy in Moldova will continue to remain fragile. Their sudden outburst in street protests will only add to the general instability, keeping Moldova in a permanent state of unconsolidated, partial democracy.

⁵⁸ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁵⁹ Gabriel Bădescu, Paul E. Sum and Eric M. Uslaner, “Civil Society and Democratic Values,” 340.

Annexes

Table 1. Attitudes toward the former Soviet Union: Percentage of responses

Year / age groups	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+	
2009					
Regret the Soviet Union breakdown	25.1	50.5	57.3	60.7	Eta = .221 p < .001 N = 1118
Desire the revival of USSR and of state socialism	22.5	41.9	44.5	52.6	Eta = .137 p < .001 N = 1118
Would vote in favor of a new Soviet Union	25.2	43.0	50.3	56.1	Eta = .143 p < .001 N = 1117
2016					
Regret the Soviet Union breakdown	26.1	56.9	69.8	68.9	Eta = .343 p < .001 N = 1107
Desire the revival of USSR and of state socialism	29.8	45.5	59.5	54.2	Eta = .196 p < .001 N = 1107
Would vote in favor of a new Soviet Union	32.4	48.2	56.4	55.5	Eta = .141 p < .001 N = 1107

Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data.

Table 2. Regression models for the revival of USSR and of state socialism (only standardized coefficients Beta are shown)

	2009	2016
	Beta	Beta
Things in the country head in a wrong direction	.123**	.082*
Votes PCRM	.415***	.336***
Satisfaction with the living standard	-.156***	-.039
Expectation for future living standard	-.065	-.065
Sex (M)	-.036	-.029
Education level	-.188***	-.152***

Ethnicity (Romanian/Moldovan)	-.009	-.092*
Age groups	.070	.091*
R square	.453	.218

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data.

Table 3. Attitudes toward information sources in 2016: Percentage of responses

Age groups	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+	
TV is the main source of information	36.1	59.2	72.7	78.7	Eta = .165 p < .001 N = 1108
Internet is the main source of information	49.6	23.3	13.0	1.2	
Access news from internet news sites	39.7	23.2	10.7	2.8	Eta = .343 p < .001 N = 1108
Access news from social media channels	25.0	12.9	7.9	.8	Eta = .265 p < .001 N = 1107

Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data.

Table 4. Regression models for protest activism in 2016 (only standardized coefficients Beta are shown)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Beta	Beta
Votes PCRM	-.142**	-.136**
Desire the revival of USSR and of state socialism	-.099*	-.144*
Satisfaction with the living standard	-.037	-.037
Expectation for future living standard	-.030	-.027
Sex (M)	.044	.034
Ethnicity (Romanian/Moldovan)	-.002	-.022
Education level	.068	.091*
Age groups	-.021	-.037
Urban residence	.132**	
R square	.075	.059

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data.

Prospects for Free Trade Between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union After the Sanctions

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Abstract

With growing US protectionism and uncertainties in the transatlantic relationship it is time for the EU to consider diversifying its external ties and look for other allies that support the idea of free trade gains and have a common interest in maintaining the international rules-based trading system. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which shares a common neighbourhood and is a crucial supplier of raw materials interested in getting technology transfer represents a natural trading partner of the EU. While there are currently no political (sanctions against Russia) and legal (Belarus is not yet a WTO member) preconditions for starting free trade negotiations, given the high economic significance and positive security implications such a possibility should be considered. This paper undertakes a comprehensive assessment of the potential welfare effects of a possible future EU-EEU FTA based on the Sussex Framework. Such an analysis provides important information on bilateral trade patterns and insights on the economic implications that would be useful once sanctions are removed and bilateral trade relations normalized. The results show that in the long term the aim should be a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement that goes beyond mere removal of trade barriers which could however be a feasible first step.

Keywords: free trade agreements, Eurasian Economic Union, EU, trade indicators, Sussex Framework.

Introduction

Although Europe has been able to rely on the US for the last 70 years nowadays the new Trump administration seems to be drawing back from

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globalization and liberal values making the EU no longer be certain that the US will support the multilateral order. Springford and Odendahl (2017) stress that Trump does not understand international trade, does not like bodies such as the World Trade Organization and, consequently, his administration may undermine the multilateral organizations.¹

On the other hand, the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and anaemic economic growth after it, Brexit in 2016, failure to control irregular migration from the Middle East and North Africa, the situation in Ukraine and the sanction war with Russia, populist parties that want to destroy the EU project have jointly seriously challenged the EU's economic stability and internal unity. In such situation the EU not only did devalue its position as a strategic partner for third countries but even inside the Union more and more people began questioning whether the process of globalization and economic liberalization were delivering benefits to them.

The EU's Eastern Partnership (the ambitious project of the European Neighbourhood Policy), established in 2008 with a view to "create stability, good governance and economic prosperity for its participants has been a 'near-total failure' "² especially for EU-Russian relations. In this regard, Trenin (2014) argues that it was the EU's Eastern Partnership that was at the origin of the Ukraine crisis.³ DeBardeleben (2011) highlights that this initiative was formulated unilaterally by the EU where Russia was an object of the policy rather than co-author of a joint strategy to stabilize the EU's new eastern frontier.⁴ Moreover, Russia was unhappy about being put in the same category as countries clearly having less power and status in the region. It is worth mentioning that both Russia and China found this initiative against their interests and tried to propose alternative projects to shape the countries around them challenging Western models of economic and political integration. One such project is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) led by Russia and established in 2015 that besides Russia encompasses Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the EEU is economically weak especially due to the hard economic situation in Russia. Another regional project in Eurasia is China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) designed to link China to Europe both by land and by sea. The BRI is probably the most

¹ John Springford and Christian Odendahl, "Trump, trade and the EU: Two wrongs don't make a right," CER insight, (February 2017), accessed August 25, 2019, <https://www.cer.eu/insights/trump-trade-and-eu-two-wrongs-dont-make-right>.

² Ian Bond, "The EU, The Eurasian Economic Union and One Belt, One Road: Can they work together," *Centre for European Reform*, (March 2017): 3.

³ Dmitri Trenin, *The Ukraine Crisis and The Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014): 20.

⁴ Joan DeBardeleben, "Revising the EU's European Neighborhood Policy: The Eastern Partnership and Russia," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Roger E. Kanet (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 247.

ambitious and attractive project which pursues to include many countries and delivers investment and development in the region providing economic benefits for its participants. Russia pursues a strategic partnership with China while working together on the 'New Silk Road' project even though their interests are not identical.⁵

Nowadays with growing US protectionism and uncertainties in the transatlantic relationship it is time for the EU to diversify its external ties and look for other allies that share the idea of free trade gains and have a common interest in maintaining the international rules-based trading system. The current EU's Trade and Investment Strategy published in 2015 implicitly lays out a "Pivot to Asia" and in this context the EU has already concluded (with Singapore, Vietnam, Japan) or is negotiating free trade and investment agreements with a number of Asian countries.⁶ However, a missing geographical link in the relations between the EU and Asia is a closer cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.

It should be stressed that regardless of the import-substitution policy that Russia is trying to pursue in order to move away from gas and oil dependence⁷ it has well realized that real economic diversification could only be achieved if supported industries are export-oriented. Thus the EEU is searching for trade partners actively promoting free trade agreements (FTAs). Such FTAs have already been signed with Vietnam and Iran while with Israel, India and Singapore are under negotiation. In this regard, the EU and the EEU may join their efforts for protecting FTAs, globalization and multilateral bodies in order to counterweight the US new administration policy of protectionism. While FTA between the EU and the EEU themselves seems quite unrealistic at the moment due to the EU-Russian tension, it should not be rejected right away. Despite some differences in political systems and values there are shared economic interests for both entities that make finding common approaches worth the effort instead of passively observing as the existing order is replaced by something much more hostile to the EU's values and interests.⁸ The European Commission (2015) also acknowledges that the EU's strategic interest is to achieve closer economic ties with Russia (accordingly the EEU), though that depends on domestic and foreign policy developments which so far give no signs of the necessary changes.⁹

⁵ Bond, *The EU*, 1.

⁶ Cora Jungbluth, "Trump & Brexit - European-Asian Economic Relations under New Conditions", (GED Focus Paper, Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2017): 6.

⁷ Richard Connolly and Philip Hanson, "Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia," The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham house research paper, June 2016): 2.

⁸ Bond, *The EU*, 13.

⁹ European Commission, "Trade for all – towards more responsible trade and investment policy" (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, October, 2015): 34,

The main obstacle for EU-EEU rapprochement is undoubtedly the situation in Ukraine and the sanctions between the EU and Russia. However, we argue that the step-by-step economic cooperation between the two blocs first can mitigate the political confrontation and second may become the platform for deeper collaboration when the crisis in Ukraine is resolved. Thus, in order to develop a vision of the future bilateral relations it would be useful to understand the potential effects of signing an FTA. The present study does not downgrade political factors but refrains from politicization and focuses on the economic issues of possible EU-EEU cooperation. The main aim is to examine the potential effects on the economic welfare of possible trade liberalization between the EEU and EU.

The first part of the article provides a literature review with a twofold purpose – to describe the EEU as a regional integration bloc and to present the bilateral economic relations of the EEU with the EU. The second part exhibits the methodology of analysis which involves calculation of trade indicators based on the Sussex Framework. Finally, the results of the analysis are discussed outlining the prospects of future economic relations between the EU and the EEU.

Literature Review

The literature review consists of two parts. In the first part the EEU is analysed as a new regional project within the post-Soviet space in order to present a common view of this nascent organization. In the second part EEU's foreign economic activities are studied with a particular focus on obstacles and possibilities for EU-EEU cooperation.

Eurasian Economic Union as a Regional Economic Integration Project

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union several attempts have been made to implement a project of regional organization in the post-Soviet space. However, speaking of integration in the post-Soviet era, it is worth highlighting that a great many academics¹⁰ have come to the conclusion that although the

accessed August 25, 2019, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.

¹⁰ Anastassia Obydenkova, "Multi-Level Governance in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Problems and Promises," in *Handbook on Multi-Level Governance*, eds. Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti and Michael Zürn (January 2010): 292-308; Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov,

integration existed on paper, in reality it did not possess any political or economic clout. Even perhaps the most famous organization in the post-Soviet space, that being the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has managed merely to ensure a ‘civilized divorce’.¹¹ The failure can be partly explained by the fact that Russia – as well as other nascent post-Soviet states – after being economically destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, had to focus on solving their own domestic problems rather than to opt for precarious and costly integration projects at that time. Kirkham (2016) argues that stripped of any substantial financial resources these countries saw Western economies as future investors and, therefore, Eurasian integration was not economically prioritised.¹²

Nevertheless, Russia had not totally abandoned the idea of reintegration into post-Soviet space, and as a result, on the basis of previous integration projects, the Eurasian Economic Union was created. The idea of a Eurasian Union with a clear focus on economic matters came from Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan¹³ and, consequently, the project was borrowed by Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, as a “model of a powerful, supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world” and a bridge “between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific Region.”¹⁴ In October 2007 the “Troika” (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) — the three countries that represent the kernel of the regional integration — signed the Agreement on the establishment of a customs union (CU). The Common Customs Tariff went into force in 2010.¹⁵ Thus the CU can be considered as the EEU’s predecessor. Subsequently, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the organization in 2015. However, according to Vinokurov (2017), the EEU is still best viewed as a functioning customs union with a rich additional agenda.¹⁶

Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), accessed August 25, 2019, <http://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61646/>.

¹¹ The term was applied by Putin at a Conference in 2005 during which he stated that unlike the European countries, which worked together for integration in the format of the EU, the CIS was established with the only purpose of ensuring a ‘civilized divorce’ of the Soviet Union.

¹² Ksenia Kirkham, “The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the Russian regional hegemony?,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7, Issue 2 (July 2016): 116.

¹³ The speech was given in March 1994 at Moscow State University.

¹⁴ Putin’s words cited in Golam Mostafa, “The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian policy and its implications,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4, Issue 2, (July 2013): 162.

¹⁵ The evolution of Eurasian integration is described in more detail in the following surveys: Libman and Vinokurov, *Holding-Together Regionalism*; Pablo Podadera Rivera and Anna Garashchuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union: prospective regional integration in the post-Soviet space or just geopolitical project?,” *Eastern Journal of European Studies* 7, Issue 2, (December 2016): 91-110.

¹⁶ Evgeny Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results,” *Russian Journal of Economics* 3, Issue 1 (2017): 69.

The EEU does not seem to have been welcomed by Western countries. For the West the EEU looks like a neo-imperialist project promoted by Russia with a view to reviving its splendour of a Great Empire.¹⁷ Thus, Bond (2017) highlights that the EU has taken a largely negative approach to the EEU which it sees through the prism of Russia's political ambitions.¹⁸ It is worth mentioning that many authors¹⁹ concur in their opinions considering the EEU more as a geopolitical project rather than an economic one. However, Vasileva (2017) highlights that the EEU's institutions lack a political mandate making the EEU a harmless project.²⁰ Kirkham (2016) stresses that Russia has always been treated with suspicion by the West, which proceeded with its institutional development against rather than with Russia and as a result it was excluded de facto from the institutional expansion both from a political-economic (the IMF and the World Bank) and military (NATO's operational activities and border expansion) point of view. In this regard the author strongly believes that Europe left the Russian Federation with no alternative other than a reintegration project with the post-Soviet states.²¹

The EEU nonetheless is the most ambitious²² and the only functioning project with supranational bodies for deep integration in the post-Soviet space.

¹⁷ Lilia Shevtsova, "The Return of Personalized Power," *Journal of Democracy* 20, Issue 2 (April 2009): 61–65; Dmitri Trenin, *Post-Imperium. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (Washington, DC, 2011): 1-194; Andrei Tsygankov, *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honour in international relations* (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Marcel M. Van Herpen, *Putin's wars: The rise of Russia's new imperialism* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, February, 2014): 1-296.

¹⁸ Bond, *The EU*, 8.

¹⁹ Paul Kubicek, "The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed Regionalism?," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, (February 2009): 237-256; Trenin, *Post-Imperium*; Carol R. Savietz, "The Ties That Bind? Russia's Evolving Relations with Its Neighbors," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, no. 45 (2012): 401-412; Andrey Zagorski, "Caught between the Economy and Geopolitics," in *Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia*, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 4-7; Dossym Satpayev, "Kazakhstan: Economic Integration Without Relinquishing Sovereignty," in *The Eurasian Economic Union. Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia*, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 11-14; Arseniy Sivickiy, "Belarus: Muted Integration Euphoria," in *Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia*, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 15-18; Alexandra Vasileva, *Why the European Union Should Talk with the Eurasian Economic Union?* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2017): 1-10; Podadera and Garashchuk "The Eurasian Economic Union."

²⁰ Vasileva, *Why the EU Should Talk*, 4.

²¹ Kirkham, "The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union", 121.

²² Christopher Hartwell, "A Eurasian (Or a Soviet) Union? Consequences of Further Economic Integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Business Horizons* 56, Issue 4, (2013): 411-420; Elena Kuzmina, "Expansion and Free Trade," in *The*

However, the formation of a common identity is the cornerstone on which depends the ultimate success of the regional integration project. Taking into consideration that the members of the EEU might not have lost their Soviet character entirely, these old ties should help to re-establish a Eurasian identity. Nonetheless, researchers argue that the former connections will disappear in time, and the leftover states will become part of either Europe or the Islamic world²³ for the simple reason that increased integration with the EU would be more advantageous than joining Russia to form post-Soviet independent states.²⁴ Moreover, Kirkham (2016) emphasizes that some of these inherited Soviet values have a negative impact on the current political systems of the post-Soviet states, resulting in bureaucratic inflexibility, non-market driven ways of doing business, corruption and monopolisation of strategic industries. She also suggests that the EEU authorities should work diligently for the construction of a common identity by launching cultural projects in order to battle Russo-phobia.²⁵

With regard to the methodology, Dragneva and Wolczuk (2013),²⁶ to cite two examples, have attempted to apply a neo-institutional and neo-functional approach to analysing the financial benefits that the EEU would bring to its member-states. Kirkham (2016) has pioneered in applying the neo-Gramscian approach to analysing the potential for the EEU as a Russian counter-hegemonic initiative that presupposes the analysis of four core elements: the institutional design, the capitalist system, geopolitics and cultural leadership, delivering the results via SWOT-analysis. Nevertheless, the lack of empirical evidence, due to the fact that the EEU is an infant project, seems to be the main shortcoming uncovered in recent research.

Eurasian Economic Union Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 8-10; Zagorski, "Caught between the Economy and Geopolitics."

²³ Abbott Gleason, "Eurasia: What Is It?" *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1, No. 1 (January 2010): 26-32; Aleksey Malashenko, "Zametki o prostranstve, imenuemom postsovetskim, i o tom, chto tam delaet Rossiya," (Notes on the space called post-Soviet and what Russia is doing there). *Druzhba Narodov*, no 9, (2011): 135-152; Andrei Tsygankov, "The Heartland No More: Russia's Weakness and Eurasia's Meltdown," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 3, Issue 1 (January 2012): 1-9.

²⁴ Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Guicci, *Quantitative Assessment of Ukraine's Regional Integration Options: DCFTA with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan* (Mimeo, German Advisory Group, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, November 2011): 1-13, accessed August 25, 2019, https://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/download/Beraterpapiere/2011/PP_05_2011_en.pdf.

²⁵ Kirkham, "The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union," 123.

²⁶ Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, *Eurasian economic integration: Law, policy and politics* (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013), 1-225.

Obstacles and Possibilities for EU-EEU cooperation

Despite being an ambitious regional integration project the EEU is too small to become a self-sufficient market. In this regard Vinokurov (2017) highlights that any attempts to erect an “Eurasian fortress” are suicidal.²⁷ The EEU is actively searching for partners via building up a network of free trade areas (FTAs) with large trade partners. Thus, the EEU has already signed FTAs with Vietnam and Iran, while those with Israel, India and Singapore are under negotiation. Karaganov et al. (2015) argue that cooperation with China is crucial for the EEU which will provide powerful impetus to regional development in Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East.²⁸ In this regard, the EEU and China have signed a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement hand in hand with the involvement of each in China’s new strategic concept — the Silk Road Economic Belt. Although the cooperation between the EU and the EEU is currently obstructed by a profound crisis in EU-Russian relationships, according to Vinokurov and Libman (2012) long-term sustainable development of the EEU is only possible if it relies on close cooperation not only with China but with the EU as well.²⁹ In spite of the fact that simultaneous membership in the EEU and an FTA with the EU is technically impossible due to the fact that member-states of both custom unions cannot have bilateral trade relations with other partners Vasileva (2017) argues that economic cooperation between the EU and the EEU is still possible on a union level and can be achieved by lowering trade barriers, harmonizing standards and creating a common free trade area.³⁰

Although there have been no official talks between the EU and the EEU or any engagement above the level of technical standard harmonization Vasileva (2017) thinks that the EU-EEU dialogue could be a first small step towards solving some more complicated political crises in Europe and contribution to establishing a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.³¹ Bond (2017) points out that European Commission officials do not want to give the EEU legitimacy by dealing with it formally (as Russia would like), so they limit themselves to informal contacts. But within those limitations, there is still some progress, for instance in harmonising EU and EEU standards.³²

²⁷ Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union,” 66.

²⁸ Sergey Karaganov et al., “Toward the Great Ocean: Creating Central Eurasia. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the priorities of the Eurasian states’ joint development,” (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, June 2015): 4-23, accessed August 25, 2019, <http://karaganov.ru/content/images/uploaded/a7a117d7310c6e15bf14bf0f6d2f56ae.pdf>.

²⁹ Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, *Eurasian integration: Challenges of transcontinental regionalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-230.

³⁰ Vasileva, *Why the EU Should Talk*, 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³² Bond, *The EU*, 8.

Vasileva (2017) argues that the Eurasian Economic Union (and the Eurasian Economic Commission in particular) is a suitable channel for dialogue since it is a multilateral economic organization.³³ According to Bond (2017) the fact that the EEU is institutionally limited to the economic sphere and that the BRI is primarily a project for regional cooperation makes it easier to justify practical collaboration. The author also points out that both the EU and China recognize that they cannot work together effectively along the Silk Road without taking some account of Russia and its historical links in the region.³⁴ Moreover the fact that the sanctions between the EU and Russia have not been escalated to the level of the EEU can become some kind of 'bridge' in improving relationships and contributing to economic rapprochement between the two unions. Vinokurov (2018) proposed a possible 'mega-deal' between the EU and the EEU, involving trade agreements, removal of non-tariff barriers, the creation of integrated electricity markets and visa liberalization.³⁵ Nevertheless Bond (2017) argues that it is better to start with more realistic expectations promoting gradual economic rapprochement. With this regard he opines that the EU should work quietly and incrementally with the Eurasian Economic Commission, relevant Chinese agencies and the countries along the routes of the Silk Road Belt with a view to facilitate trade across the whole region, aiming gradually to reduce tariffs and remove non-tariff barriers, and to promote transparency, good governance and the rule of law, initially at least limited to the commercial sphere.³⁶

It is worth mentioning that EEU member-states show a vivid interest in cooperating with the EU. Thus, Kazakhstan signed the Enhanced Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU in December 2015. Armenia signed the specially designed Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. Moldova is a member of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) that recently became an observer to the EEU. Bond (2017) highlights that some EEU member states like Belarus and Kazakhstan prefer bilateral negotiations with the EU. In this regard the author points out that despite all foreseeable difficulties the EU should make the effort to reach out to the members of the EEU and China.³⁷ De Jong (2016) argues that Russia's economic downturn eroded the EEU's attractiveness as a motor for economic integration and growing disillusionment on the part of the individual EEU members about the union should mean that there will be more willingness on their part to pursue a distinctly multi-vector foreign policy that

³³ Vasileva, *Why the EU Should Talk*, 3.

³⁴ Bond, *The EU*, 8.

³⁵ Evgeny Vinokurov, *Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018): 128.

³⁶ Bond, *The EU, the Eurasian Economic Union and One Belt, One Road*, 9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

seeks greater cooperation both with the EU and with China.³⁸ However, we argue that the promotion of bilateral relations with individual members of the EEU without considering the interests of Russia can provoke more conflicts and instability both within the union and in the region obliging countries to decide either to cooperate with the EU or with the EEU. In this regard for economic rapprochement with the EU it would be better to use a multilateral platform via the Eurasian Economic Commission.

It is noteworthy that according to Russia's 2016 foreign policy strategy creation of a common economic space between the EU and the EEU is one of the strategic priorities in the relations with the EU while for the EU the cooperation between two unions is conditional on the implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Nevertheless, the sanctions and the situation in Ukraine probably is the main but far from the only obstacle for rapprochement between the EU and the EEU. First of all, at the beginning the EU has taken a negative approach to the EEU which is seen through the prism of Russia's political ambitions, and in this regard, it would be difficult to get rid of these stereotypes. Second, the blocs have different political regimes and values. And finally, it should not be forgotten that substantial economic asymmetries between both parties exist. Thus, the EU's GDP is almost 5 times higher than EEU's GDP (current US \$, PPP) and EU's GDP per capita exceeds 1.6 times those of the EEU (see Figure 1).

Because of these economic asymmetries, closer cooperation might not bring equal gains for every country and the inflow of more competitive goods from Europe to the EEU market will challenge some industries and lead to their restructuring. According to a study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Stiftung the long-term economic benefits of an EU-EEU FTA would outweigh potential negative transitional costs but economic transition should be effectively managed in order to achieve popular political support for the agreement. The author suggests two potentially complementary approaches to smooth the transition. First, trade barriers should be removed to sectors with comparative advantage while for the rest this should happen subsequently and gradually. Second, programmes providing technical and financial support should be implemented by the participating states including some assistance from the EU for the poorest countries.³⁹ In this regard, this contribution aims to estimate the economic possibilities for the cooperation by using the methodology of Sussex Framework which is described in detail under a later heading.

³⁸ Sijbren De Jong, "The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union Geopolitics, Geo-Economics and Opportunities for Europe," *European Policy Analysis*, no. 11 (September 2016): 9.

³⁹ Christian Bluth, "Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok - A Tool for Peace and Prosperity: The Effects of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the Eurasian Region," Bertelsmann Stiftung, GED Studies, (2016): 13.

Methodology

Various methods are used by economists to analyse effects of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) defined as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners including FTAs and Customs Unions. Some of them are simple and based on trade indicators while others are more complex and include computable general equilibrium (CGE) or partial equilibrium (PE) market simulation models, and econometric analysis. The latter are very useful but have a number of limitations for policymakers. Simulation models require a high level of expertise and are very demanding in terms of data requirements. Cross-country econometric models have been useful in testing hypotheses about causal relationships, including links to policy changes in the past, but do not provide enough structural detail to support analysis of the impact of, for example, a given RTA.⁴⁰ Therefore, we are going to use trade indicators which are very informative and provide for a preliminary ascertainment of the pros and cons of taking part in an RTA, which can be discussed at the initial negotiations.⁴¹

Since RTAs are a second-best solution to universal trade liberalization as they involve the removal of trade barriers between participating countries but discrimination against non-members, their effects on welfare could be ambiguous. This is traditionally analysed through the concepts of *trade creation* and *trade diversion* put forward by J. Viner (1950).⁴² Trade creation arises when more efficiently produced imported goods from new partner countries replace less efficient domestically produced goods which increases welfare. There is trade diversion when sources of supply shift from more efficient non-partner countries to less efficient partner countries which involves a welfare loss. Whether an RTA is net welfare increasing or decreasing depends on the relative strengths of these two effects and requires empirical analysis to identify the outcome. There are a number of “rules of thumb” that help evaluate this net welfare impact:

- the higher are the initial tariffs between the trading partners, the greater is the likelihood of both trade creation and trade diversion;

⁴⁰ David Evans et al., *Assessing Regional Trade Agreements with Developing Countries: Shallow and Deep Integration, Trade, Productivity, and Economic Performance* (CARIS, University of Sussex, Study for DFID, 2007): 2.

⁴¹ Evgeny Vinokurov et al., “EU-EAEU Potential Economic Integration: Methodological Approaches to the Assessment of Economic Impact”, IIASA project “Challenges and opportunities of economic integration within a wider European and Eurasian space” (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2016): 5.

⁴² Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1950): 1-221.

- the greater the number of RTA partners the more likely it is that there will be overlaps with cost differences, and therefore the greater the likelihood of trade creation;
- the wider the difference in comparative advantages between countries and the higher the initial share of trade between them, the more likely the trade agreement will be welfare improving;
- the more similar is the product mix in the partner countries, the more likely it is that there will be trade creation because there is more scope for specialization;
- the higher the percentage of trade with potential partners, the greater the possibility that the RTA will be welfare increasing.⁴³

The “Sussex Framework” developed at the University of Sussex represents an analytical template to identify the central questions in considering the potential benefits of a proposed RTA. Within the Framework a range of diagnostic indicators (grounded in economic theory and related to the rules of thumb) are used to shed light directly and indirectly on the welfare consequences of a given RTA. These indicators focus mostly on elements of shallow integration (shallow, or negative, integration involves the removal of border barriers to trade, typically tariffs and quotas) but also on deep integration (deep, or positive, integration involves policies and institutions that facilitate trade by reducing or eliminating regulatory and behind-the-border impediments to trade). They reflect the current state of knowledge in economics about facilitating economic integration. The value-added from the Framework arises from putting together existing knowledge in a coherent package, identifying and explaining the relevance of particular statistical indicators.⁴⁴ The steps for analysing are as follows:

- interpretation of tariff barriers;
- analysis of export and import dynamics;
- analysis of geographical distribution of trade;
- analysis of sectoral composition of trade;
- analysis of comparative advantages;
- analysis of export similarity;
- analysis of the possibility for deep integration: intra-industry trade.

The indicators used in the analysis process are provided in Table1 (see Annexes). The Framework, the usefulness of the diagnostic indicators and the rules of thumb have been put to empirical validation against more sophisticated

⁴³ Maryla Maliszewska et. al., *Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Georgia*, (Center for Social and Economic Research, Network Reports no. 79, ISBN 978-83-7178-457-6, 2008):31; UNCTAD, “Regional Trading Agreements, Virtual Institute Teaching Material” (NY and Geneva, 2010): 22-23.

⁴⁴ Evans et al., *Assessing Regional Trade Agreements with Developing Countries*, 2.

and resource-intensive analytical methods, notably general equilibrium and partial equilibrium modelling. Overall the Sussex Framework gives very similar predictions of the likely economic effects with the considerable added advantage of working at a much more detailed sectoral and geographical level.⁴⁵

Results

In this contribution the possible welfare impacts of regional trade agreement between the EU and the EEU is analysed. The period is from 2010 (when the Common Customs Tariff went into force between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) till 2017. The analysis is presented under the following headings.

Tariff analysis

As a first step in assessing the possible effects of signing an RTA is looking at the average tariff rates of the parties under analysis. As the first rule of thumb suggests, the higher the initial tariffs, the higher the possible effects on both trade creation and trade diversion after those barriers are removed under the new preferential regime.

Since the Customs Union is at the foundations of the Eurasian economic integration and there is a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) in effect we are going to use data for Russia's MFN applied tariffs as a very close approximation of the tariffs applied by the EEU (they are not yet unified as the CCT does not cover all goods generally due to various obligations of the member states to the WTO).

Russia's accession to the WTO in 2012 has led to several rounds of declining CCT rates.⁴⁶ From Table 2 we can ascertain that by 2018 the MFN tariffs applied by Russia are already low and comparable to the ones applied by the EU. We can therefore infer that a future reduction of tariff barriers under a potential EU-EEU FTA is expected to have limited scope for either trade creation or trade diversion, especially when it comes to non-agricultural products.

It should be added that certain product groups still enjoy high tariff protection within the EEU. Besides agricultural products like meat, beverages and sugars, these are: arms and ammunition (16% equivalent ad valorem tariff), articles of leather (13%), vehicles (12%), furniture (12%) and ceramic products

⁴⁵ UNCTAD, "Regional Trading Agreements," 170.

⁴⁶ Vinokurov, *Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union*, 68.

(11%).⁴⁷ They are going to experience downsizing effects after trade liberalization and some transitional period should be stipulated, especially in the case of the automotive industry.

Export-Import Dynamics and Geographical Distribution

The analysis of parties' export and import is the first step to explore whether the EU and the EEU are "natural" trading partners. Although it is important to capture export-import structures for a longer time so as to discern the natural evolution of trade, in our case the period is limited by the fact the EEU is a young organization. It should not be forgotten that till 2015 the EEU did not exist, however, there was its predecessor - the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The evolution of export-import of EEU's export and import with the EU is shown in Figure 2.

From 2010 till 2013 there was a significant growth both in EEU's import and export to the EU. However, after 2013 there was a sharp decline in bilateral trade due to stagnation and further recession of Russian economy in general, sanctions between the EU and Russia and low oil prices (the largest economies of the EEU – Russia and Kazakhstan – are strongly depended on oil prices). It is worth mentioning that as Russia represents 86% of EEU's GDP, the EEU reflects above all the economic situation in Russia. Nevertheless, in 2018 a significant increase both in export and import (especially export) can be observed.

As for the trade balance, the EEU traditionally exports to the EU much more goods than imports from it and constantly registers a merchandise trade surplus. All in all, it should be recognized that despite the crisis in Russian-EU relations the strong trade interdependence between the two unions continues being very significant. The EU depends on raw materials from Russia and Kazakhstan while EEU member-states are depended on investment and consumer goods from the EU. However, both parties try to diminish this interdependency by diversification of their suppliers.

The openness index is indicative of an outwardly oriented economy. The openness index both for the EEU and the EU is shown in Figure 3. It should be noticed that from the beginning when the Common Customs Tariff went into force the Openness Index was not high especially compared with the EU and stood at 55%. In 2014 there was a strong decline of the Openness Index in the EEU due to economic difficulties within the union. In 2017 the Openness Index stood at 37.5% what is more than two times less than the EU's Index.

⁴⁷ According to data from the International Trade Center, accessed August 25, 2019, www.trademap.org.

The analysis of export-import structures by main trading partners is one of the most important steps of the “Sussex Framework”. Forming an RTA with a partner with which the country currently does little trade suggests there may be limited scope for expansion. The EEU’s partners’ distribution is shown in Figure 4.

Observing Figure 4 it can be said that the EU is the main trade partner for the EEU, even though by 2017 its share decreased by 5 p.p. in import and by 6 p.p. in export comparing with 2010 due to economic difficulties in the EEU (especially in Russia), sanctions and low oil prices. On the other hand, China’s share increased by 5 p.p. both in import and export structures. As for Ukraine, despite the crisis with Russia, the country continues being dependent on EEU’s raw materials even though its share declined by 1 p.p. in EEU’s export structure. However, the import from Ukraine declined significantly and while being the third biggest importer in 2010 it is not among the EEU’s main five import partners anymore. Thus, if the EEU and the EU were integrated the countries on the post-Soviet space would not be obliged to choose between the two unions and would not have to incur economic losses due to the reorientation of trade. Surprisingly, in spite of the political crisis between Russia and the West, the USA’s share in the EEU import increased by 1 p.p.

Based on the Sussex Framework, given the important position and still high though declining weight of the EU both as an import and export partner of the EEU, we can expect that there are opportunities for further expansion of exports in both directions if barriers to trade between the two partners are reduced.

Analysis of sectoral composition of trade

Following the Sussex Framework, it is important to consider the sectoral pattern of trade as it can help identify the sectoral distribution of likely trade creation and trade diversion and also those sectors which are of particular importance to the economies concerned. This has both economic significance and is also important from a political economy perspective.⁴⁸

When analysing the commodity trade structure three years’ averages were chosen to better identify trends in trade and get over short term factors such as economic fluctuations, price volatility, change in stock levels, weather conditions, etc.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ UNCTAD, “Regional Trading Agreements,” 147.

⁴⁹ Paskal Zhelev and Zoya Podoa, “Bulgarian-Russian Bilateral trade relations: Current State and Prospects,” *Evolution of International Trading System: Prospects and Challenges*, St. Petersburg: Skifiya-print (2013):154, accessed August 25, 2019, [http://worldec.ru/content/conference/october%202013/Issue-2013%20\(this%20year\).pdf#page=151](http://worldec.ru/content/conference/october%202013/Issue-2013%20(this%20year).pdf#page=151)

Table 3 allows us to identify the EEU's main sectors and to see how its export structures towards the EU evolve and to compare it with the pattern with the rest of the world. It is evident that the highest importance for the EEU's exports both to the EU and to the world have primary commodities and in particular fuels. In 2015-17 almost 3/4th of EEU's exports to the EU consisted of fuels while the equivalent share to the world was by 16 p.p. lower. Altogether the EEU exports a higher proportion of manufactured goods to the world than to the EU. Throughout the analysed period there is a positive trend of a declining share of primary goods in EEU's exports but this is mainly due to lower world prices of commodities. Generally, the EEU remains highly dependent on the exports of natural resource-intensive goods.

When it comes to imports a reverse picture is observed. The EEU imports mostly manufactured goods from the EU. In 2015-17 their share was almost 90%, around 12 p.p. higher than the correspondent share of manufactured imports from the world. Trade creation and trade diversion are likely to be concentrated in these product areas but given the already low tariff rates for these products the magnitude of the welfare effects is not going to be high.

Analysis of revealed comparative advantages

Traditional trade theory stipulates that gains from trade arise from specialization in products in which countries possess comparative advantages. According to the Sussex Framework the wider the differences in comparative advantages between partner countries the larger the possible gains from a future RTA as it enables the partners to source the products from the most efficient supplier.

In Tables 6 and 7 we have ranked the products with the highest share of EEU's exports to the EU and the EU's exports to the EEU respectively and we have calculated the RCA index to determine whether both partners are exporting products with a comparative advantage in their bilateral trade. We observe the following:

- the EEU and the EU have specialized in entirely different product groups in their trade relations;
- just the top two EEU's products make up the striking 67% of the exports to the EU, while the EU's exports to the EEU is much more diversified as the top 10 products account for 30%;
- except fertilizers all EEU's top export products are in the group of resource-intensive manufactures (petroleum oils and metals) while all leading products exported from the EU to the EEU are mostly technology-intensive (machinery and transportation equipment and chemicals);

- all of the top 10 products exported from the EEU to the EU exhibit comparative advantage on the world market (in five of the cases it is strongly pronounced – $RCA > 4$);
- except for telecommunications equipment (here we might expect trade diversion after a possible RTA) all other leading EU export items to the EEU have comparative advantage though in most cases it is weak ($RCA < 2$).

Based on the above we might expect a welfare-improving impact of a possible EEU-EU RTA. However, as tariffs are already low these effects have already been to a large scale exhausted.

Analysis of export similarity

According to the Sussex Framework an RTA is welfare improving when the potential partner countries have differing comparative advantages but produce similar mix of goods before integration, and as a result of the process of integration they are then able to source the good from a more efficient partner supplier.

We measure the export similarity based on the F-K index, with values of 0 indicating completely different export structures and values of 1 (or 100 if expressed as %) – identical export specialization. The results show that the export similarity between the EEU and the EU is very low albeit increasing from 21.5% in 2010 to 28.5% in 2017. Here we should take into account that given the higher degree of aggregation (3-digit level) the values of the index tend to be overrated in comparison with calculation at a more disaggregated level. The lowest is the export similarity with the EU of Kazakhstan – just 13.5% in 2017, while the highest resemblance exhibits Belarus – it has over 40% overlap with the export profile of the EU.

The low level of export similarity suggests that it is more likely that an FTA between the EEU and the EU will see relatively more trade diversion than trade creation as there is limited scope for further specialization but opportunities for import sources to be shifted.

Analysis of intra-industry trade

So far, we have mostly analysed the possible effects of shallow integration between the EEU and the EU. A key indicator within the Sussex Framework is the Grubel-Lloyd index that measures the intensity of intra-industry trade currently taking place and based on that the existing and the potential for further deep integration.

Given the low export similarity between the EU and the EEU it is no surprise that the bilateral IIT is also very low. In 2010 it was 6.7% and in 2017 has increased to 10.4%. That means that almost 90% of the bilateral trade between the two unions is of inter-industry type, therefore providing little evidence of deep integration and much scope for it under current trade patterns. However, a potential comprehensive RTA that goes beyond free trade and improves the business environment for FDI may strengthen the intra-industry linkages. Increased FDI have the potential to foster faster technology transfer, productivity growth and economic catch-up.

Conclusion

The structure of trade between the EEU and the EU shows a high degree of complementarity as opposed to similarity as the EEU supplies mostly primary commodities while importing manufactured goods from the EU. Thus, the bilateral trade relations are predominantly of inter-industry type and show very little mutual integration into global supply chains. Having in mind the already low tariffs we can conclude that shallow integration effects of a possible EEU-EU RTA will not be significant and trade diversion is going to be more likely than trade creation. This is because around 62% of the EEU's imports are from non-EU countries and their share has been on the upside suggesting that third countries are increasing their competitiveness and a possible RTA might drive import shifting from them, i.e. trade diversion. At the same time the low similarity of the export profiles and different comparative advantages suggest little possibility for trade creation, i.e. shifting local production to more efficient RTA partners. On the other hand, the small overlap of export structures hints that both parties have different offensive and defensive interests that should make trade negotiations of a free trade agreement easier. Notwithstanding this, there still will be some economic restructuring with the automotive sector being the biggest winner in the EU and the biggest loser in the EEU and an adequate mitigating strategy addressing it should be envisioned.

It should be stressed that the current analysis is static and does not include the dynamic effects of RTAs. However, the dynamic effects could be much more important as they bring technological diffusion, pro-competitive gains from higher import competition, economies of scale and learning by doing efficiency gains, increased FDI, positive externalities arising from institutional changes, etc. Therefore, a potential RTA between the EEU and the EU should try to trigger the dynamic effects of regional economic integration and has to involve more than mere tariff elimination. Going beyond shallow integration such an agreement will have to cover reduction of non-tariff barriers, technical regulation, trade in services, freedom of capital movement, competition rules,

protection of intellectual property rights, dispute settlement mechanism, access to public procurement, trans-border infrastructure and environmental issues.

Being geographical neighbours and natural trading partners that have already engaged in a sizeable amount of trade, both the EEU and the EU have a mutual interest in pursuing greater trade cooperation. The EU is interested in having secure supplies at lower prices of raw materials and other inputs and easy access to markets with high potential and size. The EEU is also interested in having better market access and stable demand for its products and in getting investments, technology and knowledge transfers. Third countries like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia which trade intensively both with the EU and the EEU will also gain from free trade agreement between them as they will not have to sacrifice preferential trade relations with one of the unions in order to get such relations with the other. For the global economy such an RTA could mean a resolute opposition to protectionism and support of a multilateral trade system based on rules.

Annexes



Figure 1. EU vs. EEU

Source: elaborated on the basis of data from the WB Development indicators for 2017 and images taken from China Briefing, Dezan Shira & Associates and Copyright & Disclaimer imagen, accessed August 25, 2019, https://media5.picsearch.com/is?MjfTLrxf3B0zLvLvmsiyK_cXqTM69XMKD89rQCZhfjc&height=272.

Table 1. Main Indicators for the Analysis

Indicator	Formula	Interpretation
Openness	$OPENNESS_j = \frac{M_j + X_j}{GDP_j}$ <p>The subscript j represents the country being analyzed, X are exports, M are imports and GDP is the real GDP.</p>	The openness index measures countries' exposure to international trade. A higher openness index is indicative of an outwardly oriented economy.
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index	$RCA_{ij} = \frac{X_{ij} / X_{it}}{X_{wj} / X_{wt}}$ <p>where X_{ij} and X_{wj} are values of country i's and world exports of product j, respectively; X_{it} and X_{wt} are values of country i's total exports and world total exports, respectively.</p>	This index is used for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of products. An RCA greater than 1 will imply that the given country has a comparative advantage.
Finger-Kreinin index of export similarity	$FK_{ij} = 1 - \left[\frac{1}{2} \sum_k (X_{ik} / \sum_k X_{ik}) - (X_{jk} / \sum_k X_{jk}) \right]$ <p>X_{ik} is country i's exports of product k X_{jk} is country j's exports of product k</p>	It tells how similar two partners' export profiles are. It ranges in value from 0 = totally different to 1 = totally similar.
Grubel-Lloyd index	$GL_{ijk} = 1 - \frac{ X_{ijk} - M_{ijk} }{(X_{ijk} + M_{ijk})}$	This index measures the overlap of imports and exports at a given

	X_{ijk} is exports from country i to country j of commodity k , and M corresponds to imports with the same subscript. k is defined at the level of aggregation.	aggregation level. It varies between 0 and 1, and higher values indicate a higher level of intra-industry trade (IIT). If $GL_{ijk} = 0$, there is no IIT, only inter-industry trade. This would mean that the country (group of countries) in consideration either only exports or only imports good k .
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Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sussex Framework.

Table 2. Yearly averages of MFN tariffs applied by the Russian Federation and the EU (%)

		2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2018
Russia	All products	12.4	12.2	8.9	5.2	4.9	4.8
	<i>Agricultural</i>	32.1	36.3	20.8	15.2	13.2	13.8
	<i>Non-agricultural</i>	11	10.7	8.1	4.5	4.3	4.2
EU	All products	3.2	3.2	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.4
	<i>Agricultural</i>	13.8	14.3	18.1	14	13.2	14.2
	<i>Non-agricultural</i>	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6

Source: ITC Market Access Map data.




Figure 2. Dynamics of the EEU's (Customs Union's till 2015) export and import with the EU (billion \$)

Source: Elaborated on the basis of ITC Trade Map data.




Figure 3. Evolution of EU's and EEU's (Customs Union's till 2015) Openness Index (%)

Source: Calculated on the basis of World Bank Data.




Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of EEU's (Customs Union's till 2015) Export and Import (%)

Source: Calculated on the basis on ITC Trade Map data.

Table 3. Structure of EEU's exports to the EU and the world (2010-2017, %)

Product group / Period	2010-2012 av.		2015-2017 av.	
	EU	world	EU	world
Primary commodities	90.3	83.1	86.7	76.7
<i>All food items</i>	0.7	3.2	1.5	6.7
<i>Agricultural raw materials</i>	1.3	1.8	1.5	2.3
<i>Ores and metals</i>	4.9	6.3	6.9	7.5
<i>Fuels</i>	82.3	70.8	74.6	58.3
Manufactured goods	9.7	16.9	13.3	23.3
<i>Chemical products</i>	3.4	5.4	4.2	6.7
<i>Machinery and transport equipment</i>	1.2	3.6	2.8	5.9
<i>Other manufactured goods</i>	5.1	7.9	6.4	10.6

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data.

Table 4. Structure of EEU's imports from the EU and the world (2010-2017, %)

Product group / Period	2010-2012 av.		2015-2017 av.	
	EU	world	EU	World
Primary commodities	12.5	22.8	10.4	21.9
<i>All food items</i>	9.7	12.6	7.6	13.0
<i>Agricultural raw materials</i>	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.0
<i>Ores and metals</i>	0.8	2.2	0.8	2.4
<i>Fuels</i>	1.0	7.0	0.8	5.4
Manufactured goods	87.5	77.2	89.6	78.1
<i>Chemical products</i>	17.9	11.7	22.3	13.7

<i>Machinery and transport equipment</i>	47.2	40.1	43.7	37.0
<i>Other manufactured goods</i>	22.3	25.4	23.6	27.3

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data.

Table 5. Similarity of the export profiles of the EEU and its member states with the EU (2010-2017, %)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
EEU	21.5	22.3	26.8	27.3	26.3	27.0	27.4	28.5
Armenia	16.9	25.2	24.4	18.4	16.6	17.8	17.8	18.1
Belarus	37.0	35.1	35.5	39.9	38.6	37.2	41.0	40.3
Kazakhstan	12.0	12.4	14.1	14.4	14.6	13.9	13.8	13.5
Kyrgyzstan	21.8	27.0	29.0	29.8	30.3	26.4	29.5	27.2
Russia	19.1	19.8	24.6	25.7	24.6	25.0	24.5	26.2

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD 3-digit SITC data

Table 6. Comparative advantages of EEU's products with the highest share in exports to the EU (2015-17 av.)

SITC code	Product description	Share in EEU's exports to the EU (%)	RCA eeu
333	Petroleum oils, oils from bitumin. materials, crude	43.2	5.8
334	Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals > 70 % oil	23.9	4.4
321	Coal, whether or not pulverized, not agglomerated	2.2	2.2
682	Copper	2.1	2.5
667	Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones	1.6	1.3
684	Aluminium	1.3	2.5
562	Fertilizers (other than those of group 272)	1.3	8.0

671	Pig iron & spiegeleisen, sponge iron, powder	1.0	6.7
681	Silver, platinum, other metals of the platinum group	0.9	3.0
672	Ingots, primary forms, of iron or steel; semi-finis.	0.9	9.8

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data.

Table 7. Comparative advantages of EU's products with the highest share in imports into the EEU (2015-17 av.)

SITC code	Product description	Share in EEU's imports from the EU (%)	RCA eu
542	Medicaments (incl. veterinary medicaments)	6.1	2.0
781	Motor vehicles for the transport of persons	6.0	1.6
784	Parts & accessories of vehicles of 722, 781, 782, 783	4.1	1.4
764	Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; & parts, n.e.s.	2.7	0.5
728	Other machinery for particular industries, n.e.s.	2.5	1.2
741	Heating & cooling equipment & parts thereof, n.e.s.	2.0	1.2
553	Perfumery, cosmetics or toilet prepar. (excl. soaps)	1.8	1.6
723	Civil engineering & contractors' plant & equipment	1.7	1.1
743	Pumps (excl. liquid), gas compressors & fans; centr.	1.6	1.4
772	Apparatus for electrical circuits; board, panels	1.6	1.0

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data.

Table 8. Intra-industry trade of the EEU and its member states with the EU (2010-2017, %)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
EEU	6.7	7.1	7.6	6.6	8.0	10.6	9.3	10.4
Armenia	12.6	9.9	10.8	9.1	11.8	14.4	11.5	9.4
Belarus	14.6	11.4	10.0	11.8	12.8	15.6	18.9	16.3
Kazakhstan	1.3	1.5	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.0
Kyrgyzstan	5.8	6.0	4.5	5.0	8.4	8.4	9.1	4.9
Russia	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.6	7.8	9.6	8.8	10.7

Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD 3-digit SITC data.

Understanding Populism in Ecuador. How the Ecuadorian Population Perceives Presidents Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno

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Abstract

This article explores the perception of Ecuadorian population concerning the political style of Presidents Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno and their links to populism, one of the most interesting features of the Ecuadorian political arena. The analysis is based on a survey designed and applied by the authors at a national level. The quantitative data was interpreted using linear multiple regression models, to understand which of the variables analyzed can explain the perception of the interviewees. The results were extrapolated by using a descriptive statistical analysis (means, standard deviation and correlation matrix). The article shows that a difference between Correa and Moreno's styles exists and this difference is clearly perceived by Ecuadorian population. While populist features are strongly identified in Correa's political style, they are less remarked in Moreno's rhetoric and action. This difference marks a discontinuity in the use of populism in the political style of the two presidents.

Keywords: Populism, Rafael Correa, Lenín Moreno, Ecuador.

Background

The Ecuadorian presidential elections of 2017 resulted in the victory of Lenín Moreno, the current president. Moreno, who belongs to the "Alianza PAIS" party - the same party founded by Moreno's predecessor Rafael Correa - was vice-president during the previous term and was supported by the former president during the electoral campaign. Lenín Moreno was presented as the only possible leader who could continue to lead the "Revolución Ciudadana."¹ As a consequence,

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¹ The "Revolución Ciudadana" (citizen revolution) is the name of the political program of Rafael Correa. Fernando Hallo and Rafael Camino, "La campaña electoral del 2017 en el

many politicians speculated on the eventual continuity of the governmental and political style of Rafael Correa during Moreno's presidential term; indeed, partially, the conditions for a post-populism case, according to the definition given by Filc² subsisted. According to the opposition parties, this continuity would have meant a catastrophe for national democracy. Surprisingly, the newly elected president made important changes both in the political system and in the form of government.³ Using as a pretext the very negative economic reality, Moreno made reforms that went in total opposition with Correa's policies and declarations at the end of his term.⁴ Moreover, the small margin by which Moreno won the second round of national elections (51% vs. 49%) and the accusations of electoral fraud made by his direct opponent⁵ created conditions in which the new president could not count on the same popular consent of his predecessor, diluting any post-populist conditions. Likewise, low incomes, caused by the decline in the international oil price, along with a high rate of external debt, forced the new president to operate progressive cuts of the public budget, which generated a diminution in the political support of the members of his own party⁶ and a decline of the public approval rating.⁷ Consequently, the accusations of bad administration and continuous meddling in the political scene made by Correa, motivated Moreno to direct his political action towards changing the legal structure that regulates governmental dynamics. First of all, he called for a constitutional referendum (2018) to derogate the possibility of being reelected indefinitely,⁸ thereby preventing his predecessor from being elected in the future.⁹ Likewise, he proposed reforms which aimed at granting greater

Ecuador. Un análisis desde la perspectiva el marketing sensorial”, in *Economía y Negocios*, (2017), online, <https://doi.org/10.29019/eyn.v8i1.317>.

² Dani Filc, “Post-populism: explaining neoliberal populism through the habitus,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* (2011): 221-238, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2011.575685>.

³ Sebastián Angulo, Moreno: “La mesa servida” obliga a ajustes tributarios, *Expreso*, (2017), online, <https://www.expreso.ec/economia/leninmoreno-economia-ajustes-tributarios-empresas-KN1825518>.

⁴ Redacción El Universo, “A Lenín Moreno le toca pagar ‘consumo’ de una mesa que no estaba ‘servida’,” *El Universo*, July 16, 2017, online.

⁵ The accusations were motivated by the hypothetical control that Correa had on the National Electoral Council. Redacción El Universo, “Guillermo Lasso denuncia fraude electoral ante misión de observadores de la OEA,” *El Universo*, Abril 3, 2017, online.

⁶ Redacción El Periódico, “Seguidores de Correa protagonizan marcha contra el Gobierno de Ecuador,” *El Periódico* (2018), online, <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/internacional/20180411/seguidores-de-correa-protagonizan-marcha-contra-el-gobierno-de-ecuador6749397>.

⁷ According to the pollster CEDATOS, in august 2017, credibility on Lenín Moreno figure presented a 67% value, meanwhile after less than a year the value has declined below the 40%. “Encuestas 2018”, CEDATOS, last modified March 6, 2019, http://www.cedatos.com.ec/detalles_noticia.php?Id=369.

⁸ In 2015 the ex-president Rafael Correa changed Ecuadorian Constitution by allowing the indefinite presidential reelection. According to Carvajal (2015), the procedure followed to amend the Constitution was quite questionable.

⁹ The first version of Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 contemplated only a possibility of reelection for presidents. Rafael Correa modified this principle through a constitutional amendment process in 2015. The referendum of 2018, asked to people to return to the

independence to public institutions (e.g. he proposed to reform the Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social), in order to balance the sharing of power and functions among different branches of the State, and particularly among the president and other state institutions. Moreover, Moreno's less personalistic political style seems to put his style in contraposition with Correa's style. Given that Correa has been presented by many scholars as a populist politician, one might affirm that the current president is adopting a change against this particular political style, and the works of many experts confirm this perception.¹⁰

In order to explore this topic, we propose an investigation in which, through an opinion poll conducted from May - July 2018 by the research support team of Universidad UTE, the scholars' general theory about populism is compared with the perception of the Ecuadorian people. Indeed, the current Ecuadorian research concerning the topic of "populism" is reduced to a theoretical production, based on qualitative methods that, although they are valid and useful, do not complete the analytic view of this phenomenon, in which the perception of the electorate plays an important role. Moreover, given that populism is a particular and multiform phenomenon, characterized by a huge number of elements, this study clarifies the elements which appeared to be more sensitive to the perception of the electorate. This definition could help analysts to consider those elements when making voter forecasts, although only in terms of "tendency".¹¹ Finally, for the purpose of this study, given that populism is a phenomenon which uses tools (rhetoric, image, etc.) that can produce strong effects on people, it was necessary to consider how public opinion considers Moreno, in comparison with his antecessor. This approach would clarify if the discontinuity in populism observed by scholars is also perceived by population at large.

Theories of Populism in Ecuador

Ecuadorian political context is characterized by a presidential form of government and a high level of socio-political and normative instability.¹² Since 1830, Ecuador has had 20 constitutions, about 50 presidents and several military boards;¹³ that is to say that on average every ten years the country approved a new

anterior version of that principle, so preventing Rafael Correa, who was elected three times, to run again for presidential elections.

¹⁰ Manuela Celi Moscoso, "Lenín Moreno: un punto de inflexión para Alianza País?", Nueva Sociedad, (2017): 4-16, <https://nuso.org/articulo/lenin-moreno-un-punto-de-inflexion-para-alianza-pais/>.

¹¹ Manuel Mora, *El poder de la conversación. Elementos para una teoría de la opinión pública* (Buenos Aires: La Cruzija, 2005).

¹² Juan Paz y Miño Cepeda, Ecuador: una democracia inestable (Quito, Haol, 2006), 89-99, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2380207>.

¹³ It occurred during the periods of democratic crisis. Walsh School of Foreign Service: Center for Latinamerican Studies. (2009). Political Database of the Americas, República del Ecuador. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University.

constitution and every three years voted for a new president. There is no doubt that this constitutes a particular political idiosyncrasy, which remarkably conditions and explains the current and, potentially, the future political situation of this Latin-American country.

One of the main researchers of the Ecuadorian political scene, Carlos de la Torre¹⁴ states that one of the elements that historically influenced the instability of the country is populism, which still negatively affects the Ecuadorian democratic process; for this reason we are investigating if in Ecuador, according to Ecuadorian perception, we are at the front of a continuity or discontinuity in terms of populism.

As a matter of fact, from the point of view of a liberal democracy, populism constitutes a disruptive factor: if we accept the idea argued by Sartori¹⁵ that liberal democracy is better than the other imaginable versions of democracy because of its unique political form able to grant the political rights of minorities, we should deduce that populism cannot be conciliated with such a system. As a matter of fact, the pretention of this “political style”¹⁶ is to embrace the majority of the electorate in a unique majoritarian subject: the “people”,¹⁷ and to exclude minority, that is to say the “anti-people”,¹⁸ from political action. Minority, which frequently takes the name of “elite” or “oligarchy”, is accused of corrupting the political system and to be the cause of a contextual degradation, according to a Manichaeian vision of society.¹⁹ Furthermore, considering that one of the most important pillars of democracy is horizontal accountability,²⁰ the typical political personalism used in the populist experience hugely reduces this practice. Indeed, populism changes liberal democratic process in a continuous “plebiscitary acclamation”,²¹ whereby

¹⁴ Carlos de la Torre, *La seducción velazquista* (Quito: FLACSO, 1993).

¹⁵ Giovanni Sartori, *¿Qué es la democracia?* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993).

¹⁶ Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,” *Comparative Politics* (2001): 1-22.

¹⁷ That is to say a political, massive, undetermined and majoritarian group belonging to the electoral body. Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” *Political Studies* (1999): 2-16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184>.

¹⁸ Luís Zanatta, “¿Populismos de izquierda? El caso de América Latina,” *Dialogos* (2018): 74-91, <https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/dialogos/article/view/34768/34437>.

¹⁹ Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and the politics of the extraordinary in Latin America,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* (2016): 121-139, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1150137>.

²⁰ Manuel Sánchez de Dios, “Nueva perspectiva de la responsabilidad política: la ‘teoría de la agencia’,” *Revista de las Cortes Generales* (2006): 139-181, <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/docs/862-2014-10-10-Cortes%20Generales-2006.pdf>.

²¹ Carlos de la Torre, “Populismo radical y democracias en los Andes,” *Journal of Democracy en Español* (2014): 24-37, <https://www.flacsoandes.edu.ec/agora/populismo-radical-y-democracia-en-los-andes>.

taking the form of a “delegative democracy”,²² which would consist of the claim, of populist leaders, to justify their actions by using popular consent and by stating that in this way they allow greater participation.²³ Indeed, in the case of weak public institutions, populist leaders take the form of “caudillos”, who are leaders that can act regardless of the law.²⁴

Nevertheless, beyond its relation with democracy, in order to theoretically systematize the topic of populism some considerations have to be added: the variability of this phenomenon maintains the debate about its nature, structure and contents constantly open.²⁵ Moreover, even if political scientists offer no univocal vision about the concept of populism, there is no relevant theory either that can demonstrate its needlessness to understand some political contexts. So, the lack of a generally accepted definition of the concept of “populism” is only a theoretical difficulty, meanwhile its phenomenological analysis responds to the practical need to be able to recognize it when it occurs. This explains the opportuneness of the presented investigation.

It is for this reason that this article proposes a brief description of the theories about populism, focusing particularly on the elements that can typify it.

Gino Germani, a pioneer in the analysis of this phenomenon, explained its genesis in the Argentinean social popular movements during the 1930s and 1940s as a consequence of the changes in the socio-economical structure of this country.²⁶ This is the reason why, initially, populism was considered specifically a social problem. Nevertheless, the popular nature from which this phenomenon took its name was not able to completely explain its essence. This motivated Torcuato di Tella to continue investigating this topic: he concluded that the masses of workers that led the protests in Argentina at that time were actually manipulated by the excluded political elites, in order to obtain power.²⁷ He thus deduced that populism arises from the coincidence between the reformist will of those excluded elites and the consent of “plebs”. Similarly, Laclau²⁸ stated that the socio-historical approach, which was thought to be

²² Guillermo O’ Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* (1998): 112-126, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051>.

²³ Pablo Castaño, “Populism and democracy,” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* (2018): 1-8, <https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.089>.

²⁴ Jorge Carpizo, “Características esenciales del sistema presidencial e influencias para su instauración en América Latina,” *Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado* (2006): 57-91, <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/bmdc/v39n115/v39n115a2.pdf>.

²⁵ Carlos de la Torre and Oscar Mazzoleni, “Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde Conceptualization,” *Populism* (2019): 79-95, <https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02011021>.

²⁶ Gino Germani, *Sociología de la modernización: estudios teóricos, metodológicos y aplicados a América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Paídos, 1969).

²⁷ Germani, *Sociología de la modernización*.

²⁸ Ernesto Laclau, *Política e ideología en la teoría marxista. Capitalismo, fascismo, populismo*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978).

necessary to understand this phenomenon, cannot explain it exhaustively, because populism took place as much in developed as in developing countries. For this reason, the element that can explain it better is not the class struggle (which is typical of social transition periods), but the existence of unsatisfied elites which are able to drag popular groups, by using, as the only ideological element, the need to undermine the political system in power. This theory motivates the following scholars to give populism a political focus.

As Laclau²⁹ argues, for populism to arise distinct popular groups have to identify themselves as a unique subject. This, along with the subjective feature of populism that is its quality of being disruptive, defines its object: the formation of a base, through the aggregation of different popular sets, in order to win elections. This process of homogenization, through which the “people narrative” is built,³⁰ is the consequence of a certain grade of emptiness or ambiguity of populist political content, which is never totally preset and that is typical of populist political programs. This allows politicians to delineate themselves as “empty significant”, who are able to absorb all the unsatisfied demands of the different popular groups to which they are referring. So, from this point of view, populism could be also identified with a strategy to obtain power,³¹ especially, when existing socio-economic conditions allow some figures to try to rise to political power by taking advantage of topics to which the people appear to be more sensitive. Recently, praxis has offered scholars sufficient examples to be able to define a set of features related to populism, although these features are not always entirely present in different experiences.

First of all, populism constitutes a weak ideology³² that is sustained by strong ideological elements. Thus, populism can fit in different political and economic schemes, without losing its essence. Indeed, Gratius and Rivero³³ state that it is inadequate to classify populism according to specific ideological categories (like “right-populism” or “left-populism”), inasmuch as populism is a phenomenon which does not accept the dialectics typical of pluralist systems. In practice, the political antagonism which characterizes it is not ideological but

²⁹ Ernesto Laclau, *La razón populista*, (Londres: Verso, 2005).

³⁰ Francisco Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo y Democracia en América Latina,” *Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies* (2008): 81-93, http://pdfhumanidades.com/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/apuntes/135_panizza%20fisuras%20populismo%20y%20democracia.pdf.

³¹ IPSOS, “The Rise of Populism: A Global Approach,” (2017).

³² Ben Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* (2008): 95-110, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289>.

³³ Susanne Gratius and Ángel Rivero, “Más allá de la izquierda y la derecha: populismo en Europa y América Latina,” *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals* (2017): 35-61, <https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2018.119.2.35>.

social-based, or moral-based³⁴ and it is articulated on the dichotomy “people vs. elite”. As a matter of fact, even if populists frequently wave different ideological flags, in practice they can act according to one ideological scheme or another, so by denying their association to a particular creed.³⁵

Many authors³⁶ recognize the creation of a dichotomy: “popular majority” vs. “oligarchic or elitist minority” (both categories, with extremely labile confines) as the most descriptive feature of populism. Particularly, the majoritarian subject would embody all the positive values of society, whilst the minority is presented as encompassing all the existing social anti-values.³⁷

In this dichotomy an important role is played in designation of a charismatic leader³⁸ who can create a direct link with the “people”.³⁹ In populism this link plays a crucial role, because through this connection the “people” start to accept the leader’s decisions simply because they emanate from his person.⁴⁰ In this way a delegative democracy is produced.

The identification of the “people-leader” allows the leader to set himself as the only person able to interpret the popular will.⁴¹ This creates a circular process of self-legitimation.⁴²

For this reason, the discursive dimension of populism is characterized by a simple metanarrative, able to influence people’s imagination and which

³⁴ Cass Mudde and Cristobal Rovira-Kaltwasser, *Populism in Europe and the Americas. Threat or Corrective for Democracy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

³⁵ Rodrigo Borja, “Democracia y Populismo,” *Nueva Sociedad* (1983): 126-130, <https://nuso.org/articulo/democracia-y-populismo/>.

³⁶ Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* (1996): 3-31, Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” *Political Studies* (1999): 2-16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184>, Anthony Peter Spanakos, “New Wine, Old Bottles, Flamboyant Sommelier: Chávez, Citizenship, and Populism,” *New Political Science* (2008): 521-544, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140802493308>, Cass Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition,” *Blackwell Publishing* (2004): 541-563, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>.

³⁷ Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and Nationalism in Latin America,” *Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture* (2017): 1-16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330731>.

³⁸ Carlos de la Torre, “The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms,” *Social Research* (1992): 385-414, Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” *Political Studies* (1999): 2-16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184>.

³⁹ Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* (1996): 3-31, Francisco Panizza, *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (Londres: Verso, 2005).

⁴⁰ Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo.”

⁴¹ Carlos de la Torre, “Populism and the politics of the extraordinary in Latin America,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* (2016): 121-139, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1150137>.

⁴² Spanakos, “New Wine, Old Bottles.”

contains the following narrative patterns: first, the element of a “new beginning” is strongly used⁴³ to represent the “people’s” chance to demolish the existing political context and to create a new or redeemed reality,⁴⁴ which can allow people to overcome hostile situations. Second, the logic of “radical change” is employed during electoral campaigns, as an instrument intended to obtain political power. Third, the idea of an “imminent enemy” (either internal or external to the national context), who embodies the characteristics of the antagonist of the people⁴⁵ is an element used to maintain power, by creating the idea in peoples’ imagination that it is always possible to go back to a “catastrophic past” if a change occurs in the current regime. Fourth, the idea of “revolution” is frequently adopted in Latin American populist experiences with the aim of overcoming critical moments. Indeed, in this case, the revolution idea consists of a process with indefinite durability, whose fulfillment can only be achieved by the figure of the populist leader.⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, in one of his books, Nuñez Sánchez⁴⁷ stated that without the charismatic leadership of Correa, the achievement of the “Revolución Ciudadana” would not have been possible. Moreover, this last element is frequently contextualized in the epical popular imagination, through which the populist metanarrative is strengthened by assuming that logical continuity exists between the populist leader and important historical or religious figures of the past.⁴⁸ Finally, it is interesting to take into consideration the populists’ use of clothing as a symbolic element to convey meaning and to communicate a sense of belonging.⁴⁹

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Margareth Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the two Faces of Democracy,” *Political Studies* (1999): 2-16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184>.

⁴⁵ Camil Ungureanu and Iván Serrano, “El populismo como relato y la crisis de la democracia representativa,” *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals* (2018): 13-33, <https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2018.119.2.13>.

⁴⁶ Panizza, “Fisuras entre Populismo”, Luís Zanatta, “¿Populismos de izquierda? El caso de América Latina,” *Dialogos* (2018): 74-91, <https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/dialogos/article/view/34768/34437>.

⁴⁷ Jorge Nuñez Sánchez, *Ecuador: Revolución Ciudadana y Buen Vivir* (Quito: Yulca Editorial, 2014).

⁴⁸ De la Torre, “Populism and Nationalism in Latin America,”: 1-16, Jenny Alexandra Jiménez and Santiago Patarroyo, “El populismo en contextos democráticos en América Latina: revisión a los significantes vacíos en el discurso de tres líderes populistas, un estudio desde el análisis político del discurso,” *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales* (2018): 255-287, <https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.235.64566>.

⁴⁹ Irina Bajini, “Para una aproximación a la (r) evolución del discurso político latinoamericano desde Fidel Castro hasta Rafael Correa,” *Altre Modernità* (2010): 133-155 <https://doi.org/10.13130/2035-7680/519>, Alejandro Espí, “La dimensión emocional de los movimientos políticos populistas de S.XXI en América Latina y Europa,” *Miguel Hernández Communication Journal* (2019): 101-121, <http://dx.doi.org/10.21134/mhcj.v10i0.277>.

Methodology

The following article is the result of data exploration, made from an opinion survey conducted from May 15, 2018 to July 20, 2018. This investigation was executed in collaboration with researchers of the Universidad UTE (Quito, Ecuador) and Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (Santiago de Compostela, Spain). The study is based on five thematic blocks: 1) political preferences; 2) democracy; 3) populism; 4) state institutions; 5) presidential style. The survey consisted of 161 questions, which were designed to analyze the interviewees' perception of the specified topics. Blocks 3 and 5 used the same questions to first analyze the perception of surveyed about Rafael Correa and then analyze their perception of Lenín Moreno. The importance of this study is determined by the lack of data concerning these topics and by the creation of a new survey instrument, through which it is possible to match the ample theory produced on this theme with data that can confirm its consistency, limit its treatment or direct it to further and new considerations. The considered universe was the total of Ecuadorian electoral body. To determine the sample (n=1068) we used the population projection data for 2018 from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Ecuador*.⁵⁰ A confidence level of 95% was used, and an error range of $\pm 3\%$ was assumed, by the most unfavorable assumption of $p=q$. We used a simple random sample, geographically and population-based stratified. Moreover, to prevent a minimal representation of less inhabited provinces of Ecuador, the sample was allocated in the following way: 50% equally distributed over all the provinces and 50% according to the number of habitants of each of the 24 provinces. To allow a better representation of the sexes and the age-groups,⁵¹ we used a proportional standard.⁵² The questionnaire was administered personally by the pollsters through direct interviews, and the answers were measured through an interval scale from 0 to 10. To define each question, a pilot survey was carried out. Once the data was classified in a matrix all missing data was removed and bivariate and multivariate analyses were done.

To clarify meaning for readers, the following outcome table was created. It contains the list of used variables, their category and codification, and when it was necessary a part of the literary sources used to identify them (the same cited in this article) (Table 1).

⁵⁰ "Proyección por edades Provincias 2010-2020 y nacional", INEC, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/proyecciones-poblacionales/>.

⁵¹ The considered age-groups start from the category "18 to 19" and end with the category "more than 80".

⁵² Javier Portela García, *Técnicas básicas de Muestreo con SAS* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 2007).

The first block named “populist rhetoric”, gathers some variables considered to be fundamental to identify populist actors. Indeed, as it was explained in the previous section, rhetoric is composed of different elements, which all participate in creating the dichotomist vision of populist discourse. Particularly, the variables: “He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, hostile to his person and ideas”, “He mentioned the existence of hostile situations to his person and ideas”, “He mentioned the existence of one national élite hostile to his person and ideas”, and “He mentioned that his government team and he are totally honest, capable and coherent, whilst his opponents are totally dishonest, incapable and incoherent” express the way in which populist politicians strengthen the feeling of identification with the electoral body, through the creation of the image of an indefinite enemy who prevent the populist “hero” from its affirmation.

The variables: “He mentioned to represent majority popular will”, “He mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or elite, that is part of a corrupted power” and “He mentioned that his opponents’ attitudes are misleading and can produce damage to the country” regard the discursive elements, in populist rhetoric, through which the idea of “the people” is created. Finally, the variables: “He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar or Fidel Castro)” and “He mentioned that his ideals are revolutionary”, allow us to analyse the way in which populist leaders try to transmit the message of a logical continuity between his person and important past politicians, in order to self-legitimize themselves.

The second group of variables analyses another facet of populism: personalism. As theory shows, it is very important for populist actors to personally create a strong link with the people, thereby producing a complete identification between the people and their figures. So, the variables: “He based his political campaign on his image”, “He showed himself as the only possible leader of his party”, “He showed himself as captivating”, “He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable”, identify the form by which populists, by concentrating public attention on such links, distract people from the frequent indetermination of their political programs. Moreover, through their strength of image, the before mentioned delegation of power is created.

Then, we chose to use the variables: “Populism is a positive factor in politics” and “You think that Correa/Moreno is a populist”, to define the perception of populism, as a form of contrasting the given answers. Instead, the variable “How do you assess the figure of Correa/Moreno?” is used to understand if the general expressed perception is influenced by the preferences of the interviewed. The variable “You think that during Correa/Moreno’s government political participation has grown” was included in the survey tool with the aim of taking into consideration an element that theory has put in

evidence: the feeling of growing participation of the people during populist governments.

Finally, the variables “You feel identified with Correa/Moreno” were used as dependents, in forthcoming multivariate regression, because the aim of this study is to understand if the preference expressed by the interviewed of each president is influenced by the perceived existence of populist variables.

So, according to the chosen methodology two hypotheses were generated:

H₁: Ecuadorians recognize a difference in political style in the comparison between Correa and Moreno.

H₀: Ecuadorians do not recognize a difference in political style in the comparison between Correa and Moreno.

If H₁ hypothesis were true, it would be important that, in terms of the discontinuity in populism, the outcomes express that the difference between the presidents is based on the perception of the existence of a populist style in Rafael Correa, but not in Lenín Moreno.

Analysis of the Outcomes

In order to observe the degree of correlation among the chosen variables and to test their correct use, two correlation matrixes are presented (one for each of the assessed presidents). For each combination of variables Spearman's coefficient was used (** = $p > 0.05$ o * = $p > 0.01$) and the number of subjects was indicated with which the correlation was checked (Table 2; Table 3).

As it can be observed in the first matrix, there is no correlation in only five combinations of variables: the no correlation between PPR – PFP and CPP – PFP indicates that people do not recognize a relation between, on one hand, the use of clothing and, on the other hand, Correa's populist quality, and the goodness of populism; moreover, the lack of correlation in the combinations VFP – MSA, VFP – CIP and VFP – ULP, shows that people think that the fact of having mentioned the existence of hostile situations, having used the image of his person during political campaign and having shown himself as the unique possible leader of his party, do not influence the general approval that people have of Correa (which can be considered as reasonable). Regarding the matrix related to the figure of Lenín Moreno, a greater number of combinations are not significant. Particularly, sixteen out of seventeen variables (PFP – MHC, PFP – MPP, PFP – MIR, PFP – CIP, PFP – ULP, PFP – PPR, VFP – MEE, VFP – MSA, VFP – MEC, VFP – MMO, VFP – MAE, VFP – MPP, VFP – CIP, VFP – ULP, VFP – PPR, VFP – CPP), which could have influenced the general approval that people have of Moreno present no correlation with this variable. It explains, although only in a preliminary way, that the approval of the current president does not depend on the existence of populist elements in his political

style. To have a clearer idea about the general assessment given to each considered element, a table is presented containing a brief descriptive analysis, with the means and standard deviations of each variable (Table 4).

To start with, considering the used rating scale evaluating the figures of both presidents we can see the existence of an ambiguity factor: as a matter of fact, it can be observed that the average level of identification of the interviewees with Rafael Correa (4,6) is higher than the one expressed about Lenín Moreno (4,0); nonetheless, this data contrasts with the question about the general assessment of their figures, which presents a higher value for Moreno (5,1) than for Correa (3,8). Despite that, based on the observation of each mean value, it can be clearly observed in the variables related to “rhetoric” and “personalism” that people perceive the existence of populist elements in Correa’s political style. Instead, in the case of Moreno a different situation can be observed, inasmuch as the same variables used to assess the current president present lower values.

So, in order to establish definitively if people perceive Correa and Moreno as populists, and to indicate which variables most explain this perception, multiple linear regression models were executed. To validate the models, initially the adjusted determination coefficient (R^2) was checked according to the scale proposed by Rojo (2007),⁵³ and then the existence of collinearity among the variables (Table 6). To fit the model and select the independent variables that can explain it, the technic of manual progressive elimination was used.⁵⁴ To facilitate the analysis, a double comparative table was designed, which contains the coefficients and standard error of each one of the presented models, likewise the level of significance of each variable. The adjusted determination coefficient and the value of the constants⁵⁵ were also presented (Table 5; Table 6).

The table confirms the existence of a model valid and “good” in the case of Rafael Correa, which presents an adjusted R^2 of 0,425: it means that the variables included in this model explain the 42, 5% of the variance of the dependent variable. Then, the variables that most explain the model are the positive appreciation that interviewees have of Rafael Correa, the fact that he shows himself as captivating (DCA) and the feeling that participation has increased during his term (APP). As it can be observed in the Beta values (Table 6), these are the variables that present the major weight on the dependent

⁵³ Scale: (< 0.3 = very bad, 0.3 - 0.4 = bad, 0.4 - 0.5 = regular, 0.5 - 0.85 = good, > 0.85 = suspicious).

⁵⁴ José Manuel Rojo, *Regresión con variable dependiente cualitativa*, (Madrid: Instituto de Economía y Geografía de Madrid, 2007).

⁵⁵ In the Table 6 it is added the value of the standardized coefficient which were used also to compare the variables and, as a consequence, to indicate the relative weight that each one of them has on the dependent variable, likewise the values of the multicollinearity analysis executed.

one. Among all the variables only two: the rhetorical use of the “hostile elite” (MEC) and the use of the personal image (CIP) present an inverse relation with the dependent variable.

Concerning the model related to Lenín Moreno, the adjusted R^2 present a value of 0,285, which means that the selected variables explain only the 28,5% of the dependent variable. So, the model can be considered as “bed”, which is to say that the elements related to populism cannot explain the feeling of identification that the interviewees have with the current president. Nevertheless, by observing the model we can notice that the variables that explain it the most are the positive appreciation that people have of the president (VFP), the fact of being captivating (DCA), the use of clothing to be identifiable (PPR) and the feeling that participation is increasing during his government (APP). This can indicate that, even if an obvious difference exists with his predecessor, Lenín Moreno is still trying to use some populist features to attract people.

It can thus be concluded that the electorate perceives something in common between Moreno and his predecessor (as far as populist style is concerned) but Correa used a stronger populist style than Moreno, according to the analysed perception.

Limitations and Recommendations

These outcomes come from a study that was executed during the very initial period of government of the current Ecuadorian president, Lenín Moreno. The analysis was conducted at this time to analyse the political style of Rafael Correa before the perception of people was influenced by the actions and decisions of the current president. Moreover, the perception of Lenín Moreno can only be considered as partial, because his term will finish in 2021. This is the reason why variables related to the institutions were not used to analyse the perception of the population about populism. Indeed, the institution’s erosion is a process that is fulfilled in the long term, and it would have created a big disparity between Correa and Moreno’s model, due to the difference of time available to observe their action. It is recommendable to repeat the same study at the end of the term of the president Moreno, in order to control if the new results demonstrate significant modifications, compared with the ones presented in this paper.

Conclusions

This study shows that the Ecuadorian electorate confirms the idea that a difference exists in the populist style between Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno. So, we can accept the first hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis. In addition,

it can be noticed that people who identify themselves with Rafael Correa appear sensitive both to rhetoric and personalist elements. Nonetheless, we can also say that even if Correa had, according to the analyzed perception, a stronger populist style, populist elements can still be observed in Moreno's style. So, we can say that in Ecuador, the population at large generally perceives a discontinuity in political style between Correa and Moreno, but not a total forsaking of populism in the current president. It could be interpreted in the sense that president Moreno desires to differentiate himself from his predecessor. Despite this, in order to limit the future use of populist rhetoric and personalism in Ecuadorian political competition, he has to make more efforts due to the appeal that populism has on the Ecuadorian public. Indeed, populism does not only depend on the attitude shown by political actors, but also in political culture, the strength of the state institutions, and finally the form by which the country is governed. In this regard, it is recommendable to undergo further studies that analyze the relationship between populism and the strong presidentialism that characterizes Ecuador, and how the perception of the people can play an important role on their degree of approval.

Table 1. Variables related to populism

Category	Variables	Code	Literary sources
Populist rhetoric	He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, hostile to his person and ideas.	MEE	(de la Torre, 2017; Zanatta, 2018)
	He mentioned the existence of hostile situations to his person and ideas.	MSA	(Gratius & Rivero, 2018; de la Torre, 2017)
	He mentioned the existence of one national élite hostile to his person and ideas.	MEC	(Spanakos, 2008; Stanley, 2008; Weyland, 1996; Panizza, 2005; Zanatta, 2018)
	He mentioned that his government team and he are totally honest, capable and coherent, whilst his opponents are totally dishonest, incapable and incoherent.	MHC	(de la Torre, 2016; Laclau 2005; Stanley, 2008; de la Torre, 1992; Gratius & Rivero, 2018; Mudde, 2004)
	He mentioned to represent majority popular will.	MVM	(de la Torre, 2016; Canovan, 1999; Weyland, 1996; Panizza, 2005)
	He mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or elite, that is part of a corrupted power.	MMO	(de la Torre, 2017; Spanakos, 2008; Panizza, 2009)
	He mentioned that his opponents' attitude are misleading and can	MAE	(Canovan, 1999; de la Torre, 1996)

	<p>produce damage to the country. He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar or Fidel Castro). He mentioned that his ideals are revolutionary.</p>	<p>MPP MIR</p>	<p>(de la Torre, 1992; de la Torre, 2017; Jiménez & Patarroyo, 2018) (Zanatta, 2018; Nuñez-Sánchez, 2014; Panizza,2008)</p>
Personalism	<p>He based his political campaign on his imagine. He showed himself as the only possible leader of his party. He showed himself as captivating. He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable.</p>	<p>CIP ULP DCA PPR</p>	<p>(de la Torre, 2017; Nuñez-Sánchez, 2014) (de la Torre, 2017; Panizza, 2005) (de la Torre, 1992; Canovan, 1999; Spanakos, 2008) (Bajini, 2010; Espí, 2019)</p>
Others	<p>Populism is a positive factor in politics. You think that Correa/Moreno is a populist. How do you asses the figure of Correa/Moreno? You think that during Correa/Moreno’s government political participation has grown. You feel identified with Correa/Moreno</p>	<p>PFP CPP VFP APP IRC/ILM</p>	<p>(Canovan, 1999; Spanakos, 2008; Weyland, 1996; Panizza, 2005; Gratius & Rivero, 2018; de la Torre,2016)</p>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

MMO	,273** 890	,145** 868	,543** 838	,588** 840	,687** 851	,702** 882	,724** 884	1,000 909										
MAE	,230** 912	,115** 872	,572** 845	,593** 842	,690** 851	,679** 889	,710** 889	,766** 881	1,000 926									
MPP	,283** 883	,088** 849	,467** 821	,475** 821	,608** 825	,603** 864	,647** 866	,626** 859	,679** 868	1,000 900								
MIR	,242** 923	,115** 878	,541** 850	,568** 850	,675** 859	,716** 901	,735** 900	,672** 882	,719** 903	,666** 883	1,000 941							
CIP	,148** 957	,079** 922	,475** 865	,499** 860	,577** 867	,519** 911	,541** 915	,541** 897	,550** 905	,515** 885	,596** 918	1,000 978						
ULP	,149** 965	,133** 919	,456** 867	,493** 862	,559** 870	,500** 912	,483** 912	,514** 893	,508** 905	,508** 879	,562** 920	,738** 962	1,000 984					
DCA	,321** 959	,096** 914	,369** 861	,400** 856	,497** 867	,499** 908	,507** 909	,478** 894	,503** 904	,499** 880	,518** 918	,614** 956	,629** 961	1,000 977				
PPR	,156** 967	,023** 914	,395** 861	,410** 855	,501** 868	,440** 911	,450** 912	,401** 887	,420** 901	,476** 878	,506** 919	,598** 956	,645** 964	,560** 958	1,000 989			

APP

MHC	850 *,219*	824 *,034	826 *,399*	843 *,480*	869 *,528*	1,000											
MV M	875 *,287*	840 *,071*	823 *,436*	836 *,457*	845 *,506*	894 *,603*	1,000										
MM O	900 *,232*	861 *,081*	824 *,497*	833 *,519*	840 *,587*	857 *,507*	919 *,582*	1,000									
MAE	861 *,201*	830 *,096*	799 *,489*	803 *,553*	806 *,570*	826 *,463*	863 *,552*	873 *,633*	1,000 0								
MPP	873 *,323*	839 *,016	808 *,462*	812 *,456*	816 *,443*	834 *,353*	864 *,404*	850 *,542*	889 *,536*	1,000 0							
MIR	841 *,303*	807 *,059	779 *,403*	774 *,425*	778 *,432*	802 *,400*	824 *,497*	809 *,471*	824 *,547*	852 *,626*	1,000 0						
CIP	892 *,165*	846 *,049	810 *,345*	816 *,409*	822 *,371*	846 *,298*	870 *,413*	845 *,365*	858 *,394*	837 *,364*	908 *,416*	1,000 0					
ULP	951 *,331*	901 *,052	834 *,318*	840 *,340*	848 *,307*	871 *,241*	889 *,344*	857 *,372*	871 *,357*	835 *,408*	885 *,396*	966 *,572*	1,000 0				
DCA	970 *,336*	915 *,073*	845 *,290*	851 *,328*	858 *,286*	882 *,287*	902 *,299*	866 *,307*	881 *,326*	842 *,316*	900 *,367*	957 *,548*	988 *,557*	1,000 0			

	961	912	840	847	851	874	893	863	873	839	884	943	964	977				
PPR	,321*	,037	,224*	,263*	,198*	,187*	,269*	,300*	,300*	,382*	,386*	,457*	,479*	,460*	1,000			
	953	898	827	834	840	865	886	851	863	832	885	936	954	945				
APP	,431*	,132*	,234*	,257*	,196*	,273*	,338*	,259*	,285*	,331*	,335*	,292*	,357*	,420*	,286*	1,000		
	928	884	815	819	826	846	869	845	857	821	869	918	928	920	917	942		
CPP	,255*	,120*	,265*	,316*	,258*	,254*	,315*	,264*	,281*	,380*	,349*	,414*	,367*	,372*	,356*	,505*	1,000	
	911	878	807	809	816	832	855	828	839	803	845	901	909	904	902	899	924	
VFP	,249*	,067*	-,048	-,002	-,030	,125*	,130*	,037	,012	,044	,085*	,061	,056	,132*	,010	,239*	,021	1,000
	968	944	837	844	849	875	897	853	869	835	888	941	963	955	947	923	905	1035

Source: Author's own compilation.

Table 4. Descriptive analysis of the variables referring to populism in Correa and Moreno's political style.

Categories	Variables	Rafael	Correa	Lenín	Moreno
		μ	σ	μ	Σ
Populist rhetoric	He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, hostile to his person and ideas.	6,5	2,98	4,7	3,09
	He mentioned the existence of hostile situations to his person and ideas.	6,8	2,74	4,8	3,01
	He mentioned the existence of one national élite hostile to his person and ideas.	6,5	2,94	4,7	2,94
	He mentioned that his government team and he are totally honest, capable and coherent, whilst his opponents are totally dishonest, incapable and incoherent.	6,2	3,21	5,0	2,87
	He mentioned to represent majority popular will.	6,3	3,09	5,3	2,72
	He mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or elite, that is part of a corrupted power.	6,2	3,06	4,6	2,74
	He mentioned that his opponents' attitude are misleading and can produce damage to the country.	6,4	2,89	4,8	2,77
	He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar or Fidel Castro)	6,5	2,93	4,2	2,80
He mentioned that his ideals are revolutionary.	6,8	3,01	4,5	2,85	
Personalism	He based his political campaign on his imagine.	6,8	2,89	5,2	2,85
	He showed himself as the only possible leader of his party.	7,2	2,85	4,9	2,81
	He showed himself as captivating.	6,6	3,00	5,1	2,80
	He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable.	7,3	2,92	4,8	3,07
Others	Populism is a positive factor in politics.	4,8	3,18	4,8	3,18
	You think that Correa/Moreno is a populist.	6,3	3,03	4,7	2,69
	How do you asses the figure of Correa/Moreno?	3,8	3,25	5,1	2,64
	You think that during	5,4	3,05	5,0	2,64

Correa/Moreno's government political participation has grown. You feel identified with Correa/Moreno	4,6	3,49	4,0	2,86
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Source: Author's own compilation.

Table 5. Adjusted multiple linear regression models, related to Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno.

Variables	Modelo 1 Rafael Correa	Modelo 2 Lenín Moreno
How do you assess the figure of Correa/Moreno?	0,314*** (0,033)	0,140*** (0,034)
He mentioned the existence of one national élite hostile to his person and ideas.	-0,116* (0,049)	
He mentioned that minority corresponds to an oligarchy or elite, that is part of a corrupted power	0,111* (0,047)	
He mentioned important past politicians (e.g. Simón Bolívar or Fidel Castro)	0,103* (0,046)	0,119** (0,039)
He mentioned the existence of foreigner enemies, hostile to his person and ideas.		0,077* (0,034)
He based his political campaign on his imagine.	-0,122** (0,048)	-0,134*** (0,040)
He showed himself as captivating.	0,187*** (0,046)	0,167*** (0,042)
He used clothing (shirts, hats, ties, etc.) to be identifiable.	0,084* (0,042)	0,191*** (0,037)
You think that during Correa/Moreno's government political participation has grown.	0,376*** (0,037)	0,262*** (0,040)
Constant	-0,088 (0,308)	0,210 (0,294)
Adjusted squared R	0,425	0,285

Significance level 0,001***; 0,05** and 0,1*.

Source: Author's own compilation.

Table 6. Standardized beta coefficients and collinearity analysis of the models referring to Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno

	Model 1: Rafael Correa			Model 2: Lenín Moreno		
	Standardized Beta coefficients	Collinearity Analysis Tolerance Beta		Standardized Beta coefficients	Collinearity Analysis Tolerance Beta	
VFP	0,301	0,774	1,292	0,134	0,927	1,078
MEC	-0,099	0,429	2,329			
MMO	0,098	0,433	2,311			

MPP	0,089	0,475	2,106	0,119	0,667	1,500
CIP	-0,102	0,470	2,126	-0,131	0,643	1,556
DCA	0,162	0,489	2,044	0,162	0,592	1,690
PPR	0,073	0,576	1,736	0,201	0,672	1,487
APP	0,335	0,702	1,424	0,243	0,716	1,396
MEE				0,082	0,743	1,346

Source: Author's own compilation.

Agents Politiques et Discursifs de La Modernité Roumaine. Origines, Hésitations, Malentendus*

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Résumé

La représentation des concepts modernes d'État et de citoyen dans la pensée politique du XIXe siècle exige une analyse de leur construction narrative. Dans le cas roumain, un regard plus détaillé s'impose sur la manière dont les intellectuels roumains qui ont promu les discours de la modernité ont élaboré la réflexion concernant les termes clé de l'institutionnalisation de la démocratie, surtout autour de la Révolution de 1848 et de l'Union de 1859. Les agents politiques de l'époque se retrouvent dans un cadre plus étendu, marqué par les discontinuités philosophiques et politiques qui leurs appartiennent. Une lecture s'impose alors, constituée à partir de la reconstitution des sources intellectuelles qui nourrissent leur pensée et conceptions politiques et qui se reflètent par la suite dans le contour des discours et des récits sur la démocratie, sur la modernité et sur le rôle assumé des nouvelles institutions et dont on retrouve des éléments présents dans la construction ultérieure de la modernité au XXe et XXIe siècles.

Mots-clés: Modernité, Démocratie, Pensée politique roumaine, Récits sur le XIXe siècle.

Introduction

La question de départ de ce texte a été nourrie d'une interrogation sur les débuts de la constitution des réseaux de compétence démocratique dans la modernité roumaine et sud-est européenne, ainsi que sur le constat d'une

* Ce texte développe et amplifie des références du chapitre *Les naissances de la société civile et le narratif politique roumain de la corruption*, in *Réformes, démocratisation et anticorruption en Roumanie et Bulgarie: dix ans d'adhésion à l'Union européenne*, Coord. Alexandra Iancu et Antony Todorov (București: Editura UB, 2018), 135-152.

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présence de plus en plus manifeste dans la littérature contemporaine d'un appel aux analyses qualitatives fondée sur le concept fondateur de « crise ». En partant bien-évidemment du passage obligé de la théorie politique de l'analyse du rapport entre démocratie et crise, les modèles explicatifs actuels suivent une trajectoire marquée par le constat d'un conflit de substance à l'intérieur de la démocratie,¹ ou bien une rechute dans la barbarie,² un abandon des citoyens par un pouvoir politique perdu dans sa propre errance populiste,³ une rupture de plus en plus manifeste entre l'agenda public et l'agenda des élites politiques et économiques avec un fort effet de polarisation globale.⁴ Les élites sont soumises à l'examen ou à la contestation, confrontées à un processus de sélection, de prise de décision et de promotion des politiques publiques qui paraît parfois découplé de l'agenda public. Les régimes politiques sont secoués par des scandales de corruption, des mouvements indépendantistes menacent l'établissement institutionnel : un mélange problématique pour la démocratie et qui exploite un désenchantement palpable des citoyens confrontés aux défis toujours renouvelés de la globalisation, des différences culturelles,⁵ des crises économiques, de la fameuse désindustrialisation,⁶ au profit de l'agenda obscur des leaders populistes. Les démocraties sont « défigurées »,⁷ dévorées par un mal interne dont un grand théoricien de la démocratie comme Tocqueville avait entrevu le potentiel nuisible près de deux cents ans plus tôt.⁸ Dans la littérature récente, on peut retrouver par ailleurs des théories qui veulent démontrer, à partir de ce constat, le caractère obsolète de la démocratie telle que la modernité l'a forgée⁹ et qui analysent la configuration contemporaine sous l'angle d'un abandon démocratique, où bien d'autres thèses qui, au contraire,

¹ Zygmunt Bauman, Carlo Bordoni, *State of Crisis* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 140-141.

² Une analyse extensive de ce phénomène, en Mark Lilla, *The Shipwrecked Mind. On Political Reaction* (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).

³ Tzvetan Todorov, *Les ennemis intimes de la démocratie* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2012), 201-247.

⁴ Pierre Veltz, *La société hyper-industrielle. Le nouveau capitalisme productif* (Paris: Seuil, 2017), 97-100.

⁵ Rainer Forst, *Tolerance in Conflict, Past and Present*, traduction de Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 518-542.

⁶ Le concept de société post-industrielle est de plus en plus contesté : au contraire, dans des théories récentes, on avance l'opposé, la société hyper-industrielle, qui loin de subir une dématérialisation de la production, est en train de la renforcer, tout en expérimentant la délocalisation. Voir, dans ce sens, l'excellent livre de Pierre Veltz, *La société hyper-industrielle*.

⁷ Nadia Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured. Opinion, Truth and the People* (Cambridge, Mass., London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014), 73-79.

⁸ Ceci explique d'ailleurs la multiplication des modèles explicatifs contemporains du concept de crise de la démocratie en faisant appel à l'inspiration tocquevillienne, tels David Runciman, avec son livre *The Confidence Trap, A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁹ Jason Brennan, *Against Democracy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 74-111.

voient dans l'intensification et l'actualisation des procédures démocratiques une possible issue de secours de l'impasse signalée.¹⁰ Il s'agit dans la perspective de la recherche d'une réévaluation des enjeux, des modes, des significations que les démocraties participatives, en Europe et dans le monde, partagent et, *last but not least*, des différentes affiliations conceptuelles possibles. Dans le cas roumain aussi, le besoin de revenir à l'aide des outils méthodologiques les plus récents, sur l'étude des origines de la pensée politique moderne est un parcours nécessaire. Car il s'agit dans ce cas d'un parcours concernant les filiations intellectuelles et doctrinaires en même temps que les discontinuités et mêmes les dérapages contemporains.

La continuité et l'utilité méthodologique de cette approche de plus en plus présente dans l'analyse de la démocratie se dévoile surtout quand l'on se penche sur la question des hésitations multiples de la démocratie après son avènement politique réel, c'est-à-dire grosso-modo après le milieu du XIXe siècle : « les facteurs qui vont faire marcher la démocratie au cours du temps – flexibilité, diversité, adaptabilité – sont les mêmes peuvent mener à sa perte. Ils engendrent des réactions irréflechies, logique de courte durée et myopie historique ».¹¹

Élites et « Spécificité Nationale ». Le Clivage Orient/Occident, au Cœur du Débat sur La Modernité

Dans le cas roumain, plusieurs strates de la narration démocratique se recomposent afin de dresser l'agencement des élites et du système représentatifs qu'elles construisent. Dans l'analyse de l'imaginaire démocratique et de son narratif,¹² la longue durée est indispensable pour pouvoir retracer les clivages qui dominent jusqu'à aujourd'hui la narration roumaine moderne.¹³

« L'échec du libéralisme »¹⁴ ou la difficulté chronique de consolider le système démocratique et du bon gouvernement dans la société roumaine

¹⁰ Nadia Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured*, 73-79.

¹¹ Runciman, *The Confidence trap*, XV, la traduction nous appartient.

¹² J'entends questionner le régime politique roumain moderne à travers ce que l'historien et le politiste Yaron Ezrahi décrit comme des « fictions politiques nécessaires » dans l'avènement de la modernité, en *Imagined democracies. Necessary political fictions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 60-71.

¹³ Pour un panorama compréhensif de cette ligne d'interprétation, voir Cristian Vasile (coord.), « *Ne trebuie oameni !* ». *Elite intelectuale și transformări istorice în România modernă și contemporană* (Târgoviște: Ed. Cetatea de Scaun, 2017).

¹⁴ The « failure of liberalism »: l'expression appartient à Paschalis M. Kitromilides, qui l'utilise pour décrire le développement de la culture politique grecque à la même époque. Kitromilides parle d'une difficulté de distinguer entre public et privé, dans les sens définis par la modernité politique et qui a mené vers « a generalized public hypocrisy about individualism and its values ». Kitromilides décrit aussi « the basis of arguments about

contemporaine pourrait se retrouver, d'une manière discursive, dans les fondements narratifs des deux derniers siècles, qui ont accumulé des strates conflictuelles de culture politique. C'est une dominante de la culture politique du sud-est européen, observe la littérature, et les fondements de cette inhabilité (soit manque de volonté politique) dans la création et la gestion des valeurs de l'état de droit, profondément liées au problème de la corruption, retrouvent leurs racines dans la construction des jeunes nations du sud-est européen.¹⁵

La fragilité de la construction de l'imaginaire démocratique roumain est liée aux modes de lectures proposés pas les acteurs roumains avant et après 1848 et à leur relation avec les milieux politiques et philosophiques français, surtout.¹⁶ Les intellectuels roumains de ces générations se retrouvent devant le double défi d'un renouveau institutionnel qu'ils doivent proposer et d'une construction méthodologique de la projection démocratique elle-même qu'ils ont à parfaire. La modernisation de la Roumanie à l'époque est donc intimement liée à un processus d'importation des idées philosophiques et politiques de la modernité européenne, doublé par un processus d'acculturation. Les acteurs de 1848, confrontés à l'échec du mouvement révolutionnaire en soi, se retrouvent engagés soit dans le processus institutionnel de modernisation produit surtout après l'union de 1859, soit (parfois en même temps) dans un processus de recomposition de l'imaginaire démocratique moderne basé sur l'idée d'Occidentalisation. Le modèle occidental se retrouve vite en collision avec un modèle concurrent qui surgit dans le discours et l'imaginaire politique roumain lié à l'identité nationale en *dépit* de l'influence occidentale.

On se propose de retracer cette ambivalence à travers quelques exemples révélateurs et uniques dans leur genre, puisqu'ils contribuent à la formation d'un certain langage politique plus spécialisé et ils participent en même temps à la création d'un horizon d'attente dans la construction du concept de démocratie/bon gouvernement. Le choix du corpus est aussi motivé par la rareté de ces analyses dans la période dont on discute. Les textes reconstituent une attitude toujours ambiguë des acteurs politiques et culturels des premières générations de la modernité. Dans un siècle du présentisme déclaré et affiché souvent comme un nouveau paradigme,¹⁷ où plus d'un se convertissent à la

rights, privacy, and difference » qui sont restées « anémiques ». (in *Enlightenment and Revolution: the Making of Modern Greece* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013), xii).

¹⁵ Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution*, 13.

¹⁶ J'ai analysé ce sujet dans *Difficiles modernités. Rythmes et régimes conceptuels de la démocratie dans la pensée politique roumaine au XIX^e siècle* (București: Editura Universității din București, 2015).

¹⁷ Cf. John Wyon Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason. European Thought, 1848-1914* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 109-124.

nouvelle religion du progrès¹⁸ et tentent de construire l'avenir à travers la nouvelle histoire, des agents politiques et culturels dans les Pays roumains se replient, tantôt dans une démarche assumée, tantôt en vertu d'une certaine naïveté intellectuelle, vers la revendication d'une collection de repères plus ou moins imaginés. Ces repères se revendiquent d'une tradition autochtone constituée souvent *ad-hoc* légitimée par les fondements plus solides des gestes et idées politiques européennes. Ceci n'est bien évidemment pas unique dans la région, mais la démarche en question incarne dans un même moule l'ambivalence générale du XIXe siècle.¹⁹

Afin d'illustrer cette hypothèse, le texte ci-présent va évoquer deux exemples tirés de la littérature politique des deux premières générations de la modernité roumaine, à partir de quelques observations d'ordre général.

Une première observation vise le caractère hétéroclite de l'adoption du paradigme philosophique et politique occidental, qui embarque le discours roumain de l'époque dans une cohabitation difficile car simultanée de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Régime. Le premier exemple ci-dessous va suivre de près ce phénomène de balayage philosophique atemporel dans un siècle de l'immédiateté.

Une deuxième remarque concerne la manière de lire la politique à travers l'histoire, et non pas à travers le politique lui-même, ce qui engendre, dans une lecture aronienne,²⁰ une confusion non pas seulement terminologique, mais aussi conceptuelle et méthodologique. Le second exemple évoqué, ainsi que la brève discussion intermédiaire concernant le moment 1848 se proposent d'illustrer cette incongruence que l'on interprète aussi comme source possible de la fragilité constitutive de la narration politique roumaine moderne : voir la fondation de l'imaginaire démocratique sur l'instrumentalisation du passé et de l'histoire dans une éternelle « crise de croissance ».²¹ Le transfert et les acquisitions conceptuelles de l'époque donnent – c'est ce qu'on se propose de montrer – à la construction de la modernité politique roumaine un caractère prolix tout en sachant que de toute façon, la « démocratie des modernes est un phénomène tout sauf simple » et rattache, dans des négociations complexes « séparément et indissolublement, de politique, de droit et d'histoire ».²² Tout le débat réside alors dans la capacité des acteurs d'apprendre les techniques du réglage fin entre ces trois piliers fondamentaux de la démocratie moderne.

¹⁸ Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers. The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe, From the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 252.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 261.

²⁰ J'utilise la référence classique à Raymond Aron et à ses équivoques du mot « politique », cf. Raymond Aron, *Démocratie et totalitarisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), 23-37.

²¹ Syntagme employé par Marcel Gauchet pour décrire les aléas de la démocratie moderne, en *L'avènement de la démocratie. La révolution moderne* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 21.

²² *Ibid.*, 21.

Une nouvelle « forme et poids »²³ du monde politique

« Malgré les apparences, ce ne sont pas les *attitudes* qui comptent en politique, mais la forme et le poids du *monde* auxquels ces attitudes ont pour fonction de réagir »,²⁴ remarque dans son dernier livre l'anthropologue et le politiste Bruno Latour, où il parle de la capacité de la politique moderne de sortir des cadres immatériels pour se plonger dans la relation avec le monde simultanément avec l'action inverse d'abstractisation progressive de ses outils institutionnels. En d'autres mots, la politique moderne opère avec des outils immatériels pour dompter, organiser, rationaliser le monde palpable: sol, territoire, nature etc. Elle devient en principe plus adaptable et plus modelable, ce qui rend cette même politique plus visible dans la sphère publique. Elle se retrouve de nos jours dans une impasse, car les performances des institutions seraient en connexion directe avec cette capacité de saisir le monde tout autour. Cette négociation récurrente serait le signe d'un passage, d'une transformation. C'est ce qui se passe aussi dans la pensée politique sud-est européenne au début du XIXe siècle.

La pensée roumaine de l'époque subit les mêmes processus de construction-transition. Dans un texte daté le 6 juin 1824, *Compte rendu relatif à la garantie requise par le Grand Vizir pour la sûreté des soldats et des commerçants turcs de Moldavie*, l'un des premiers agents (auteurs) répertoriés²⁵ au début du XIXe siècle, Ionică Tăutul, dresse le tableau souhaité de l'ensemble institutionnel destiné à organiser, à rationaliser le monde:

« 1. Les règlements politiques, qui sont faits en rapport avec le bien public (*lois politiques*); 2. Les règlements qui ordonnent les droits et la conduite des particuliers entre eux (*lois civiles*); 3. Les lois pénales, qui doivent juger et punir non seulement le voleur et le criminel, mais aussi l'opresseur et toutes sortes de hors-la-loi, comme on le fait ailleurs. Donc, non seulement ces lois doivent être conçues dans la langue du pays, mais il faut poser aussi les règlements fondateurs (*lois fondamentales*), qui comprennent le corps et l'âme du pays, la forme de gouvernement, la manière dont le pouvoir public travaille, comme ailleurs ».²⁶

On se trouve ici devant la consécration, d'une part, de la division entre public et privé, les lois politiques étant la manière de régler les rapports dans

²³ La formule est inspirée par les propos de Bruno Latour, *Où atterrir ? Comment s'orienter en politique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2017), 70.

²⁴ Latour, *Où atterrir*, Pour un développement de cette théorie sur la modernité et sa relation à la politique, voir aussi Bruno Latour et Pierre Weibel, *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy* (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2005).

²⁵ Vlad Georgescu, *Istoria ideilor politice românești (1369-1878)* (München: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1987), 129-130.

²⁶ Ionică Tăutul, *Scrisori social-politice*, préface, note et éditions établies par Emil Virtosu, (București: Editura Științifică, 1974), 138-139 (la traduction française nous appartient).

l'espace public et dans l'intérêt de la communauté, et d'autre part de l'existence des « particuliers », qui sont le signe d'une distribution moderne²⁷ des parties du corps politique.

Il s'ensuit une analyse des causes du mauvais état dans lequel se trouve le pays, dont la première est le désordre de l'Assemblée populaire, ainsi que le manque de réglementations de cette chambre. Elle n'a pas un nombre fixe de députés, ce qui engendre des difficultés pour son fonctionnement ; leur mandat est aléatoire, aussi y a-t-il un manque de responsabilité de la part de ceux qui savent que leurs actes n'auront pas une conséquence directe sur la durée du mandat; la participation des juges à l'élaboration des lois a de mauvaises conséquences sur l'équilibre des compétences :

« Les juges ne doivent pas négliger leur devoir pour participer aux affaires publiques – terme employé ici pour désigner l'effort législatif, *n. n.* –, car ceci veut dire qu'ils font eux-mêmes les lois selon lesquelles ils jugeront. Cette situation n'existe pas ailleurs. Au contraire, l'Assemblée doit être un corps à part ».²⁸

L'auteur exprime son mécontentement envers l'absence d'une chancellerie de l'Assemblée, fait qui détermine l'absence d'archives, où l'on puisse observer le parcours du trajet législatif: « Nous n'avons pas d'archives du pays, et nous ne connaissons pas non plus les travaux de l'Assemblée ».²⁹ Et, dernière cause du mauvais fonctionnement du pays, les décisions ne sont pas prises démocratiquement, par le choix des plus nombreux: « C'est pour cela qu'elles ne peuvent pas rayonner la justice publique ».³⁰ Et il conclut: « Voilà la clef et la méthode de l'unité (du peuple, *n. n.*) ».³¹ Il faut alors envisager un projet démocratique où les pouvoirs – au moins le législatif et le judiciaire – soient séparés, où on parle de lois politiques, civiles et, par-dessus tout, de constitution.

Le modèle politique proposé par Tăutul va dans une direction semblable aux textes de réformes de ses compagnons de génération, tels Simion Marcovici, par exemple, qui publie lui aussi un programme de réforme et un projet de constitution.³² La volonté du renouveau institutionnel va réveiller sans

²⁷ Il s'agit d'un constat qui est fait pour la plupart des sociétés de l'Europe de sud-est, le lien établi entre la présence de la philosophie des Lumières et la modernisation hâtive du discours politique et du cadre institutionnel, comme le montrent aussi Balász Trencsény, Maciej Janowski, Mónika Baár, Maria Falina, Michal Kopeček dans *History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe*, vol. I, *Negotiating Modernity in the "Long Nineteenth Century"* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 19-20.

²⁸ Tăutul, *Scieri*, 140-141.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Les textes sont répertoriés par Vlad Georgescu in *Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les principautés roumaines, Répertoire et textes* (L'introduction, le répertoire et les notes ont

doute un désir de plus en plus fort pour une clarification politique. Dans les efforts sûrement accomplis dans cette direction, on retrouvera des textes, tels que ceux de Tăutul, mais aussi des projets plus appliqués. On n'y retrouve pas, cependant, une volonté cohérente pour la fondation et la clarification d'une théorie politique à proprement parler.

Les projets et les mémoires de réforme de cette période se proposent explicitement de s'inspirer de la philosophie politique du XVIII^e siècle, invoquant, parmi d'autres Rousseau, mais aussi Montesquieu ou Leibniz. En même temps, on remarque une certaine fréquence des références à la philosophie politique antique. Ce va-et-vient entre des strates et des paradigmes philosophiques distinctes met son empreinte sur le désir d'unité intellectuelle et politique du projet auctorial annoncé et le plonge dans un conglomérat hétéroclite:

« A vrai dire, je ne suis pas connu comme créateur d'idées nouvelles. De cette source, les philosophes de toutes les époques ont tellement puisé, que ce n'est pas à un lettré roumain, mais à un savant des rives de la Seine ou de la Tamise qu'il revient de récupérer les quelques gouttes qui en restent. Mes idées sont les idées de ceux qui les ont cueillies avant moi, et je conseillerai à tous ceux qui en ont besoin d'aller les chercher dans les écrits classiques des centaines d'hommes anciens et nouveaux, qui ont fait, à eux seuls, la gloire de l'espèce humaine ».³³

Une proposition de « méthode » et une indication générale des sources utilisées, localisables dans l'unité des acquisitions intellectuelles et philosophiques auxquelles l'auteur peut avoir accès, nous permet de retracer le projet possible d'une démocratie qui prend comme point de référence *la pensée des Anciens* et comme argument d'autorité et de légitimité politique et intellectuelle, *la philosophie du contrat*, à partir de Locke jusqu'à Rousseau.

Dans la même lettre, politiste avant la lettre synthétise les trois grandes questions que son correspondant semble lui avoir posées:

« 1. Quelle est la cause pour laquelle, dans beaucoup d'États, on ne voit à l'intérieur que des choses vilaines, même si à l'extérieur, et dans les autres types de rapports politiques, il semblerait que l'on n'eût réservé à ces peuples que de la tranquillité et du bonheur ? ; 2. Comment se fait-il qu'il y a fréquemment dans le monde de telles différences d'un peuple à l'autre, comme si deux êtres semblables étaient l'un parfait, l'autre contrefait ? et 3. Un État qui aurait impérativement besoin de réformes politiques internes importantes ne pourrait-il les accomplir que par la voie trouble des renversements ? ».³⁴

été traduits du roumain par Radu Crețeanu, Bucarest: Assoc.internat. d'études du Sud-est europ. 1972), p. 33. Il s'agit des *Brèves réflexions sur toutes les formes de gouvernement*, suivies d'une *Constitution politique*, éditées dans *Curierul Românesc*, n^{os} 29, 35, 39/1929.

³³ Ionică Tăutul, *Lettre à Theodor Balș, maréchal du Palais, sur les fondements de la politique*, in *Scrieri*, 153 (la traduction nous appartient).

³⁴ Ibid.

Après avoir fait le tour de ces trois questions, Tăutul répond, en renvoyant son correspondant, finalement, aux études de la science politique, qui serait capable de donner les réponses requises, trop abondantes d'ailleurs pour qu'il puisse en donner une version abrégée:

« Par ces trois points, vous avez résumé toute la matière qui depuis tant de siècles est étudiée à l'école de Solon. Et pour y donner une réponse complète, il faudrait que je mobilise toute l'histoire du monde, toutes les recherches et les critiques des publicistes et, des écrits des philosophes, tous les sujets qu'on pourrait trouver dans la grammaire politique ».³⁵

Le but du bon gouvernement – on n'en trouve pas ici une description – est d'assurer « la plus longue vie possible pour son peuple », qui soit en accord avec « le bien-être de chaque habitant ».³⁶ Le problème des strates devient encore plus évident. Car le penseur roumain emprunte visiblement à Aristote, ou à une tradition *grosso modo* classique, les trois types de régimes, mais il énonce aussi des constats tirés de Montesquieu, qu'il connaît et cite plusieurs fois. Le but du bon gouvernement est la vie longue du peuple, donc sa sûreté, ce qui nous renvoie aussi à une certaine vision contractuelle sur la société politique. Ou ce serait peut-être, dans le sens que Hilary Putnam donne à la troisième modernité, celle du XIX^e siècle, une fusion entre deux visions: si le contrat a laissé des traces, c'est justement dans la perception du gouvernement comme dérivant dans sa légitimité du consentement des gouvernés³⁷ et comme résultat des médiations successives entre « le convenable et le possible ».³⁸ Ce qui suit dans le texte peut encore confirmer ce propos, car le jeune secrétaire d'ambassade, censé donner des renseignements sur les fondements et les moyens de la politique extérieure de la Moldavie, y fournit une autre vision sur le système politique qui pourrait très bien être décrit comme un « mécanisme » que les manipulateurs s'efforceraient de mettre et de maintenir dans un état convenable de fonctionnement. Ce mécanisme serait pourtant sujet aux règles à la fois de la mécanique et de la souveraineté, car, dans un passé, hélas, meilleur que le présent désastreux, qui ne respecte plus les normes et les traités, il y avait pour la Moldavie une structure que l'on pouvait appeler « état souverain »³⁹:

« Nous avons notre gouvernement, plus ou moins autonome, nous avons notre armée et notre pouvoir, nous pouvions faire, et nous l'avons fait d'ailleurs plus d'une fois, la guerre et de la paix avec nos voisins, nous avons une certaine importance parmi les autres États et nous pouvions maintenir des relations diplomatiques avec eux ».⁴⁰

³⁵ Ibid., 154.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Hilary Putnam, *Enlightenment and Pragmatism* (Amsterdam: Koninklijke van Gorcum, 2001), 14.

³⁸ Ionică Tăutul, *Lettre à Theodor Bals*, en *Scrieri*, 157, en français dans le texte.

³⁹ Ibid., 158, en français dans le texte.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 159.

Et de conclure, dans une vision qui constate les « ruines »⁴¹ du temps présent, sur l'impossibilité – en raison des défaillances des sciences historiques – d'avoir, pour l'instant, une projection de l'avenir. Troublante entrée discursive dans un régime d'historicité qui n'est plus celui des Anciens, mais qui n'est pas non plus celui des Modernes!

Percutante vision qui rappelle celle de l'auteur des *Ruines*, Volney, celui qui, à citer François Hartog, pose comme question d'arrière-plan « le rapport entre l'état présent et l'état passé »⁴² renversé, du présent vers le passé. Tăutul va encore plus loin, poussant les limites de ce régime intermédiaire, car s'il n'a pas la pratique de l'histoire-projection, il en éprouve au moins l'intuition:

« Et pour connaître la cause de si grands dégâts pour le cœur sensible d'un patriote, pour ne pas blâmer, en vain, le destin, *chimère inoffensive et innocente*, ou pour récupérer des enseignements qui nous servent au moins dans les temps à venir, il nous faudrait une histoire juste et critique de notre état ».⁴³

C'est comme une réponse donnée à Volney, dont voici la voix, expliquant le sens de la « fatalité » chez les Orientaux: « La fatalité est le préjugé universel et enraciné des Orientaux: CELA ÉTAIT ECRIT, est leur réponse à tout; de là, leur apathie et leur négligence, qui sont un obstacle à toute instruction et civilisation ».⁴⁴ Et la voix de Volney, est reprise, avant de s'éteindre, par les « graves accents d'une voix profonde », celui du Génie des ruines, qui clame: « Jusques à quand l'homme importunera-t-il les cieux d'une injuste plainte? Jusqu'à quand, par de vaines clameurs, accusera-t-il le SORT de ses maux? ».⁴⁵ Sans les accents dramatiques de Volney, Tăutul témoigne d'une croyance similaire. Le présent est mort et, par conséquent, le passé ne peut servir pour raviver l'avenir: « Mais une pareille histoire nous manque, les enseignements que les mésaventures passées auraient pu nous donner sont morts pour les temps futurs; il faut donc les réapprendre en souffrant ».⁴⁶

Crises, solidarités et clivages

La négociation démocratique moderne se situe, comme on avait remarqué ci-dessus, dans une narration qui implique le réglage fin de la relation politique-

⁴¹ François Hartog, *Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expérience du temps* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2003), 101-102.

⁴² Ibid, 102.

⁴³ Tăutul, *Scrieri*, 159.

⁴⁴ Constantin-François Volney, *Les Ruines ou Méditation sur les révolutions des empires* (Paris, 1791), 332.

⁴⁵ Volney, *Les Ruines*, 14.

⁴⁶ Tăutul, *Scrieri*, 159.

histoire-droit. Ce réglage met parfois en difficulté les acteurs politiques moldaves et valaques à la moitié du XIXe siècle (et sud-est européens d'une manière plus générale)⁴⁷ confronté avec le poids d'une modernité encore mal comprise et d'un imaginaire démocratique souvent assimilé par la mythologie historique. Chez Tăutul, l'incongruence de certaines références est légèrement compensée par une intelligente démarche rhétorique d'autodérision qui l'aide à marquer ces distances par rapport à ses propres confusions.

La superposition conceptuelle devient un sujet manifeste et l'objet des polémiques dans les générations suivantes. Dans une lettre écrite en 1850 par l'ex-révolutionnaire Ion Ghica pour son confrère C. A. Rosetti, on peut apprendre la nature de dissensions entre les membres de l'ancien comité révolutionnaire de 1848 visant, le combat pour la société des individus libres vs. le discours nationaliste instrumentalisée politiquement:

« ... Au moment où les Slaves, les Allemands, les Italiens, les Hongrois et les Roumains vont s'entendre entre eux, c'est-à-dire qu'ils vont saisir dans l'action ce qu'aujourd'hui se retrouve uniquement dans l'intellect, à savoir que l'intérêt de chacun est que les autres soit libres, alors la révolution nationale se produira en Orient ».⁴⁸

C'est le constat implicite d'un projet moderne qui passe outre les acteurs, pour fixer le cadre communautaire et fusionnel.

L'idée de l'urgence, d'une mission à accomplir va perdurer quelques bonnes décennies dans l'imaginaire politique moderne des penseurs roumains. On la retrouve par exemple en 1863 dans un texte écrit par le même Ion Ghica dans le journal *Independința română* (*L'Indépendance roumaine*): « L'œuvre urgente, qui a aujourd'hui la priorité, est l'organisation et la consolidation de l'État roumain, sans laquelle tout ce que l'on a obtenu est en danger ».⁴⁹ Il faut remarquer un déplacement progressif vers une négociation plus équilibrée dans la rhétorique politique, entre la politique, l'histoire et le droit, tout en remarquant aussi la présence du clivage Orient-Occident comme indicateur supplémentaire, car la mission du peuple roumain, placé d'une manière stratégique au carrefour de trois empires, serait celle de devenir une « barrière contre le panslavisme ».⁵⁰

L'esprit moderne roumain se construit pendant cette période à travers, de nouveau, une la négociation du présentisme avec les projections messianiques

⁴⁷ V. par exemple, pour le contexte général sud-est européen de cette période, le livre de Robert Adam, *Două veacuri de populism românesc* (Bucarest: Humanitas, 2018), 31-44.

⁴⁸ Ion Ghica, *Opere*, vol. III, *Corespondență*, édition critique, étude introductive de Ion Roman, préface d'Eugen Simion (București: Academia Română, Fundația Națională pentru Știință și Artă, Muzeul Național al Literaturii Române, 2017), 990.

⁴⁹ Ibid, vol. II, *Studii, articole, documente*, 426. Article paru le 8 juin 1863.

⁵⁰ Ion Ghica, «Misiunea românilor», en *Țăranul român*, no. 22, le 15 avril 1862, publié en Ion Roman, *Opere*, 421 (la traduction de ces paragraphes nous appartient).

d'une part et avec la narration nationaliste mythologique d'autre part. Sur le plan des grands concepts ou constructions politiques, les régimes de pouvoirs ou les projets institutionnels sont les révélateurs plus ou moins fidèles du rythme de changement. Ce qui est différent dans le Nouveau Régime, c'est justement le mode de changement et le rapport entre les étapes qui précèdent, annoncent et suivent ces changements.⁵¹ Les procédures discursives des élites bulgares à l'aube de la modernité seraient donc construites sur un moule, qui se retrouve au moins en partie dans le sud-est de l'Europe - la Serbie, la Roumanie, la Macédoine, la Grèce etc.⁵²

Le temps serait mobilisé dans cette construction symbolique pour fonder et légitimer la production de l'identité doublement individuelle et nationale des jeunes nations: le récit historiographique orienté et subjectif participe consciemment au processus de construction du modèle politique :

« Pour faire comprendre le caractère symbolique du temps, il est peut-être utile de rappeler que la forme dominante de la communication humaine est celle qui s'effectue par le moyen des symboles sociaux [...] Ici encore apparaît une conception de l'homme qui place l' « individu » au centre et fait de la « multiplicité » quelque chose de rapporté. A travers le concept de socialisation, on se représente la vie collective et ses contraintes comme quelque chose qui viendrait s'ajouter de l'extérieur à l'individu ».⁵³

Il s'agit d'un parcours de violence symbolique et politique (qui traduit la notion de conflit), mais aussi d'une évaluation continue faite par rapport aux autres (la tolérance). Ce va et vient entre l'auto définition identitaire, souvent conflictuelle et la perspective sur les autres forme un ensemble de croyances qui se retrouvent ensuite dans la construction historiographique nationale. Une lecture des concepts liés à la construction identitaire et politique du sud-est européen dans cette première partie du XIX^e siècle doit être faite par rapport à un ensemble de croyances qui se reflètent dans la production d'un système de valeurs (la patrie, le patriotisme, la tradition), construites et transformées ensuite en réalités dites objectives⁵⁴ et reflétées par le concept matrice du siècle, la

⁵¹ Hartmut Rosa, *Accélération: une critique sociale du temps*, traduit de l'allemand par Didier Renault (Paris: La Découverte, 2013), 137-140.

⁵² Pour une analyse du discours historiographique bulgare et un rappel de ce qu'on considère comme révélateur pour l'analyse de cette époque dans la région, voir le "régime d'historicité", voir Martin Ivanov, "Indipendenza politica contro declino economico: l'esperienza bulgara, 1880-1910. Un'ipotesi di «sviluppo senza la liberazione»", dans Marco Dogo (dir.), *Schegge d'impero, pezzi d'Europa. Balcani et Turchia fra continuità e mutamento 1804-1923* (Gorizia: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2006), 149-168. Voir aussi Elena Sipiur, "L'idée d'Etat dans les Balkans au XIX^{ème} siècle. Le cas bulgare", in *Bulgarian Historical Review* 3-4 (2012): 11-26.

⁵³ Norbert Elias, *Du temps*, traduit de l'allemand par Michèle Hulin (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 23.

⁵⁴ Pour une discussion post-weberienne des concepts tels que valeurs, croyance, réalité objective -- voir D. L. d'Avray dans *Rationalities in History, A Weberian Essay in Comparison* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

démocratie et qui façonne la structure des modèles politiques⁵⁵ roumains au cours de ce siècle. « Par ailleurs, l'influence des idées de la Révolution Française a été décisive pour le développement des nations balkaniques ». ⁵⁶

Dans ce sens, le deuxième exemple que l'on mobilise est celui d'un auteur libéral post'48, Emanoil Quinezu, qui fournit une bonne illustration de cette transition, souvent hésitante, entre deux types de rapports au passé, d'une part, et à la démocratie, d'autre part. Le choix de Quinezu est motivé toujours par la rareté de ces traités politiques systématiques et aussi par l'expression, remarquable en Roumanie à son époque, de la rigueur du constitutionnaliste avec la propriété des termes de la science politique. Car la démocratie de type ancien et la démocratie de type moderne sont tantôt identifiées comme se nourrissant d'une même source – le principe d'égalité – soit des sources différentes, quand il s'agit de révéler les impératifs historiques différents des « Latins » et de nos contemporains. La démocratie et la liberté sont désormais tenues responsables pour la modernisation des institutions et du discours politique, au moins dans les textes de tendance libérale, tout en tenant compte du fait que la démocratie fraye difficilement son chemin dans un discours où la Patrie, la Nation mère jouent généralement le rôle de catalyseur égalitaire – ce qui engendre une contradiction fondatrice dans la définition de la notion de citoyen dans le régime démocratique. ⁵⁷

Le projet constitutionnel de Quinezu n'échappe pas à ces contradictions internes, même s'il est clairement construit avec plus d'égard envers la cohérence académique et envers aussi la méthodologie spécifique d'identification des sources. Néanmoins, le traitement moderne du passé est mis en question par l'opposabilité anachronique des modèles philosophique et politique de Solon et de George Washington: « Ce n'est pas étonnant donc que, dans les yeux des gens bien-pensants, Likurge, Solon et Vashington [*sic* !] passent pour les plus grands héros de notre monde ». ⁵⁸ Il s'agit de penser la modernité – comme l'auteur nous invite à le faire – dans une continuité avec les Anciens et les « valeurs éternelles »: « La Moralité et la Liberté, la Vertu et le Mérite ». ⁵⁹ C'est d'ailleurs dans l'esprit du *motto* qui est inscrit sur la couverture du livre, un extrait des *Considérations sur la formation d'un*

⁵⁵ Sur les définitions possibles du syntagme “modèle politique”, voir Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le modèle politique français. La société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 2004), particulièrement 29-37.

⁵⁶ Maria Todorova, *Imaginaire des Balkans*, traduit de l'anglais par Rachel Bouyssou (Paris: Editions de l'EHESS, 2011), 11.

⁵⁷ Cf. Ligia Livadă-Cadeschi, « Former le citoyen. La lecture roumaine d'un objectif européen » in *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. VII, no. 2 (2007): 333.

⁵⁸ Emanoil Quinezu, *Constituțiunea României, reintegrată sau Skitză pentru o constituțiune în România* (Bruxelles, 1857), 10.

⁵⁹ Emanoil Quinezu, *Adevărul asupra căderii ministerului Brătianu sau liberalismul și istoria lui în România* (Bucarest: Imprimerie Nationale, 1871), 8.

gouvernement en Pologne de Rousseau: « Corrigez, s'il se peut, les abus de votre constitution, mais ne méprisez pas celle qui vous a faits ce que vous êtes ».

Ces valeurs des Anciens vont à l'encontre de l'« idéal que le temps veut réaliser dans notre société politique moderne »⁶⁰ mais tiennent aussi compte d'un « champ d'expérience », dans une logique qui participe à la construction du concept en tant que participation de deux éléments constitutifs fondamentaux: « Voici donc une œuvre que j'ai tirée *a posteriori* et non pas *a priori*, c'est à dire de l'observation et de la pratique, et non de notre imagination ou de notre raison suprême ».⁶¹

La démocratie est non seulement en accord avec le principe de l'harmonie constitutionnelle, mais elle se fonde sur la loi. Le libéral de Craiova choisit de traduire la *Préface* de l'auteur et l'argument – avec les définitions successives des vertus politiques et les différences entre les vertus chrétiennes et la vertu politique, qui serait « l'amour pour la patrie et pour l'égalité ».⁶² Il enchaîne ensuite les trois premiers chapitres du premier livre – « sur les lois en général et sur les rapports qui existent entre les lois et les autres êtres, sur les lois de la nature et sur les lois positives ». Il présente ensuite en roumain cinq chapitres du deuxième livre, « Sur les lois qui dérivent directement de la nature du gouvernement ». Il suit ainsi de près la discussion de Montesquieu sur la nature des gouvernements, sur les lois et les vertus qui sont propres à chaque type de régime: « le gouvernement républicain et les lois relatives à la démocratie »,⁶³ les lois relatives à la nature de l'aristocratie, les lois dans leurs rapports avec la nature du gouvernement monarchique et, finalement, les lois qui correspondent à la nature de l'État despotique.

Les classifications des régimes faites par Quinezu dans ses propos constitutionnels laissent d'ailleurs entrevoir ses activités de traducteur et de lecteur assidu et enthousiaste des œuvres classiques. Il y aurait ainsi cinq types de régimes dans l'histoire, découverts grâce à la « philosophie de la politique »⁶⁴:

« Le gouvernement patriarcal, le despotisme tyrannique », ensuite la « démocratie anarchique, la démagogie », qui correspond au moment où « l'homme reconnaît l'autorité de son individualité, l'indépendance de sa liberté et transforme sa personne dans l'unique univers possible ».⁶⁵ Après le stade de l'affirmation anarchique de l'individualité humaine, d'autres étapes, dans cette brève histoire des régimes, interviennent:

⁶⁰ Quinezu, *Constitutiunea României*, Préface, 5.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶² Emanoil Quinezu, *Monteskiu, Spiritul Legilor. Ku note de kătre auctor schi o alegere de observațiuni de Diupin, Krevie, Volter, Mabli, Laharp, Servan etc.* (Bucarest, 1858), 5.

⁶³ Quinezu, *Monteskiu*, 21.

⁶⁴ Quinezu, *Constituția*, 14.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Les traduction du roumain en français nous appartient.

« L'homme libère la Divinité de toute représentation, il la reconnaît dans l'infini de son pouvoir au-dessus de tout être humain, la personnalité humaine s'efface, son individualité est sacrifiée à la chose publique (*respublica*); la subordination; le monde romain; l'homme s'efface devant l'autorité publique qui nie sa personnalité; ceux qui ont le plus de pouvoir règnent: le *Despotisme oligarchique* ». ⁶⁶

La classification des régimes transcrite ici fait appel aux moins à deux sources de la philosophie politique: on remarque, d'un côté, l'influence des débats aristotéliens, surtout celui sur la démagogie ou l'anarchie –le pire ennemi de la démocratie, thème récurrent dans ses écrits. Le projet constitutionnel dressé par Quinezu reprend ensuite les classifications aristotéliennes sous la bannière d'une esquisse de définition de la souveraineté moderne: « C'est seulement à ce moment que l'on peut réaliser cette étroite union et solidarité entre la société et son gouvernement, qui est l'élément le plus fort du pouvoir d'une nation ». ⁶⁷

Conclusions

On est parti de l'hypothèse qui place le rôle des agents et des acteurs politiques dans la configuration de la rhétorique politique de la modernité à travers une ambiguïté conceptuelle et doctrinaire. La narration démocratique moderne entretient un rapport ambivalent avec les catégories temporelles et avec leurs modalités d'instrumentalisation, et ceci dans le siècle du présentisme assumé, où des grands penseurs de l'époque se convertissent à la grande religion du progrès ⁶⁸ et tentent par le biais de l'histoire, de conquérir l'avenir. Une bonne partie de ses agents du changement se retournent pour ce faire – dans une démarche tantôt assumée, tantôt réflexe, par un mouvement d'innocence philosophique, vers des repères toutes faites qui valent « la tradition ». Le discours politique roumain se fonde, dans cette perspective, sur un ensemble de choix et narrations politiques et culturelles disposées en strates. En plus, la modernité roumaine ne fait pas exception à un phénomène remarqué comme régional, c'est-à-dire que la notion de modernisation est liée à un travail déployé par les agents et les acteurs politiques engagés dans un ample processus d'acquisition des outils de base de cette modernité politique. ⁶⁹

En suivant cette ligne d'interprétation, la lecture du projet politique roumain (ou de la modernisation, les termes vont, au moins pour cette période et cet espace géographique, de pair) ou sud-est européen se définit soit par rapport à une conscience de la faiblesse et du retard (une des conséquences du voyage à

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Burleigh, *Earthly Powers*, 252.

⁶⁹ Balász Trencsény, Maciej Janowski, Mónika Baár, Maria Falina, Michal Kopeček, *History of Modern Political Thought*, 5.

l'ouest, dont les récits publiés font l'image en miroir des visions glauques sur l'est européen et sur l'orient), soit de l'admiration inconditionnée, en cohabitation permanente avec un fond de culture politique orientale.

La construction d'une identité politique passe à travers un travail collectif, par des institutions ou des groupes qui contribuent, à leur manière à la construction de ces identités politiques. Il serait d'ailleurs plus difficile d'envisager ce travail en considérant l'individu séparément, car « tout homme en présuppose d'autres avant lui ».⁷⁰

L'ensemble ainsi constitué par ces générations d'intellectuels actifs dans l'espace public dans est vérifié, légitimé ou validé par rapport à une définition du modèle qui passe à travers ce que l'on pourrait appeler « la patrie des autres ».⁷¹ Dans cette période (début du XIXe siècle), la patrie des autres est forcément plus avancée, elle doit l'être ainsi pour être revendiquée comme modèle et comme objet du désir.⁷² Plus tard, dans la génération suivante, la patrie des autres devient l'égal: il s'agit d'une fraternité basée sur des valeurs communes, également partagées. Ensuite, dans la troisième vague de cette modernisation du XIXe siècle, on passe lentement à un regard sur la patrie des autres qui a le mérite de garder les acquis du passé (mais ce n'est pas nécessairement du traditionalisme, car la référence est aux autres).

C'est aussi le peuple: cette fiction constitutive de l'ordre politique et de la communauté par la suite, qui dans l'espace roumain existe dans le narratif politique -- conceptuel ou institutionnel -- avant d'exister en tant que produit communautaire. Car ce travail sur la notion d'individu passe à travers celle des dichotomies du monde moderne -- universel-particulier, par exemple.⁷³

On se retrouve ainsi devant un paradoxe, car les deux premières générations tenues responsables pour l'entrée dans la modernité, surtout grâce à l'immersion dans le modèle démocratique, deviennent en même temps les porteuses d'un discours qui récupère les origines de ce qu'on appelle « la nouvelle religion politique »⁷⁴ de la modernité laïque.

⁷⁰ Elias, *Du temps*, 25.

⁷¹ Dans le sillage d'une proposition méthodologique que l'on retrouve dans les dernières interprétations sur le contexte des régimes politiques en Europe centrale et sud-est-européenne au début de la modernité: « In telling the story of political thought in the region, we can no longer draw on some sort of idiographic method or Geistesgeschichte-based presumption depicting the changing 'spirit of the age'; rather, the principal focus of our inquiries is the interplay of different discursive traditions and individual projects contesting or legitimizing power ». En Trencsény, Janowski, Baár, Falina, Kopeček, *History of Modern Political Thought*, 5.

⁷² Ce mouvement se retrouve à l'origine d'un pan-nationalisme régional, avec des un spécifique localisé géographiquement et historiquement. Le point de départ était la nation, qui restait ensuite à se retrouver dans une formule plus inclusive de solidarité politique et culturelle. (Ibid., 309-3020.)

⁷³ Yves Mény, Yves Surel, *Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les démocraties* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), 185.

⁷⁴ Cf. l'analyse de Michael Burleigh en *Earthly Powers*, où l'auteur se réfère à cette nouvelle religion en se rattachant à une entière tradition intellectuelle qui commence avec Voegelin. Pour la narration de la modernité roumaine, on la retrouve dans une manière parsemée de contradictions et de replis parfois non avoués à l'intérieur de l'« autel » de la nation.

Policy Integration Across Multiple Dimensions: the European Response to Hybrid Warfare

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Abstract

The article analyzes the European Union’s response to hybrid warfare and argues that a proper interpretation of the policies adopted offers cautious support for a rational choice institutionalist approach. It begins with the presentation of the main theories of European decision-making, among which rational choice and constructivist institutionalism and it derives a hypothesis which it tests in the third part of the article. Several policy documents are analyzed in order to provide the empirical material for the analysis. The article concludes that EU institutions prefer to undertake supra-national action in technical fields which are less politically controversial and where supra-nationalization is more easily accepted.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, constructivism, institutionalism, spill-over.

Introduction

The 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as well as the beginning of the Donbas conflict represented a relevant turning point in EU policy making. These challenges required a response from the institutions of the Union, given that two member states, Latvia and Estonia share a direct border with the Russian Federation, while others, such as Romania and Bulgaria have a coastline on the Black Sea. In 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative presented to the European Parliament a policy document entitled the *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats*,¹ which included a varied set of replies to the evolving challenge.

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¹ European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response’,” JOIN(2016) 18

The concept of “hybrid warfare” was coined to describe the tactics that Russian Federation employed against NATO and the EU states.² While it has been heavily criticized in the literature,³ “hybrid warfare” captures, to some extent, the diversity of means that the Russian Federation has employed. The Russian strategy in Crimea used a combined set of military, economic and information warfare,⁴ which helped the Russian Federation obtain a quick victory. Furthermore, the use of information warfare was documented in the 2016 US elections,⁵ as well as in the Brexit referendum that took place the same year. Other, less intrusive attempts at interference occurred in the case of the 2017 Italian elections,⁶ as well as in the 2018 Hungarian ones.⁷ The most recent incident was the attempted assassination of the ex-GRU colonel, Serghei Skripal and of his daughter Yuliya, that took place in Salisbury, UK as well as the attempted sabotage of the investigation into the incident by the Russian GRU.⁸

The article will analyze the European Union’s policies for combating hybrid warfare through the lenses of contemporary European decision-making theories and will argue that the re-emergence of the Russian threat has provided the supra-national institutions of the Union with an opportunity to assert and even extend their power. The article will argue that policies adopted to combat Russia’s hybrid warfare offer support for a rational-choice institutionalist perspective of interpretation of European decision-making. The analysis will

final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN>.

² Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe,” *International Affairs* 92, no 1 (2016): 175-195, Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no 6 (2017): 773-816.

³ Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’,” *Contemporary Politics* 22, no 3 (2016): 283-300.

⁴ Tony Balasevicius, “Looking for Little Green Men: Understanding Russia’s Employment of Hybrid Warfare”, accessed June 13, 2018, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1227f31f-370a-4051-83ca-3a04f97932be/pdf>.

⁵ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on Russian Active Measures,” March 22, 2018, accessed June 10, 2019, <https://docs.house.gov/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=n65m50GVLvqRylNukkZqFsYqIKLxv9JJI5J4RbV772k>.

⁶ David Alandete and Daniel Verdú, “How Russian networks worked to boost the far right in Italy,” March 1, 2018, accessed June 13, 2018, https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/01/inenglish/1519922107_909331.html.

⁷ Katalin Andor et al., “The impact of Russia’s state - run propaganda apparatus on online media in Hungary - 2010–2017,” March 2018, accessed June 13, 2019, http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/crcb_2017_mrsrpnhm_English_180319_.pdf.

⁸ Government.nl, 2018, “Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service disrupts Russian cyber operation targeting OPCW,” accessed July 20, 2019, <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-service-disrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw>.

rely on a set of policy documents issued by the European Commission and will employ process-tracing in order to describe the development and trace the evolution of the European Union's policies for combating hybrid warfare.

The first part of the article will describe the theoretical framework which the article will employ. It will describe the main tenets of Ernst Haas' neofunctionalism and the concept of spill-over, rational choice and constructivist institutionalism and will derive the hypothesis that will be tested in the empirical part of the article. Further, a short presentation of the decision-making mechanisms under co-decision and the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be outlined. The theories presented will be compared on the basis of their conceptualization of the actors and of the way they predict actor behavior in the face of a policy challenge.

The second part of the article discusses theories of European decision making, while the third presents process tracing and shows how the article employs this methodology in order to analyze the European Union's policies for countering hybrid threats. The fourth section will present the state of the EU's policies as they have developed since the 2016 adoption of the *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats*.⁹ The last section of the article will assess whether the hypothesis tested has been confirmed or rebutted by the empirical material. Furthermore, it will argue that the empirical material presented lends evidence to support a rational choice-institutionalist interpretation. The article's main finding is that both rational choice and constructivist institutionalism would predict an expansion of the power of supra-national institutions, but the former can better explain why supra-national integration is primordially achieved in technical and scientific policy areas.

Theories of European Decision-Making

The following section will present an overview of three theories of European decision-making. It will discuss both their ontological fundamentals and their conceptualization of the policy adoption process. Then, the architecture of European decision-making will be briefly presented, in order to understand the institutional positions of actors involved in combating hybrid threats and the incentives and identities that these operate under.

The main argument of the classical theory of neo-functionalism is that trans-national cooperation in a particular field leads to increased cooperation in

⁹ European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: 'Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response'," JOIN(2016) 18 final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN>.

other policy fields, in a process called spill-over. According to this view, once cooperation between actors begins, it leads to an increased demand for regulation, which also supports cooperation in other fields and, which, in turn leads to more demand for regulation. According to Sandholtz and Sweet,¹⁰ the process of integration takes place through “spillover” effects from one policy area to another.

The authors define the idea of “spillover” as “spillover occurs when actors realize that the objectives of initial supranational policies cannot be achieved without extending supranational policy-making to additional, functionally related domains.”¹¹ This is similar to the definition offered by Philippe Schmitter in 1969, who argued that spillover is “the process whereby members of an integration scheme - agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals - attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitments to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment), or both.”¹²

Another fundamental concept in the neo-functionalist theory is the idea of “stickiness.” This means that rules, once enacted, create a series of actors interested in their maintenance. Thus, once a set of interests has been institutionalized, it becomes very difficult to roll them back given that actors have vested interests in defending them.¹³

Yet another result of integration is, in the view of neo-functionalist analysts, the emergence of supra-national interests. Not only do actors such as Member States or interest groups at the sub-national level (commercial interests, trade unions, political parties) cooperate at an accelerated rhythm, but the creation of supra-national institutions generates an interest that these have to perpetuate and increase their own power. Supra-national institutions generate positions, are served by a well-paid bureaucracy and act as places of elite socialization, where previously nationally-minded elites need to adopt a “European” identity. These institutions themselves then drive the integration process, aiming to extend their competences, both at the expense of Member States and at the expense of each other.¹⁴ One example quoted in the literature is the pan-European networks of interests that the European Commission

¹⁰ Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” in Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 1-19.

¹¹ Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” 15.

¹² Carsten Stroby Jensen, “Neo-functionalism” in Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (eds.), *European union politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 71-86.

¹³ Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” 16.

¹⁴ Jensen, “Neo-functionalism,” 92.

assembles regularly, with the aim of proposing “European” solutions to problems and thus increasing the power of the Commission to the detriment of that of national governments.¹⁵ A further example could be observed in the 2018 State of the European Union address by Commission president Jean Claude Juncker who argued for the increase use of Qualified Majority Voting in European Security Policy.¹⁶ This would severely restrict the power of the Council of the European Union and of Member States that are represented in it, as foreign security policy represents the last policy field where a unanimity is needed to adopt decisions.

Classical neo-functionalism does not take any stand on ontological debates. Spill-over effects can be generated either by a set of rational actors taking advantage of the economies of scale generated by a wider market or by a process of common identity formation through socialization in supra-national institutions. Given its ontological silence, neofunctionalism can be adapted by both rationalist and constructivist inspired conceptions.

The second theory of decision-making that the article employs to understand the development of EU policies aimed to combat hybrid warfare is rational-choice institutionalism. Developed by Jon Elster, Douglas North and Ronald Coase, rational choice institutionalism argues that actors are, at least instrumentally, rational. This means that they are able to identify a certain goal (at the most basic level, the theory assumes that actor goals are relatively invariant and they can be subsumed under the idea of power maintenance and maximization) and optimize the means in order to achieve it. Furthermore, actors’ rationality is bounded, in the sense that they employ the minimum required effort to acquire the information necessary for a decision and employ heuristic devices such as “rules of thumb, standing decisions, stopping rules, and satisficing.”¹⁷

Rational-choice institutionalism embraces a positivist epistemology. Under its assumptions, the world is “composed of discrete objects that are independent from the observer”¹⁸ and objective trends and phenomena exist and are identifiable by the respective observer. Thus, actors and their strategy are easily identifiable by the researcher and the result of their bargaining can be analyzed after a judicious coding of their initial preferences and the policy outcomes.

¹⁵ Jensen, “Neo-functionalism,” 92, Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” 17.

¹⁶ Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the European Union 2018,” September 2018, accessed July 20, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2018_en.

¹⁷ Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism” in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 24-26.

¹⁸ Ariadna Ripoll-Servent, *Institutional and policy change in the European Parliament: Deciding on freedom, security and justice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 7.

Within this context, institutions (understood as sets of rules) represent either constraints on actor behavior or equilibrium results when a phase of institutional change occurs. They represent constraints in the sense that they determine the “rules of the game”, under which the actors pursue their rational goals. Therefore, according to this interpretation of rational-choice institutionalism, institutions limit or aid what an actor can do when attempting to achieve his goals (increase or decrease transaction costs, determine that an actor must include the interest of another in his decision-making, simplify information flows).¹⁹ The simplest understanding of rational choice institutionalism has been presented as: “goal-oriented actors operat[e] within institutional constraints”,²⁰ where actors form their preferences exogenously.

According to rational choice institutionalism institutions can also represent equilibrium results. On this view institutions are not exogenous constraints, but the results of interaction between rational, power-maximizing actors. Thus, they reflect the power balance between particular actors at a particular time. Thus, when a new rule is made, actors’ bargain and the preferences of the stronger actor prevail and are institutionalized.²¹

Conversely, constructivist institutionalism employs a post-positivist epistemology and an interpretive methodology. According to this view, social entities “do not exist as an external unit but are socially constructed through perceptions, norms and discourses of social actors.” Thus, according to the proponents of constructivist institutionalism “social entities and actors are ‘mutually constituted’: structures, such as ideas and norms, constitute actors and their interests, but actors can also change and reformulate structures.”²²

According to constructivist institutionalism, there is a much closer relationship between actors and structures, who are not necessarily separated. If, in the case of rational choice institutionalism, actors adapt their strategies to existing institutions, when constructivist frames are applied, the relationship thins. On the one hand, actors are defined by values and narratives, while, on the other, institutions are built to embody particular views of the world. Actors, according to this view, are defined by interests which are “social constructions that cannot serve as proxies for material factors.”²³ Thus, actors do not have exogenous preferences, they form preferences in relationship with the institution they operate under, by partially adopting the narrative of the institution. Alternatively, institutional change occurs when particular actors

¹⁹ Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism,” 25.

²⁰ Ripoll-Servent, *Institutional and policy change*, 44.

²¹ Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism,” 27.

²² Ripoll-Servent, *Institutional and policy change*, 7.

²³ Colin Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism”, in Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (eds.), *The Oxford handbook*: 56-74.

manage to frame a particular issue in such a way in which it is accepted by enough other actors to institutionalize it.

According to Ripoll Servent,²⁴ under constructivist institutionalism “the translation from policy preferences into policy outputs is done using framing as a mechanism for change.” Thus, actors jockey to provide the most acceptable understanding of events through framing, which is understood as the process during which “definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events (...) and our subjective involvement in them.”²⁵ Frames compete among each other and are carried through by frame entrepreneurs, who push their own frame and attempt to modify the competing frames in order to achieve consensus on a particular issue. The position of the frame-entrepreneur within the system of symbolic power is crucial: a previously held position of power and the ability to show knowledge of a particular issue allows a frame entrepreneur to better adjust the framing of an issue to his or her preferred position.²⁶

To summarize, the goal of constructivist institutionalism is to identify how, in the competition of ideas, some get institutionalized, while others get eliminated. According to Colin Hay “constructivist institutionalism thus seeks to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to which—through processes of normalization and institutional embedding—established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals.”²⁷

Combating hybrid warfare takes place across several policy fields, each falling under a different decision mechanism. This makes the analysis of the comprehensive policy package extremely difficult, since each policy generates a different requirement for inter-actor agreement and a different “game” to be played between different actors. Within this policy package, several decisions involve the adoption or better implementation of EU-wide legislation (directives or regulations), others imply actions coordinated by the Commission but implemented by Member States, some are applied by the Commission’s own agencies and subordinated institutions, while yet others, come under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is adopted unanimously by the Council of the European Union, based on a proposal from the High Representative.

Based on this short presentation of the EU's policy areas, one can define four ways in which EU institutions can act. These will be used in the analysis of the actual policies adopted by EU institutions. The first and most clear type of action EU institutions can take is the adoption of supra-national legislation through the ordinary legislative procedure or other similar procedures. The

²⁴ Ripoll-Servent, *Institutional and policy change*, 49.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁷ Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism,” 65.

second option is the inter-governmental adoption of policies, which is a requirement in foreign and security policy. The third is supra-national action at below the legislative level through, for example, the use of one of the Commission's agencies or services to elaborate guidelines or to implement changes to its own mode of operation. Finally, the fourth and the least “supra-national” of them is the coordination of national policies whereby the Commission only adopts the role of a mediator and coordinator between the national governments.

The main aim of the article is to investigate whether rational-choice or constructivist institutionalism better explain the EU institutions' actions in combating hybrid warfare. In order to do this, it formulates a hypothesis based on the two theories.

Rational choice institutionalism claims that actors seek to maximize power but that they will take the minimum required risks. Thus, supra-national actors such as the Commission or the High Representatives will undertake policy initiatives in “technical” fields, which are governed by specialized personnel and where member states benefit considerably from increased cooperation. Thus, supra-national institutions will seek to present “unity” in front of an external threat but aim to supra-nationalize power in policy fields where less controversy is to be expected.

Alternatively, constructivist institutionalism sees actors as defined by their identity. In this case, where the Russian Federation is primordially defined as a “non-democratic” threat which is opposed to the “civilized West”,²⁸ supra-national actors will make a “stand” in crucial foreign and domestic policy initiatives, which aim to reinforce the “democratic values” narratives held by European institutions. The existence of an “external threat” will allow the Commission or the High Representative to centralize power to the detriment of Member States in domains previously reserved to national prerogative such as foreign policy.

The article aims to test the following hypothesis, whose confirmation would lend support to rational choice institutionalism. Alternatively, evidence against the hypothesis would lend credence for constructivist institutionalism

In the context of hybrid warfare, the EU's supra-national institutions initiate policies in more “technical” and less “political” fields of policy-making.

Methodology

Process - tracing aims to explain a certain policy result by determining and thoroughly investigating the relevant moments which brought it about and through the evaluation of potential explanations for that outcome. According to

²⁸ Glen Diesen, *EU and NATO Relations with Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, (London: Routledge, 2015).

Bennett and Checkel, process-tracing relies on the “examination of intermediary steps in a process, in order to examine how that process took place and if that process led to a relevant result.”²⁹ Similarly, according to Collier, process-tracing is similar to historical investigation, in the sense that relevant episodes are arranged in a temporal sequence.

Process-tracing can be used either to explain pre-existent theories or, in the absence of a theory to generate relevant hypotheses, to analyze crucial moments which led to the relevant result. If a higher-level theory is not used as an explanatory framework, an alternative is presenting competing hypotheses which explain the final result and testing them on relevant moments. From the point of view of data collection, process - tracing employs: 1. Document analysis 2. Interviews with political decision-makers 3. The analysis of relevant statements by political decision-makers, especially those made before relevant decision-making moments (which will be compared to the results of those decision-making processes- for example, negotiations that lead to the adoption of a particular treaty). According to Robinson the aim of process-tracing in the case of specific episodes is to investigate the way in which “particular configurations of idealized factors were combined in order to generate specific results.”³⁰

Bennett³¹ describes process-tracing as “retroactive scenario analysis” and identifies a number of similarities between the two. Both are interested in small-scale decision-making, aiming to investigate what were or what will be the choices made by high-level officials, especially under the influence of external stimuli. However, the main difference between the two lies in their time-orientation: scenario analysis looks to identify potential future developments, while process-tracing looks towards the past in order to evaluate the relative importance of the determinants of a particular event. According to Punton and Welle,³² process-tracing requires five stages:

1. Elaborating a hypothesis on the causal mechanism which achieved a particular result. This can involve the use of higher-level theories which allow for the generation of hypotheses or simply the enumeration of the potentially relevant determinants.

²⁹ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic tool*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 20.

³⁰ Corey Robinson, “Tracing and explaining securitization: Social mechanisms, process tracing and the securitization of irregular migration,” *Security Dialogue* 48, nr. 6 (2016): 505–523.

³¹ Andrew Bennett, “Using Process-Tracing to improve Policy Making: the (negative) case for the 2003 Intervention in Iraq,” *Security Studies* 24, nr 2 (2015): 228-238.

³² Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps,” 2015, accessed October 3, 2019, https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5997/CDIPracticePaper_10_Annex.pdf;jsessionid=8AAF83A109DB2372F412BC6CA0B67656?sequence=2.

2. The operationalization of the causal mechanism involves identifying the observable manifestations of a mechanism and of the empirical evidence which would allow us to state that the particular chain of events that the causal mechanism predicts actually took place.
3. The collection of empirical data through interviews or document analyses.
4. The evaluation of the explanatory power of each piece of evidence and the identification of their relevance (does it support, confirm, weaken or invalidate the theory).
5. The elaboration of conclusions on whether the hypothesized mechanism produced the particular result.

The article uses process - tracing based on document analysis. Thirteen relevant EU policy documents have been identified, which outline the plans and the progress of the European Union in combating hybrid threats. A wide approach was used, and the documents included did not refer only to hybrid threats *per se*, but also to specific areas of hybrid warfare such as disinformation and to specific measures adopted, such as creating resilience. The wide approach led to the inclusion of other policy documents such as the code of conduct for online platforms.

A system of analysis was elaborated which included the actors relevant for a particular action, as well as its nature (either a form of coordination of inter-governmental cooperation, inter-governmental policy making or the use of supra-national legislation) and a coding of the policy field in which the action is undertaken. Policy fields were coded as either “technical” or “political”, depending on whether they are more or less contested by relevant actors. The goal of this analysis is to identify whether supra-national action is carried out in more “technical” or more “political” fields of policy-making when combating hybrid threats. Finally, policy implementation steps were arranged in a chronological order, with the aim of identifying relevant junctures in policy roll-out and to form an overall picture on the evolution of the combating of hybrid warfare. Table 1 presents, the analysis of the policy documents which the European Union has issues on the topic of hybrid warfare.

EU Policies - Combating Hybrid Warfare

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the ignition of the Donbas war were first reflected in EU documents in a food-for-thought paper initiated by the External Action Service in May 2015 in preparation for the Foreign Affairs Council that month.³³ This document³⁴ suggested that the

³³ Council of the European Union, “European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions,” accessed July 13, 2019, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20/conclusions-european-council/>, 2015.

Russian Federation's rapid victory over Ukraine was caused by the latter state's extensive vulnerabilities. According to the document, Russia's hybrid warfare (defined as the centralized use of both covert and overt tactics) exploited Ukraine's vulnerabilities such as:

- (i) weak governance and national institutions, wide-spread corruption;
- (ii) lack of trust and support for security and defense structures;
- (iii) the presence of a large Russian speaking population that perceived itself marginalized; and
- (iv) critical dependency on Russia for imports and energy supply.”³⁵

The food-for-thought paper sees two steps in answering this challenge - the improvement of awareness capabilities (of both hybrid actions as well as one's own vulnerabilities), followed by the increase of resilience (diminishing one's vulnerabilities in order to better withstand stress and catastrophe). In order to achieve these goals, the document foresees a form of self-evaluation of vulnerabilities from the part of Member States, EU support through CSDP missions in neighboring states in order to increase resilience as well as cooperation with NATO (considering that the EU does not have mechanisms to respond to a conventional military attack).

Further, the paper foresees the creation of a EU fusion cell, with the aim of improving the secure exchange of information on hybrid attacks and on the vulnerabilities of member states, to improve the cooperation with NATO and to increase the strategic communication efforts that seek to combat the information component of hybrid warfare.³⁶

The institutionalization of these efforts came through the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of June 2015, which addressed the topic of security and defense with the NATO Secretary General.³⁷ This represented the preliminary for the April 2016 Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, entitled *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response*.³⁸ It constitutes the roadmap for the EU's policies against hybrid threats and is divided in five chapters and 22 actions. Three implementation reports have been

³⁴ Council of the European Union, “Food-for-thought paper ‘Countering Hybrid Threats’,” 2015, accessed July 6, 2019, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eeas-csdp-hybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf>.

³⁵ Council of the European Union, “Food-for-thought paper.”

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Council of the European Union, “Outcome of the Council Meeting. 3389th Council meeting. Foreign Affairs - 18 May 2015,” 2015, accessed July 13, 2018, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23345/st08966en15.pdf>.

³⁸ JOIN(2016).

issued in July 2017, July 2018 and May 2019, which show the progress of the Communication's actions and the areas where improvement is required.³⁹

The Communication begins with an argument where the concept of hybrid threats is defined as the "mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes."⁴⁰ Further, the Communication argues that, while national security remains a responsibility of the nation-states, many of the threats that these face are common and require a coordinated response, thus paving the way for supra-nationalization of policies. The Communication also references other EU sectoral strategies such as "the European Agenda on Security, the upcoming European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and European Defence Action Plan, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Maritime Security Strategy",⁴¹ arguing that it represents merely a continuation and deepening of these efforts.

As can be seen in Table 1, the European Commission adopted a number of 22 policy directions and has, over the past three years, worked to implement them. They are divided into four main areas entitled: "Recognizing the Hybrid Nature of a Threat", "Organizing the EU response: improving awareness", "Organizing the EU response: building resilience".⁴² "Preventing, responding to

³⁹ European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response," 2017, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA>; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint Report on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats from July 2017 to June 2018," 2018, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019 "Report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats," 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/report_on_the_implementation_of_the_2016_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_and_the_2018_joint_communication_on_increasing_resilience.pdf/

⁴⁰ EC/EEAS, "Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats."

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: 'Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response'," JOIN(2016) 18

crisis and recovering”. The first dimension involves only one policy dimension and asks member states to determine their own vulnerabilities through a questionnaire addressed to all governments. The second dimension looks to improve the awareness of both institutions and the population regarding disinformation campaigns and dangerous propaganda, through measures such as the establishments of a Hybrid Fusion Cell, improved strategic communication, and the analysis provided by the Helsinki Center for combating hybrid threats. Building resilience comes next and it involves, according to the European Commission, a wide approach to the concept, which includes the resilience of institutions, people and critical infrastructures. Finally, on the recovery side, the action plan involves establishing operational protocols for crisis management and testing them through common exercises with NATO, as well as investigating the EU’s military capabilities.

The differential roll-out of the policies is presented in Table 1. While some began quickly after the adoption of the Communication, others required more time for consultation and debate before they could be formalized in official legislative acts. For example, the creation of the EastStratcom cell within the EEAS was implemented rather quickly, while the creation of a set of indicators which detail the vulnerability of critical infrastructures or the creation of guidelines for screening foreign investments and the adoption of a regulation on it took until 2019. EU-NATO cooperation was strongly increased due to the fact that both institutions placed the resurgence of the Russian Federation high on the scale of potential threats.

Furthermore, the European Commission took separate actions against online disinformation. The first step undertaken by the Commission was the formation of a High Level Expert Group on fake news. This group aimed to analyze the way fake news spread, the roles and the responsibilities of relevant actors and to formulate recommendations of how this phenomenon can be fought.⁴³

The report of the High Level working group was issued in March 2018 and includes a set of analyses and policy recommendations. The report defines misinformation and disinformation differently and argues that the first is truly dangerous because it constitutes an intentional and clear action with the aim of causing a damage or to obtain a profit. The report argues that civil society should act as a “watchdog” of democracy (supervising the actions of state and private actors) and that, a part of information that is spread is relayed further by citizens, especially given the emergence of electronic mass-media. According to

final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN>.

⁴³ European Commission, “Next steps against fake news: Commission sets up High-Level Expert Group and launches public consultation,” 2017, accessed July 17, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4481_en.htm.

the Report, a better understanding of the phenomenon is necessary before the elaboration of a comprehensive response.⁴⁴

In its next chapter, the report evaluates measures already developed by relevant actors in the field such as online platforms as well as by press institutions and radio emitters, which strengthened their capacity to verify information, either through the creation of specially dedicated offices or through establishing a cooperation with fact-checking NGOs. Furthermore, campaigns to increase critical thinking and media literacy have been undertaken.⁴⁵

The Report of the High Level Expert Group was followed by the issuing, in 2018, of a Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation⁴⁶ and the adoption of a Code of Conduct for online providers.⁴⁷ After defining the concepts of disinformation and categorizing its main ways of spreading, the Communication presents four main principles which lie at the heart of the action against disinformation. These are transparency, defined as a better knowledge of the source of information, and the way it is sponsored and disseminated, diversity of information, understood as increasing the number of the sources of information available to the public, credibility understood as flagging false information to deter its spread and inclusiveness, defined as employing long-term solutions that involve a wide number of stakeholders.

The Communication foresees the elaboration of a EU-wide code of conduct for online platforms, which would require them to better scrutinize the way advertising is paid for and to better identify and close fake accounts, as well as to improve users' ability to access a diversity of verified information. Further, through the Communication, the Commission foresees a stronger cooperation with fact-checkers, better cyber-security tools to more easily identify the source of a particular piece of information online, an increase in research oriented to new technologies that help with the identification of false information, a better coordination between national authorities responsible with election management in order to prepare for the 2019 European Elections, the improvement of media literacy, including through the formation of an Expert

⁴⁴ European Commission and authors, "A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation," 2018, accessed July 13, 2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation>.

⁴⁵ European Commission and authors, "A multi-dimensional approach," 18.

⁴⁶ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach," 2018, accessed July 13, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&from=EN>.

⁴⁷ European Commission, "Code of Practice on Disinformation," 2018, accessed July 13, 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation>.

Group and the funding of related projects through Erasmus+ and the support of quality journalism.⁴⁸

The Code of Conduct for online platforms was issued in 2018 and includes a set of actions that the signatories commit to, which include limiting the possibilities of fake commercial advertising, implementing policies for the transparency of the sources of funding for political advertising, including single-issue advertising, the identification and banning of automated bots and investing in technologies that increase the diversity and the quality of information available to consumers.⁴⁹

Data Analysis

As can be seen in Table 2, from the twenty-two policy actions which the European Union adopted in order to combat hybrid warfare, ten were classified as “political” and twelve as “technical”. This classification was done based on the nature of the policy field: if a certain policy implied only issues that involved increased cooperation between technical authorities, or between expert groups, or involved the improvement of technical capabilities of specific authorities. Alternatively, policy were classified as “political” when they involved the affirmation of identity or the investment in military equipment or an affirmation of the values and identity which the European Union desires to project.

Considering the actual policies that the EU institutions adopted, eight could be classified as the coordination of inter-governmental cooperation, thirteen as action by supra-national institution which did not involve the adoption of legislation (while not counted, all the actions performed in the struggle against disinformation can also be included here), seven new pieces of supra-national legislation were elaborated or adopted and three CFSP/CSDP actions were adopted or envisioned.

Action by supra-national institutions through their internal capabilities represented the main policy tools in both the political and the technical areas. However, the main difference identified is that in the “political” fields, which mostly involved CFSP/CSDP actions, the lead institution was the High Representative while in the “technical” fields, actions are mostly driven by the

⁴⁸ European Commission, “Tackling online disinformation.”

⁴⁹ European Commission, “Code of Practice on Disinformation, European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation,” 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN>.

Commission. Furthermore, given that many more “technical” fields fall within the scope of the EU’s internal action, a greater number of legislation was adopted. One notable exception, which was coded as a “political” field are policy actions to combat radicalization, where a directive is being considered. Between the two types of fields, the same number of policy actions rely on the coordination of inter-governmental cooperation.

Overall, the data provides a cautious support for the rational choice institutionalist approach, given that considerably more legislation and internal actions (even if one includes the CFSP decisions adopted through inter-governmental means under the broad concept of “legislation”) have been adopted in “technical” rather than “political” fields. This would support the claim that EU institutions have a cautious approach to combating hybrid threats and prefer to use this new situation to consolidate policies that had already been planned and which are relatively less controversial. This could also be said about policies adopted to combat disinformation, which include a broad number of stakeholders and which resulted in action which is not based on new legislation. Furthermore, the High Representative was the main “spearhead” in foreign policy. However, it also preferred to use its own resources to establish institutions such as EastStratcom or the Hybrid Fusion Cell, while issues that required a broad cooperation by governments were addressed in inter-governmental formats with the EU taking a more coordinating rather than supra-national role.

Thus, one can argue that the EU institutions are only slowly supranationalizing power and are acting to minimize a backlash from the governments of member states. Technical policy fields allow for more support to be built, given that transnational expert networks are more easily built by supra-national institutions. Even in the face of an external threat, the EU acts cautiously to build its own legitimacy and allows political decisions to be made by national governments.

Conclusion

The article argued that the Russian Federation’s new assertiveness has been conceptualized by the institutions of the European Union as “hybrid warfare” and has been addressed through a series of policy tools which are grouped under three main categories: identifying the nature of the threat, improving awareness and building resilience and that an analysis of these policies offers cautious support for rational-choice institutionalism. Further, the article argued that the EU institutions proceeded cautiously and preferred to adopt supra-national policies in areas where this is bound to cause the least backlash.

Technical policy fields were the preferred area of action of EU institutions, which adopted both legislative acts and coordinated a number of cooperation initiatives in areas which help improve capabilities and information exchange of technical agencies. Alternatively, the EU acted less and less supranationally in traditional areas of state prerogative, such as foreign policy and the identification of vulnerabilities, allowing member states to take the lead and to report on their own state of preparedness.

While not decisive, the data collected for this article provides cautious support for a rational-choice institutionalist approach, which argues that actors seek to minimize risk and maximize benefits and will pursue a “path of least resistance” in pursuing their power interest. Alternatively, data has shown that while the affirmation of “values” is important for the EU, less has been done to concentrate power and more has been allowed to the member states when addressing their own vulnerabilities and handling the relation with the Russian Federation.

Annexes

Table 1 : European Union policies to combat hybrid threats 2016-2019

Action	Institutional actor entrusted with application of the action.	Type of action/ Policy field	State of the art in July 2017	State of the art in July 2018	State of the art in May 2019
Recognizing the Hybrid Nature of a Threat					
<i>Member States, supported as appropriate by the Commission and the High Representative, are invited to launch a hybrid risk survey to identify key vulnerabilities, including specific hybrid related indicators, potentially affecting national and pan-European structures and networks.</i>	Member states supported by the Commission and the HR	Coordination of intergovernmental cooperation Political	The “Friends of Presidency” groups was created (an ad-hoc group established as a preparatory body of the Council of the European Union) and a questionnaire was created and distributed concerning the vulnerabilities of each member state.	Plans were being put forward to prolong the Mandate of the FoP group.	A summary of the findings based on 24 questionnaires was presented during the Bulgarian presidency The Mandate of the “Friends of Presidency” group was extended in June 2018.
Organizing the EU response: improving awareness					
<i>Creation of an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the existing EU INTCEN structure, capable of receiving and analysing classified and open source information on hybrid threats. Member States are invited to establish National Contact Points on hybrid threats to ensure cooperation and secure communication with the EU</i>	High Representative and Member States	Supra-national action - internal (action by the High Representative at the EEAS). Coordination of inter-governmental cooperation. Political	The cell was created at the level of INTCEN and has begun to distribute analysis, including the Hybrid Bulletin.	The Cell was operational and integrated in the EEAS. It already participated, by disseminating analysis products during the PACE17 exercises. .	The Cell is operational and several vacancies need to be filled.

<i>Hybrid Fusion Cell.</i>					
<i>The High Representative will explore with Member States ways to update and coordinate capacities to deliver proactive strategic communications and optimise use of media monitoring and linguistic specialists.</i>	The High Representative Member States	Coordination of inter-governmental cooperation Political	In 2015, the Council of the European Union founded EastStratcom which aims at anticipating disinformation and negative information campaigns. The website euvsdisinfo.eu was released and its associated newsletter which disseminates the results identified to a wider audience.	A new communication was adopted “Tackling online disinformation: a European approach” in April 2018 EastStratcom continued to debunk disinformation from the Russian-speaking media. Awareness-raising campaigns and cooperation have been undertaken in Eastern Partnership countries.	The <i>Action Plan against Disinformation</i> was endorsed by the European Council in December 2018. A Rapid Alert System was set up to enable Member States and EU institutions to facilitate sharing of data, enable common situational awareness, facilitate the development of common responses, and ensure time and resource efficiency.
<i>Member States are invited to consider establishing a Centre of Excellence for ‘countering hybrid threats’.</i>	Member states	Coordination of inter-governmental action Political	The Centre is based on a memorandum of understanding signed on 11.04.2017 by nine countries, which were joined by other three at the end of the year. The Center was launched in Helsinki with HR Mogherini and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg attending (EEAS 2017)	16 states have become members of the Helsinki CoE. Three Communities of Interest: on Hybrid Influencing, Vulnerabilities and Resilience and Strategy and Defence. A sub-group on non-state actors has been established	22 Member States have become Members of the Helsinki CoE. In September 2018, the CoE facilitated a scenario - based discussion at a joint meeting of the Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council, which was broadly appreciated.
Organizing the EU response: building resilience					
<i>The Commission, in cooperation with</i>	The Commission	Supra-national action - internal (the use of the	A workshop on critical	A draft manual of vulnerability indicators and	The list of vulnerability indicators

<i>Member States and stakeholders, will identify common tools, including indicators, with a view to improve protection and resilience of critical infrastructure against hybrid threats in relevant sectors.</i>		European program in order to improve critical infrastructures) A better application of the directive on critical infrastructure Supra-national action - legislation Technical	infrastructures was organized and a roadmap elaborated on future activities.	resilience hybrid threats to critical infrastructures in the EU has been developed. A proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union if they are likely to affect security or public order has been elaborated.	for the resilience and protection of critical infrastructure against hybrid threats has been completed. The EU adopted Regulation (EU) No 2019/452 11 setting up a framework for the screening of investments from non-EU countries that may affect security or public order.
<i>The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will support efforts to diversify energy sources and promote safety and security standards to increase resilience of nuclear infrastructures</i>	The Commission Member States	Supra-national action -legislation (a directive will be elaborated which is to apply directly to member states) Coordinating inter-governmental cooperation (on gas pipelines) Technical	Legislation was elaborated on ensuring the security of gas supply, which was agreed, in principle, by the Council and the Parliament.	In September 2017, a Joint Communication : "Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU" was adopted. <i>The Commission will continue supporting the European Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Centre on cybersecurity.</i> Member States are implementing the Security of Gas Supply Regulation. The Risk Preparedness Regulation, is under negotiations.	The European Parliament and the Council reached in November 2018 an agreement on the Commission's Proposal for Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector The Commission has been also actively supporting Member States in the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 14 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supplies.
<i>The Commission will monitor emerging threats across the transport sector</i>	The Commission The High Representative Member	Supra-national action (direct action by the Commission through internal	A methodology for the "common	Risk analyses of maritime threats are being undertaken. The Information	Regulation (EU) 2019/123 on the implementation of Air Traffic Network

<p><i>and will update legislation where appropriate. In implementing the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Customs Risk Management Strategy and Action Plan, the Commission and the High Representative (within their respective competences), in coordination with Member States, will examine how to respond to hybrid threats, in particular those concerning transport critical infrastructure.</i></p>	<p>States</p>	<p>means). Supra-national legislation Technical</p>	<p>evaluation of risks to be undertaken at the EU level" was elaborated with the help of national air security experts and with the support of the EEAS. This will allow the exchange of classified information and the definition of a common vision on risk.</p>	<p>Sharing Environment is being upgraded. An action plan to improve military mobility through the use of the Trans-European network was being elaborated.</p>	<p>Functions has been adopted. It created the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (ECCC). The EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan has been revised.</p>
<p><i>Within the context of the Space Strategy and European Defence Action Plan, the Commission will propose to increase the resilience of space infrastructure against hybrid threats, in particular, through a possible extension of the Space Surveillance and Tracking scope to cover hybrid threats, the preparation for the next generation of GovSatCom at European level and the introduction of Galileo in critical infrastructures</i></p>	<p>The Commission</p>	<p>Supra-national action (direct action by the Commission through its own agencies) Technical</p>	<p>No concrete action, but the issues of resilience will be integrated in future regulation.</p>	<p>The Commission elaborated a Space Programme of the Union, which includes aspects to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure.</p>	<p>Plans to implement GOVSATCOM - a system of satellite based governmental communications has been elaborated and a draft exercise project has been started. Given that the HR and the Council have responsibilities for the security of space assets, the HR has elaborated hybrid war scenarios which include attacks on the EU's satellites.</p>

<i>dependant on time synchronisation.</i>					
<i>The High Representative, supported as appropriate by Member States, in liaison with the Commission, will propose projects on how to adapt defence capabilities and development of EU relevance, specifically to counter hybrid threats against a Member State or several Member States.</i>	The High Representative	Inter-governmental adoption of EU policies (the European Defense Agency is coordinated by the HR but is overseen by a board composed of member state representatives) Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • three table top exercises based on hybrid scenarios • The inclusion of the hybrid dimension in the 2005 Requirements Catalogue • analysis report on military implications stemming from hybrid attacks directed against critical harbor infrastructure 	The Commission proposed in a Regulation establishing a European Defence Industrial Development Programme. A provisional agreement on the draft Regulation was reached on 22 May 2018 by the European Parliament and the Council. For the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission proposed an integrated European Defence Fund with an ambitious budget of EUR 13 billion.	The Council and the European Parliament reached a partial agreement on the Proposal for Regulation establishing the European Defence Fund for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.
<i>The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will improve awareness of and resilience to hybrid threats within existing preparedness and coordination mechanisms, notably the Health Security Committee.</i>	The Commission Member States	Supra-national action (internal to EU institutions) Coordinating inter-governmental cooperation Technical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • n exercise was planned for the autumn of 2017, concerning hybrid and multi-dimensional threats • common action on vaccination, including the predictions concerning the supply and demand of vaccines and the research on vaccines • reation of a network of funders of health 	A The Commission organized Chimera, an exercise for the health, civil protection and security sectors throughout the EU and third countries to test preparedness and response planning to serious cross-border threats. In April 2018, the Commission published a Communication and submitted a proposal for a Council Recommendation to strengthen the EU cooperation against vaccine-	The report on the Chimera exercise was adopted. A workshop was organized in April 2019, in cooperation with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Decision (EU) 2019/420 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2019 has been adopted.

			research abroad	preventable diseases.	
<i>The Commission encourages Member States as a matter of priority to establish and fully utilise a network between the 28 CSIRTs and the CERT-EU (Computer Emergency Response Team-EU) as well as a framework for strategic cooperation. The Commission, in coordination with Member States, should ensure that sectorial initiatives on cyber threats (e.g. aviation, energy, maritime) are consistent with cross-sectorial capabilities covered by the NIS Directive to pool information, expertise and rapid responses.</i>	The Commission	Supra-national - internal (applying the NIS directive) Supra-national action- legislation Coordinating inter-governmental cooperation. Technical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • adopting the NIS directive in 2017 • expansion of the mandate of the ENISA and its transformation in the EU cybersecurity agency • European framework for certifying the security of cyber-products. • the funding of cyber defense projects through PESCO (suggested in September 2017 through the State of the Union Address) 	<p>The European Defense Agency organized CYBRID 17, a cyber response incident exercise.</p> <p>The Commission monitors the way in which the NIS directive is adopted.</p>	<p>A network of Computer Security Incidents Response Teams has been established and work is progressing on building trust between its members and with CERT-EU.</p> <p>The Commission adopted a Proposal for Regulation to establish the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centers.</p> <p>A Cybersecurity Act was adopted on 17 April 2019</p>
<i>The Commission, in coordination with Member States, will work together with industry within the context of a contractual Public Private Partnership for cybersecurity, to develop and test technologies to better protect users and infrastructures against cyber aspects of hybrid threats.</i>	The Commission	Supra-national action (independent action by the Commission) Technical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the signing, by the Commission, of a public-private partnership for cybersecurity 	<p>The Commission signed a public-private partnership on cybersecurity with the European Cybersecurity Organisation (ECSO).</p> <p><i>The Joint Communication on Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity in Europe</i> was adopted.</p>	<p>A European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre is being planned.</p>
<i>The Commission will issue guidance to</i>	The Commission	Supra-national action (independent	Planning a sectoral strategy on	The Commission will establish an	In April 2019, the Commission adopted a

<p><i>smart grid asset owners to improve cybersecurity of their installations. In the context of the electricity market design initiative, the Commission will consider proposing 'risk preparedness plans' and procedural rules for sharing information and ensuring solidarity across Member States in times of crisis, including rules on how to prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks.</i></p>		<p>action by the Commission) Technical</p>	<p>cyber-security in the field of energy (where smart networks have appeared)</p>	<p>energy sectoral work stream under the NIS Cooperation Group to address the particularities of the energy sector and to provide guidance to Member States on the implementation of the NIS Directive</p>	<p>Recommendation on cybersecurity in the energy sector.</p>
<p><i>The Commission, in cooperation with ENISA, Member States, relevant international, European and national authorities and financial institutions, will promote and facilitate threat information-sharing platforms and networks and address factors that hinder the exchange of such information.</i></p>	<p>The Commission</p>	<p>Supra-national action (elaborating a legislative framework applicable to all member states and Commission's independent action) Technical</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modifying the Directive on Payment Services • Elaborating minimal technical standards on the strict authentication of clients and the secure communication of payments. 	<p>The Fintech action plan was elaborated. to eliminate barriers that limit information exchange between market players.</p>	<p>.</p>
<p><i>The Commission and the High Representative (within their respective areas of competence), in coordination with Member States, will</i></p>	<p>The Commission The High Representative</p>	<p>Supra-national action (internal action of supra-national institutions) Technical</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • laborating the common research agenda of the commission and the 	<p>CERT-EU has signed a Service Level Agreement with EUROCONTROL and a Memorandum of Cooperation with the</p>	<p>The the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is currently developing the European Centre for Cyber Security</p>

<p><i>examine how to respond to hybrid threats, in particular those concerning cyber-attacks across the transport sector.</i></p>			<p>EEAS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • he capacity to handle hybrid threats by national authorities with coastguard functions was analyzed and measures to increase cooperation were suggested 	<p>European Aviation Safety Agency</p>	<p>in Aviation (ECCSA), which is currently in its pilot phase.</p> <p>The Commission is working on transposition of the new International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) cybersecurity standard to the Aviation Security Implementing Regulation.</p> <p>Implementation of EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan concerning preparedness and response to hybrid threats, in particular to cyber attacks across the transport sector in ongoing.</p>
<p><i>The Commission will use the implementation of the Action Plan on Terrorist Financing to also contribute to countering hybrid threats.</i></p>	<p>The Commission</p>	<p>Supra-national action - legislation (the elaboration of a supra-national framework, the elaboration of implementation standards).</p> <p>Technical</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • hree legislative proposals on the introduction of criminal sanctions in the case of money laundering and illicit cash payments, concerning the freezing of assets and the confiscation of goods • he monitoring of the transposition of the fourth Directive on the 	<p>A proposal for a Directive was launched to step up the cooperation between the authorities responsible for combating serious crime and terrorism and to enhance their access to and use of financial information.</p> <p>The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive was adopted.</p>	<p>The implementation of the 5th anti-money laundering directive is ongoing.</p>

			combating of money laundering . • legislative proposal to consolidate the directive with supplementary measures. • regulation proposal with the aim of preventing the import and the storage in the EU of cultural assets illegally exported from other countries.		
<i>The Commission is implementing the actions against radicalisation set out in the European Agenda on Security and is analysing the need to reinforce procedures for removing illegal content, calling on intermediaries' due diligence in managing networks and systems.</i>	The Commission	Supra-national action (internal action of supra-national institutions); Adoption of supra-national legislation Political	• The development of the Radicalization Awareness Network . • Developing the EU Internet Referral Unit at Europol, and the EU Internet Forum • Elaborating a code of Conduct for countering illegal hate speech online	The Commission has launched an impact assessment to determine whether current efforts are sufficient or whether additional measures are needed.	The Commission adopted a Proposal for Regulation to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content online. The European Strategic Communications Networks working on the issue of disinformation and its implications.
<i>The High Representative,</i>	The High Representative	Supra-national action (internal	• a study on risks	Dedicated Hybrid Risk	Hybrid Risk Surveys have been

<p><i>in coordination with the Commission, will launch a hybrid risk survey in neighborhood regions. The High Representative, the Commission and Member States will use the instruments at their respective disposal to build partners' capacities and strengthen their resilience to hybrid threats. CSDP missions could be deployed, independently or to complement EU instruments, to assist partners in enhancing their capacities.</i></p>	<p>The Commission</p>	<p>action of supranational institution) Inter-governmental adoption of EU policies (a possible CSDP mission). Political</p>	<p>elaborated in the framework of a pilot-project developed together with the Republic of Moldova with the aim of identifying the country's main vulnerabilities and to ensure that the EU targets the specific fields</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • further recommendations on the basis of this research • Program on the cyber resilience of third countries. 	<p>Surveys are being launched to identify the critical vulnerabilities and provide targeted support for EaP countries. These surveys have been used in Republic of Moldova. In 2018, Jordan and Georgia have officially requested the EU to undergo vulnerability surveys.</p>	<p>launched in seven partners: Moldova, Georgia, Jordan, Albania, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro.</p>
<p>Preventing, responding to crisis and recovering</p>					

<p><i>The High Representative and the Commission, in coordination with the Member States, will establish a common operational protocol and carry out regular exercises to improve strategic decision-making capacity in response to complex hybrid threats building on the Crisis Management and Integrated Political Crisis Response procedures.</i></p>	<p>The High Representative The Commission The Member States</p>	<p>Supra-national action (internal action of supra-national institutions) The coordination of inter-governmental cooperation</p> <p>Technical</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The elaboration of the EU's operational protocol on the combating of hybrid threats (EU playbook). • Improving the synergy with NATO, which has elaborated a protocol on the cooperation of the EU. • Coordinating the decision-making procedure between the two institutions. 	<p>A EU operational protocol has been established and tested during the 2017 NATO-EU Parallel exercises. NATO-EU interaction has been greatly expanded.</p>	<p>The EU Hybrid Exercise MULTILAYER 18 - EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Has been carried out on the basis of the Playbook.</p>
<p><i>The Commission and the High Representative, in their respective areas of competence, will examine the applicability and practical implications of Articles 222 TFEU and Article 42(7) TEU in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs.</i></p>	<p>The Commission The High Representative</p>	<p>Supra-national action (internal action of supra-national institutions)</p> <p>Political</p>	<p>When joint exercises are organized, of the invocation of the solidarity clause by a state.</p>		
<p><i>The High Representative, in coordination with Member States, will integrate, exploit and coordinate the capabilities of military action in countering hybrid threats within the Common Security and</i></p>	<p>The High Representative</p>	<p>Supra-national action (internal action of supra-national institutions)</p> <p>Political</p>	<p>Elaborating a document called <i>EU military contribution to countering hybrid threats within the CSDP</i>.</p>	<p>The "EU military contribution to countering hybrid threats within the Common Security and Defence Policy" plan has been finalized. The Concept Implementation Plan is being elaborated.</p>	<p>The "EU Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions" is being modified to out to include hybrid threats aspects.</p>

<i>Defence Policy</i>					
<i>The High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will continue informal dialogue and enhance cooperation and coordination with NATO on situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity and "crisis prevention and response" to counter hybrid threats, respecting the principles of inclusiveness and autonomy of each organisation's decision making process.</i>	The High Representative The Commission	The inter-governmental adoption of EU policies (the Warsaw NATO-EU declaration was adopted by the European Council) Political	A set of 42 proposals was elaborated and it was, subsequently endorsed in separate, parallel processes on 6 December 2016 by both the EU and NATO Councils. The first exchanges were carried out between the NATO Hybrid Analysis Cell and the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell.	The PACE17 exercise has tested the two organisations' 'Playbooks' and, through that, their capacity to work together to support their members. Consultations on Strategic Communication have taken place support for Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia.	The PACE 2018 exercise has deepened the lessons from PACE 2017. PACE 2018 was based on a hybrid scenario including cyber-security, disinformation and civil protection. Staff-to-staff meetings on cyber-security, CBRN and situational awareness.

Source: This table was constructed through analyzing the following documents: European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: 'Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response'," JOIN(2016) 18 final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN>; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response," 2017, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA>; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Joint Report on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats from July 2017 to June 2018," 2018, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019 "Report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats," 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/report_on_the_implementation_of_the_2016_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_and_the_2018_joint_communication_on_increasing_resilience.pdf; European Union and NATO, "Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 2016, accessed June 13, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/de/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm; European Union and NATO, "Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016," 2017, accessed June 13, 2018, <https://eeas.europa.eu/>

sites/eeas/files/170614-joint-progress-report-eu-nato-en-1.pdf; European Union and NATO, “Second progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016,” 2017, accessed July 2, 2019, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35577/report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf>; European Union and NATO, “Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,” 2018, accessed June 13, 2018, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf>.

Table 2 - Synthetic analysis of European Policies for combating hybrid threats

Field	Type of action
Political (10 fields)	4 Coordination of inter-governmental cooperation 5 Supra-national action - internal 1 Supra-national action - legislation 3 Inter-governmental adoption of EU policies
Technical (12 fields)	4 Coordination of inter-governmental cooperation 9 Supra-national action - internal 6 Supra-national action - legislation

Personality traits as determinants of political behavior: Ukrainian electoral and voting tendencies

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Abstract

Now there is a sharp increase of interest in politics, especially among young people. Meanwhile, the psychological mechanisms of the person’s political behavior (its manifesting and regulating), as well as interaction of his cognitive, emotional, motivation and value factors with the political system remain insufficiently studied. The aim of this research is to study the influence of personality traits on political behavior in order to find out the connection between person’s individual-psychological characteristics and the degree of his participation in political life within the territory of Ukraine. The Five-Factor NEO-PI-R (NEO Personality Inventory-Revised) model was used for analyzing the respondents’ tendency to politically significant behavior. The survey was conducted in 2017 in Ukraine (n=1247, age: 15-50 years). A positive correlation of the political participation indicators with the personal indicator Conscientiousness and the negative correlation with the Agreeableness parameter were revealed. We have established that emotionally balanced respondents more often show a desire to run for office and rarely participate in voting. High results for Agreeableness and Neuroticism determine the low level of political ambitions. These findings constitute a new step forward in understanding how personality traits form responses in the people’s political engagement while demonstrating the Ukrainian political tendencies.

Keywords: personality traits, political behavior, Five-Factor model, Big Five, NEO Personality Inventory-Revised.

Background and Research Hypothesis

At last decades, the people's activity in political life is an important aspect of their social interests, which has attracted a particular attention of researchers. Current personality researches base now upon an integrative view of the person, therefore both examining and explanation the human decision-making would be incomplete without putting a special focus on the personality traits in relation to formation of political attitudes, actions, interests, political behavior and citizens' engagement in the world of politics.¹ Political behavior usually depends on various factors: socio-cultural and geographical environment, socio-economic determinants, demographic indexes, ethnic indicators, and others. Meanwhile, the psychological mechanisms and factors that determine political behavior and particularities of cognitive, emotional, motivational interactions within political system remain insufficiently studied.

Herewith, a particular look should be dedicated for analyzing not only the personality traits (such human properties that a person acquires in the process of life) but the individual-psychological characteristics also (as the qualities given to a person with birth) which to a large extent affect both the people's everyday life and their political behavior. It is quite obvious that any individual feels natural striving to work in comfortable non-stressful conditions and with the most positive result of own activities; but the complexity of life, derived from various problems that have both a wide range of determinants and an extensive set of manifestations (cognitive, behavioral, emotional and physiological), does not permit to use effective means of dealing with a stress² in order a person might be capable to reveal own mobilization resources and recreational

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¹ Matthew Cawvey, Matthew Hayes, Damarys Canache and Jeffery J. Mondak, *Personality and political behavior* (Politics: Oxford Research Encyclopedias, 2017), <http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-221#>.

² Andreyanna Ivanchenko, Oleksandr Timchenko and Evgeniy Zaika, "How to get around the stress-traps in the students' life and avoid the stress acute angles," *Science and Education* 3 (2018): 12-19, http://scienceandeducation.pdpu.edu.ua/doc/2018/3_2018/2.pdf.

potential for increasing a proper productive-energetic outcome.³ So, what stimulates and motivates people to any activity, including in politics? What does it depend on?

Political behavior includes different aspects: electoral participation (also called as voter turnout), right to vote, and information during voting, interest in politics, etc. The definition of political participation can include variety of activities. The popular in political science dichotomy of conventional and non-conventional behavior had a long way to go before it appeared in contemporary political discourse. Conventional political behavior is mostly comprised of traditional activities taking place via legally accepted institutions, such as voting and campaign activity, contacting politicians and governmental officials, party membership, discussion of politics, etc. The over-all averages of voting in elections and discussing politics are, not surprisingly, the most widespread forms of conventional political activity.

The range of political activities was broadened in the 1960s with protesting and petitioning, classified as unconventional.⁴ Although such classification is widespread and well known, labeling petitions or demonstrations as “unconventional” acts remains controversial as those have become generally accepted. Nevertheless, the current study was designed upon traditional classification of conventional and non-conventional behavior due to recent massive protest activity in Ukraine that was not properly embedded in the political system. The analysis of political participation within Ukrainian context would contribute to the literature in general so as it provides psychological insides for on-going political transformation from relatively closed to more open political system. While open political systems find less need to resort to non-conventional movements, in closed systems conventional strategies fail to succeed.⁵

To our believe, transformations in modern Ukraine were triggered by citizens’ desire to be heard, when conventional strategies were not likely to induce authorities to give into the movement demands. Our intention is to point out substantial and comprehensive results by giving particular detailed look at

³ Andreyanna A. Ivanchenko, “The positive summarized effect of the creative life-orientation phenomenon,” *Fundamental and Applied Researches in Practice of Leading Scientific Schools* 21, no. 3 (2017): 100-107, <https://farplss.org/index.php/journal/issue/view/17>.

⁴ Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, *Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).

⁵ Rik Linssen, Hans Schmeets, Peer Scheepers and Manfred te Grotenhuis, “Trends in Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation in Europe, 1981-2008,” in Christina Eder, Ingvill C. Mochmann, Markus Quandt (Eds.) *Political Trust and Disenchantment with Politics. International Perspectives. Series: International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology*, 125, chap. 2 (2014): 31-58, <https://brill.com/view/title/24914>.

personality traits and their role in conventional and non-conventional political behavior. It is necessary to underline that political engagement is a highly important indicator of political system and democracy level in the country. When the citizens' essential interests are affected, a wide, equal and effective participation in the decision-making process would ensure the fulfillment of their aspirations, self-expression and self-affirmation.

The influence of personality traits on different forms of political participation is reflected in a wide array of studies. Despite the studies' findings are often mixed or some non-significant effects are found, we extracted the main trends for conventional versus non-conventional participation. Several studies have identified significant relationships between conventional, as well as non-conventional, forms of political participation and Extraversion. Conscientiousness shows strong negative relationship to non-conventional and a positive relation to conventional participation, when individuals feel that their voice is heard.⁶ Openness yields significant positive relationships with non-conventional activism and a lesser degree with conventional activism.⁷ The results of Mondak and Halperin (2008)⁸ revealed that all facets of personality, captured within the Big Five framework, significantly matter for citizens' operating in politics, and effect on virtually all aspects of political behavior.

Besides, a great number of researchers have analyzed different personality traits that could affect not only the level of civic duty or achievement striving but also the political propensity to participate in elections, in particular, as follows: personality traits are related to identification with different political parties and to the strength in party identification over time;⁹ high Agreeableness and Openness were predictive of intention to vote in presidential elections;¹⁰ different components of personality traits, as well as values, and self-beliefs, have impact on citizens' political preferences and

⁶ Jeffery J. Mondak, *Personality and the foundations of political behavior* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761515>.

⁷ Arne Roets, Ilse Cornelis and Alain Van Hiel, "Openness as a predictor of political orientation and conventional and unconventional political activism in Western and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Personality Assessment* 96, no. 1 (2014): 53-63, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223891.2013.809354>.

⁸ Jeffery J. Mondak and Karen D. Halperin, "A framework for the study of personality and political behaviour," *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (2008): 335-362, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000173>.

⁹ Bert N. Bakker, David Nicolas Hopmann and Mikael Persson, "Personality traits and party identification over time," *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 2 (2015): 197-215, doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12070.

¹⁰ Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Michele Vecchione and Chris R. Fraley, "Voters' personality traits in presidential elections," *Personality and Individual Differences* 42, no. 7 (2007): 1199-1208, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.09.029>.

participation;¹¹ party leaders' warm personality traits influence the people's voting behaviour;¹² Openness to experience promotes greater likelihood of strategic voting, whereas Agreeableness decreases that probability;¹³ statistically significant relationships between Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and several nonelectoral modes of participation were found;¹⁴ Agreeableness interacted with negativity to influence turnout intentions;¹⁵ only Openness to experience and Extraversion have an effect on online political engagement;¹⁶ higher levels of Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Emotional stability indirectly decrease the probability of voting during elections for a future president, whereas a higher level of Openness to experience indirectly increases the probability of voting;¹⁷ personality traits influence on sense of civic duty.¹⁸ Some scholars consider the link between openness to experience and protest participation is significantly moderated by direct democracy.¹⁹ The other more specific findings show the indirect relationships between personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea and imply that the impacts of personality traits on voter participation vary by country or geographic region.²⁰

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- ¹¹ Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione, "Personality approaches to political behavior," in *The Oxford handbook of political psychology*, 2d ed., ed. L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, and J. S. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 23-58, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.001.0001.
- ¹² Patrício Costa and Federico Ferreira da Silva, "The impact of voter evaluations of leaders' traits on voting behavior: Evidence from seven European countries," *West European Politics* 38, no. 6 (2015): 1226-1250, doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1004231.
- ¹³ Cengiz Erisen and André Blais, "Strategic voting and personality traits," in *Voting Experiments*, ed. A. Blais, J. F. Laslier, K. Van der Straeten (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016): 237-256, <https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783319405711>.
- ¹⁴ Sang E. Ha, Seokho Kim and Se Hee Jo, "Personality traits and political participation: Evidence from South Korea," *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 34, no. 4 (2013): 511-532, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12008>.
- ¹⁵ Aaron C. Weinschenk and Costas Panagopoulos, "Personality, negativity, and political participation," *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 2, no. 1 (2014): 164-182, doi:10.5964/jspp.v2i1.280.
- ¹⁶ Ellen Quintelier and Yannis Theocharis, "Online political engagement, Facebook, and personality traits," *Social Science Computer Review* 31, no. 3 (2013): 280-290, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439312462802>.
- ¹⁷ Ching-Hsing Wang, "Personality traits, political attitudes and vote choice: Evidence from the United States," *Electoral Studies* 44 (2016): 26-34, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.07.004>.
- ¹⁸ Aaron C. Weinschenk, "Personality traits and the sense of civic duty," *American Politics Research* 42, no. 1 (2014): 90-113, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X13484172>.
- ¹⁹ Kathrin Ackermann, "Individual differences and political contexts – The role of personality traits and direct democracy in explaining political protest," *Swiss Political Science Review* 23, no. 1 (2017): 21-49, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12227>.
- ²⁰ Ching-Hsing Wang, Dennis Lu-Chung Weng and Hyun-Jin Cha, "Personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea: The mediation argument," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 3 (2017): 426-445. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S146810991700010X>.

Apart from these results, many other researches of the personality traits influence have shown the following: individual-psychological characteristics may predict and positively affect volunteerism;²¹ two of the Big Five personality traits, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, are positively related to favorable attitudes toward political compromise;²² the Big Five contributes to political efficacy and participation and offers an excellent, efficient, workable means to incorporate attention to trait structure in researches on political behavior;²³ the effects of the Big Five on political and civic participation were confirmed but varied considerably across countries in a cross-national analysis, conducted in 24 countries with the aim to examine the influence of personality;²⁴ finally, in which way core personality traits shape responses to various aspects of the act of voting, in particular, that the Openness is associated with broad persuasibility and increased the likelihood of voting among those scoring high on Openness.²⁵

The psychological characteristics of political participation are no less important than its objective parameters – number of people engaged, compliance with law, intensiveness, sustainability, and others.²⁶ Personal dimension of political participation is comprised of motivation, a sense of engagement and self-perception. The foundation for thorough analysis of political behavior as well as human behavior are consideration of personal factors alongside different types and forms of political actions. For instance, inactive citizens, who are not practically involved in politics, do not feel in control of the political situation and, thus, do not feel psychologically engaged. On the contrary, civil activists are highly engaged in political life on the

²¹ Gustavo Carlo, Morris A. Okun and Maria Rosario T. de Guzman, “The interplay of traits and motives on volunteering: Agreeableness, extraversion and prosocial value motivation,” *Personality and Individual Differences* 38, no. 6 (2005): 1293-1305, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.08.012>.

²² Doo-Hun Choi and Don D. H. Shin, “Exploring political compromise in the new media environment: The interaction effects of social media use and the Big Five personality traits,” *Personality and Individual Differences* 106 (2017): 163-171, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.022.

²³ Michele Vecchione and Gian Vittorio Caprara, “Personality determinants of political participation: The contribution of traits and self-efficacy beliefs,” *Personality and Individual Differences* 46, no. 4 (2009): 487-492, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.11.021>.

²⁴ Aaron C. Weinschenk, “Big Five personality traits, political participation, and civic engagement: Evidence from 24 Countries,” *Social Science Quarterly* 98, no. 5 (2017): 1406-1421, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12380>.

²⁵ Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling and Costas Panagopoulos, “Big Five personality traits and responses to persuasive appeals: Results from voter turnout experiments,” *Political Behavior* 35, no. 4 (2013): 687-728, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-012-9216-y>.

²⁶ Jeffery J. Mondak, Matthew V. Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. Seligson and Mary R. Anderson, “Personality and civic engagement: An integrative framework for the study of trait effects on political behavior,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (2010): 85-110, <https://my.vanderbilt.edu/seligson/files/2013/12/APSR-published-article.pdf>.

personal and psychological levels. So, it makes sense to look at personality as an important causal predictor of both voting behavior and relevant political attitudes.²⁷

We have to mention several more findings on the personality traits and political acting in order to reveal additional details as to the relationship between them. Investigations as to voter turnout and political interest find that individuals with high comprehension ability and an aggressive personality are more likely to both turn out to vote and have an interest in politics.²⁸ Gallego and Oberski (2012)²⁹ confirm that the effects of personality traits on voter turnout and protest participation are sizeable but indirect, and mostly are mediated by attitudinal predictors. The other, more specific statistic data, concerning the protest activity in the samples of two nations – Uruguay and Venezuela, revealed that Conscientiousness emerges as a very strong deterrent, which fact ascertains the personality's influence on abovementioned political behavior and participation, both in Europe and in Latin America.³⁰

However, there is a difference between being positive about any activity in principle and actually engaging in it, because Extraversion and Openness are positively linked to engagement in both participatory and deliberative activities, while Agreeableness and Emotional stability are negatively related; in any case, the impact of personality on political participation should be taken in consideration.³¹ Parks-Leduc, Feldman, and Bardi³² have carried out an important study revealing as follows: Openness to experience and Agreeableness are the most strongly and coherently related to personal values; Extraversion and Conscientiousness also have some meaningful relations to

²⁷ Markus Steinbrecher, *The Big Five, party identification, and voting behavior in Germany*, Paper prepared for delivery at the ninth ECPR General Conference, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Canada, August 26-29, 2015, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7199d2c9-51f7-408b-9fd2-de90e10ad566.pdf>.

²⁸ Kevin Denny and Orla Doyle, "Political interest, cognitive ability and personality: Determinants of voter turnout in Britain," *British Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (2008): 291-310, doi:10.1017/S000712340800015X.

²⁹ Aina Gallego and Daniel Oberski, "Personality and political participation: The mediation hypothesis," *Political Behavior* 34, no. 3 (2012): 425-451, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9168-7>.

³⁰ Jeffery J. Mondak, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. Seligson and Matthew V. Hibbing, "The participatory personality: Evidence from Latin America," *British Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1 (2011): 211-221, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341000027X>.

³¹ Marina Lindell and Kim Stranberg, "A participatory personality? Examining the influence of personality traits on political participation," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 41, no. 3 (2018): 239-262, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12118>.

³² Laura Parks-Leduc, Gilad Feldman and Anat Bardi, "Personality traits and personal values: A meta-analysis," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 19, no. 1 (2015): 3-29, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868314538548>.

values; Emotional stability is generally unrelated to values; traits and values are distinct constructs and their relationships show little variation cross-culturally.

For another thing, the analysis of personality traits in the Brazilian context demonstrated that citizens scored high in Extroversion and Openness to experience seek out an additional political information, which allows them to take the decision to engage in a protest activity; so, it seems that the personality represents a kind of substrate for the development of proper cognitive skills relating to politics.³³

Personality traits indirectly affect partisan attitudes and voting behavior in Germany: Openness makes citizens more inclined to support parties endorsing social liberalism, Conscientiousness increases voting for parties subscribing to economic or social liberalism, high levels of Neuroticism promote support for parties that offer shelter against material or cultural challenges.³⁴

Political behavior increasingly takes place on digital platforms. Online mobilization occurs at a faster pace and involves citizens that would otherwise not be inclined to participate. Rapidly changing digital environment is the new field for political engagement research. Among other forms, online petitions have recently gained popularity across the globe, giving citizens a chance to bring issues on the agenda of democratically selected assemblies. But the effects of personality traits on online forms of political engagement do not substantially differ from offline.

We should note some interesting data as to the gender influence on correlation voter turnout, namely: Conscientiousness and Emotional stability can significantly increase female turnout, but have no effect on male turnout; Openness to experience exerts opposite effects on male and female turnout; no dependence on gender was noted concerning the Extraversion and Agreeableness which are not associated with voter turnout.³⁵ Besides, recent results of Ching-Hsing Wang³⁶ confirmed that the Big Five personality traits have different effects on male and female party identification in the United States, namely: with the increase of Agreeableness, women tend to be

³³ Ednaldo Aparecido Ribeiro and Julian Borba, "Personality, political attitudes and participation in protests: The direct and mediated effects of psychological factors on political activism," *Brazilian Political Science Review* 10, no. 3 (2016.) on-line version Dec. 12, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212016000300003>.

³⁴ Harald Schoen and Siegfried Schumann, "Personality traits, partisan attitudes, and voting behavior. Evidence from Germany," *Political Psychology* 28, no. 4 (2007): 471-498, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00582.x>.

³⁵ Ching-Hsing Wang, "Gender differences in the effects of personality traits on voter turnout," *Electoral Studies* 34 (2014): 167-176, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.10.005>.

³⁶ Ching-Hsing Wang, "Gender differences in the effects of personality traits on party identification in the United States," *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 38, no. 3 (2017): 335-362.

Republicans, but men tend to be Democrats; and furthermore, when Openness to experience increases, women are more likely to be strong partisans, but men are more likely to be independents or leaning partisans.

Age is a further variable affecting willingness to take an active role in politics. The comparative analysis from three largest European countries – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – revealed interesting findings on this matter. The younger generations are less likely to vote than their older counterparts and more inclined for participation in unconventional activities. While some forms of political involvement are strongest among the elderly (that is voting), other types are more pronounced among individuals between the ages of 34 and 65 (that is signing petitions) or the young (that is participation in demonstrations).³⁷ In addition, age differences were found suggesting that mean levels of Neuroticism and Extraversion are negatively associated with age, whereas Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are positively associated.³⁸

The study of Schoen and Steinbrecher (2013)³⁹ demonstrated that Agreeableness and Emotional stability considerably affects turnout, while Conscientiousness, Openness and Extraversion turned out to be ineffective. Concerning the links between individuals' personality traits and their propensity to vote at ages 36-50, the results show that Extraversion and Agreeableness are positively associated with voter turnout, but not at all ages; besides, the effect of Extraversion varies depending on the level of education: high-educated people are more prone to be habitual voters regardless of their Extraversion level.⁴⁰

Conventional behavior analysis, if respondents have not attained the voting age, could be pursued by exploring young adults' attitudes toward political behavior and internal political efficacy beliefs. Drawing on the framework of the theory of planned behavior, the changes in young adults' intentions to participate in politics could be explained. Findings on this matter showed that young respondents' intentions to participate in politics and their internal political efficacy beliefs predicted changes in their actual behaviors.⁴¹

³⁷ Daniela F. Melo and Daniel Stockemer, "Age and political participation in Germany, France and the UK: A comparative analysis," *Comparative European Politics* 12, no. 1 (2014): 33-53, <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.31>.

³⁸ Regula Lehmann, Jaap J. A. Dennison, Mathias Allemand and Lars Penke, "Age and gender differences in motivational manifestations of the Big Five from age 16 to 60," *Developmental Psychology* 49, no. 2 (2013): 365-383, doi:10.1037/a0028277.

³⁹ Harald Schoen and Markus Steinbrecher, "Beyond total effects: Exploring the interplay of personality and attitudes in affecting turnout in the 2009 German Federal election," *Political Psychology* 34, no. 4 (2017): 533-552. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12168>.

⁴⁰ Mikko Mattila, Hanna Wass, Peter Söderlund, Sami Fredriksson, Paivi Fadjukoff and Katja Kokko, "Personality and turnout: Results from the Finnish longitudinal studies," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34, no. 4 (2011): 287-306, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00273.x>.

⁴¹ Katharina Eckstein, Peter Noack and Burkhard Gniewosz, "Predictors of intentions to participate in politics and actual political behaviors in young adulthood," *International*

Individual personality traits plays a significant role in nascent political ambitions regardless of age. Recent studies proved that individuals with higher levels of Extraversion and Openness are more likely to consider running for office, while Agreeable and Conscientious individuals are significantly less interested.⁴² Another stream of research emphasizes the effect of civic associations on political participation. Existing literature depicts the relationship between civic associations and protesting behavior, proceeding from the idea that the ties formed in civic associations are more effective than other ties in recruiting protest participants.⁴³

With all this, there are some opposite conclusions declaring the following: (1) the studying of relationship between personality traits and political behavior, held in 21 countries from all continents, showed that effects of personality traits cannot be generalized easily across the world as their effects vary considerably from country to country;⁴⁴ (2) the impact of personality traits and psychological characteristics (namely, altruism, shyness, efficacy and conflict avoidance) is evidenced like being an indirect one and mediated by interest and duty;⁴⁵ (3) and even moreover, that a purely causal relationship between personality traits and political attitudes does not exist.⁴⁶

Summary of Expectations

The rapid rise of interest in politics, especially among young Ukrainians, unlocked a research potential related to measuring both personality traits and individual-psychological peculiarities and their effect on political participation. Investigation of the psychological determinants reveals a complicated system of links between the personality traits and political engagement and highlights the role of personality traits in the socialization and self-actualization in political

Journal of Behavioral Development 37, no. 5 (2013): 428-435, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025413486419>.

⁴² Adam M. Dynes, Hans J. G. Hassell and Matthew R. Miles, "The Personality of the Politically Ambitious," *Political Behavior*, online: 24 February 2018, 1-28, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9452-x>.

⁴³ Chaeyoon Lim, "Social networks and political participation: How do networks matter?," *Social Forces* 87, no. 2 (2008): 961-982, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20430898>.

⁴⁴ Matthias Fatke, "Personality traits and political ideology: A first global assessment," *Political Psychology* 38, no. 5 (2017): 881-899, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12347>.

⁴⁵ André Blais and Simon Labbé St-Vincent, "Personality traits, political attitudes, and the propensity to vote," *European Journal of Political Research* 50, no. 3 (2011): 395-417, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01935.x>.

⁴⁶ Peter K. Hatemi and Brad Verhulst, "Political attitudes develop independently of personality traits", *PLoS ONE*, 10, no. 7 (2015): 1-24, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0134072>.

sphere. The aim of our study is to examine the effect of the personality traits and individual-psychological characteristics upon political behavior in Ukraine, based on empirical data across five core personality dimensions: Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness and Conscientiousness. We specified the aim in subsequent tasks:

Firstly, to reveal connection between the psychological determinants of personality and indicators of political activity.

Second task is to undertake comparative analysis of obtained data with the results of recent studies, concerning the relation between personal traits, individual-psychological characteristics and political behavior.

Finally, we tend to introduce the control variables (age, gender, membership) while analyzing psychological determinants of political participation.

Based on literature review we can now summarize our expectations embodied in tentative working hypotheses. Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are expected to have the strongest positive relationship with conventional political behavior and negative relationship with non-conventional activities. Voting behavior is coherently related to personal values of citizens. Thus, only if the persons believe their voice is matter, they would try to make a difference by voting. We assume that voting behavior for respondents scored high in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness would be highly affected by the weight, given for elections within their inner scale of values.

High levels of Neuroticism are associated with political behavior that could offer a psychological shelter. Building on this idea, we expect that being a member of political (civil) organization, as well as expressing political identity by voting, is favorable behavior for the persons scored high in Neuroticism.

In line with prior research, we predict that high levels of Extraversion and Openness would have the positive relation with political ambitions, while agreeable individuals are less likely to be interested in running for office. Extraversion and Openness are also expected to have the positive relationships with online forms of political participation.

The effect of personality traits on political behavior is mediated by sex and age. Consistent with prior research, for Conscientiousness and Emotional stability we expect a significant increase in voting turnout for female respondents. Our other suggestion is that a substantive difference of political participation could be found across various age groups.

This leads us for hypothesis that younger respondents are less likely to participate in conventional activities and, alternatively, are more likely to participate unconventionally. In line with this, we assume that Neuroticism and Extraversion would affect the group difference for unconventional behavior, whereas Agreeableness and Conscientiousness would work for conventional participation.

The other factor expected to have an impact on participation is membership in civic associations. In line with previous findings, we assume that membership would be positively associated with non-conventional behavior so as the members are more likely to be recruited in protest activities than nonmembers.

Method

Participants and procedure

The sample of our study comprised the responses of one thousand two hundred and forty-seven (1247) participants aged from 15 to 50. A reasonably balanced proportion of male (41%) and female (59%) respondents was included. We held the survey in autumn 2017 in several cities of the Ukraine: Odessa, Kiev and Kharkov. The data was gathered by means of a self-evaluation questionnaire. The decent part of respondents was the 1-5 year students (64%), among whom anonymous testing was conducted. Participants were contacted in lectures and seminars and asked to fill out a questionnaire. 36% of data was collected randomly online through the Facebook platform. The sample encompasses the respondents from South (60%), West (10%), East (10%), Center and North of Ukraine (20%). The mean age of participants was 25.76 years. Of the participants, 60% were affiliated to civil society organizations. But the spectrum of those groups is very diverse: 28% respondents are engaged with charitable organizations and civil association, advocating for human rights, diversity, sustainability, democracy or providing support for vulnerable groups (elders, kids, disable people, women, etc.); the members of associations, promoting culture or sports comprise 16% of a total; 10% of respondents are affiliated to trade unions, 6% are engaged with other professional or business groups.

Measures

The personality inventory in our survey is based on the Five-Factor model ("Big Five"). The conceptual foundations of this test were gradually identified by L. Goldberg, P. Costa, H. Eysenck, R. Cattell, R. McCrae, J. Guilford, who developed a hierarchical model of the questionnaire, which includes assessments of personality characteristics, but its final 5-factor

personality model was elaborated and published by L. Goldberg.⁴⁷ According to their studies, Neuroticism could be best described as *worrying, insecure, temperamental* and *self-conscious*. The individuals high in Neuroticism more frequently use inappropriate coping responses like hostile reactions and wishful thinking because they must deal more often with the disruptive emotions and stress. *Sociable, fun loving, active, persistent* and *emotional* are the highest loading variables on the Extraversion factor. High results on Openness indicate that a person loves to experience everything new and to follow the latest trends. Openness could be best characterized by such references as *original, imaginative, having a broad range of interests, and daring*. Agreeableness is labeled by *social adaptability, likability, friendly compliance* and *love*. Those scored high in Agreeableness are trustful and altruistic; they usually tend to cooperate with their colleagues. A conscientious person could be described as *scrupulous, hardworking, ambitious, energetic, with a constant striving for achievement*. An undirected individual may have a demanding conscience and a pervasive sense of guilt but be unable to live up to his or her own standards; the cause of such situation is the lack of self-discipline and energy.

The questionnaire in our study, in which the participants have completed test, measuring personal traits – Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience and Neuroticism, is built on the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised, NEO-PI-R.⁴⁸ The test consists of fifty items, each trait domain is represented by 10 descriptive phrases to which the respondents must rate their agreement on a five-point scale, where: 1 – “Strongly disagree”, 2 – “Disagree”, 3 – “Neither agree, nor disagree”, 4 – “Agree”, 5 – “Strongly Agree”. In the present sample, the internal reliability coefficients were: .75 (Emotional stability), .85 (Extraversion), .78 (Openness to experience), .74 (Agreeableness), and .90 (Conscientiousness).

Apart from Big Five item pool, there are specific items that probe the respondents’ age, sex, membership in civil organizations. We created 5 age groups (15 to 20 year olds, 21 to 26 year olds, 27 to 32 year olds, 33 to 40 year olds, 40 to 50 year olds) to examine broad age trends across the sample. Due to sparse number of participants at older ages, we expanded the age interval for the latter groups. As a result we achieved the even distribution of participants for about 20% for each group.

Seven items reflecting specifically the respondents’ engagement in political activity measured political behavior. The complete list of items measuring political participation can be found in Table 1. These questions were

⁴⁷ Lewis R. Goldberg, “The development of markers for the Big-Five factor structure,” *Psychological Assessment*, 4(1), 1992, 26-42, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.4.1.26>.

⁴⁸ Paul Costa Jr and Robert R. McCrae, *Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R™) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) professional manual* (Odessa, Fla.: Psychological Assessment Resources, 1992), <https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/13311561>.

built around the voting turnout, intention to run for office, general evaluation of electoral process, participation through E-Petitions, participation in political protests and discussions. Except for the “Protests Activity (last 5 years)”, “E-Petition (last 5 years)” and (“yes” = “1”; “no” = “0”), the response options ranged from “1” to “5”. Political participation items offer a reliable scale of generalised trust with a Cronbach’s α of 0.721 and, hence, an acceptable internal coherence. In addition, abovementioned items were factored into scales, indicating conventional and non-conventional political behavior. Four items were used to examine respondents’ intentions to participate in conventional political activities (“Voting turnout”, “Positive attitude towards elections”, “Political Ambitions”, “Discussion of Politics”; Cronbach’s α of 0.684). Non-conventional political behavior was assessed with three items (“Protests Habits”, “Protests Activity (last 5 years)”, “E-Petition (last 5 years)”; Cronbach’s α of 0.626).

The data sample used in this study was build upon self-reported evaluation of political engagement. Inconsistencies between self-reported and actual political behavior are confirmed by numerous empirical examinations, thus, we naturally questioned reliability of answers provided. The accuracy of respondents’ self-reports could be challenged by: a) misreporting of respondents, tending to put themselves in the best light possible; b) misremembering the past behavior;⁴⁹ c) misunderstanding the question being asked.⁵⁰ The respondents tend to present themselves in a favorable manner, especially when it comes to voting or other socially desirable behavior. They are more likely to select the socially desirable answer due to memory failure, when there are no strong beliefs about true past events.⁵¹

In order to reduce the overreporting, we experimented with item construction. Questions about participation in protests were subjected to the “past five years” and “life-time” frames. As the approach of Andolina et al. (2003),⁵² has proved helpful for dealing successfully with social desirability bias it is expected that the introduction of the reporting period frame would

⁴⁹ Robert F. Belli, Michael W. Traugott, Margaret Young and Katherine A. McGonagle, “Reducing vote overreporting in surveys: Social desirability, memory failure, and source monitoring,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (1999): 90-108, <https://nebraska.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/reducing-vote-overreporting-in-surveys-social-desirability-memory>.

⁵⁰ Molly Andolina, Scott Keeter, Cliff Zukin and Krista Jenkins, *A guide to the index of civic and political engagement* (College Park, MD, The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, 2003), <https://civicyouth.org/PopUps/IndexGuide.pdf>.

⁵¹ Volker Stocké and Tobias Stark. “Political involvement and memory failure as interdependent determinants of vote overreporting,” *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 21 (2007): 239-257, https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/55955/1339_ft.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁵² Andolina, Keeter, Zukin and Jenkins, *A guide*.

bring results closer to reality. Within given sample, the variables indicating period and lifetime frames for protest activities correlated at a fairly high level (pearson's $r = .152$; p -value = .046). The reason, the respondents were asked about their protesting during the past five years, is that such frame fits into the chronology of key events in modern protest history of Ukraine, including Maidan Revolution in 2014. Similar approach was introduced for the measurement of online participation. "Electronic petition" question was build upon particular participation tool that had been launched for the first time in Ukraine in 2015.

Results and Discussion

Our analysis begins with assessment of the possible direct effects of the Big Five trait dimensions on various indicators of political engagement. We used the regression analysis as it enables to investigate multivariate relations between variables. This approach matches perfectly to the nature of political behavior measurement as well as enables us to find relationship that may not be obvious. Table 2 demonstrates how the Big Five traits performed alongside a number of predictors, used to reveal the level of political engagement. We used the linear regression measure for the political engagement variables with values ranging from (1) to (5) and binominal regression for dichotomous variables, if there are only two response options ("yes" or "no"). The political behavior indicators have been included as dependent variables, whose value depends upon personality indicators (independent variables). Positive coefficients indicate that the effect of political engagement is stronger for individuals high on the trait, while negative coefficients indicate that the effect is weaker for those high on the trait. The default setting for the statistically significant results is $p < .05$. This universally accepted approach to hypothesis testing has been adopted throughout the study. However, we considered the cases with $p < .10$ as suggestive of significant effect that warrants further study.

As it was expected, Conscientiousness showed the strongest significant positive relationship with conventional political behavior and negative relationship with non-conventional activities, although the latter demonstrated insignificant results. For Agreeableness, our findings did not correspond with initial hypothesis. The highest significant relation reported is between Conscientiousness and voting turnout, positive attitude towards elections and intention to run for office (political ambitions). The actions of individuals with the high level of Conscientiousness are strongly shaped by a sense of the task's importance. Thus, high scores on Conscientiousness are significant predictors of political participation, if the respondents perceive a sense of duty while engaging in particular activities.

Based on this idea, we examined voting depending on their attitude for elections. Results of correlation analysis indicated positive trend for voting, when the respondents declare trust for democratic election institutes (Pearson's $r = .185$; p -value = .022). The multiple regression test with «Voting Turnout» as dependent variable demonstrated a substantial positive association of voting with both «Positive Attitude towards Elections» and Conscientiousness variables (for Conscientiousness: $B = .203$, $SE = .081$, $Sig. = .013$; for «Positive Attitude towards Elections»: $B = .143$, $SE = .080$, $Sig. = .043$). Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a likelihood for higher voting turnout among the respondents scored high in Conscientiousness, when they believe their voice is matter.

As could be seen from Table 2, only the persons scored high in Conscientiousness demonstrated a positive trend in both the political ambitions and positive attitude towards elections. Thus, political ambitions and confidence in the effectiveness of election procedures would not necessarily coincide.

Our results of the regression analysis indicated a positive, but nonsignificant, association of Extraversion and Openness with political ambitions. Meanwhile, the respondents scored high in Agreeableness demonstrated low intention to run for election, that comes in line with initial hypothesis. Running for office and holding office could be challenging for the people scored high in Agreeableness because of the threat of possible conflicts, herewith this type would usually avoid them.

The positive relation between emotional stability and political ambitions revealed within current study proves that emotionally stable people are more likely to manage stress and negative emotions related to running for office. As was expected, within our sample, the respondents scored high in Neuroticism demonstrate a positive tendency towards regular voting. There is an interesting assumption on this matter offered by Markus Steinbrecher in his aforementioned work (2015),²⁷ that the people low on emotional stability may find helpful a self-identification with political party, in order to reduce the complexity in the political world and restore the mental stress.

The rapid development of the Internet and social networks has led to the emergence of numerous online forms of political participation. Within current study, we have analyzed E-Petitions, which have gained popularity in recent years after the launch of the online service that enables the citizens to appeal to the President of Ukraine. Unlike previous researchers, we were not able to find significant evidence, confirming the positive effect of Extraversion and Openness on signing E-Petitions.

The next step of our study is the estimation of results considering additional factors that can affect respondents' behavior (namely – age, gender, membership in civil organizations). We have introduced control variables into regression analysis in order to determine which factors may be helpful to gain the estimates as realistic as possible. The regression coefficients of models with

control variables are presented in Table 3. The models are built on the basis of relations between political behavior acts and personality traits transferred from Table 2. In order to have the opportunity to compare the influence of various factors on political behavior, we have introduced different sets of control variables that are believed to affect respondents' behavior. Experiments with control variables enable us to identify controls which may produce change in results and to reveal how models react to the addition of particular sets of control variables. Only those results from Table 2, that proved to be statistically significant ($p < .05$.) or at least considered as suggestive of significant effect ($p < .10$), were included for detailed examination and testing with control variables in Table 3.

The first model (M1) includes the same predictors as those used in Table 2. The second model (M2) adds the perceived importance of age and gender. In addition to those factors, the third model (M3) includes a control variable of membership in political or civil organizations. We entered the control variables into the regression models with the evaluation of Adjusted R Square for each model. The adjusted R-squared indicates the explanatory power and reliability of presented models. Thus, within this study, only the models with the highest adjusted R-squared or Nagelkerke R Square (for binomial models) were considered.

The experiments with control variables demonstrate the minor shifting between the models when it comes to Conscientiousness. Introduction of the control variables for "Voting Turnout" and "Attitudes towards Elections" did not improve the explanatory power of the model 2 as well as of the model 3.

The coefficients reflecting the effects of "Emotional stability" on political ambitions, mediated by control variables, have been proved to be statistically significant ($p < .05$). The introduction of controls demonstrated upward trend throughout the models with the highest adjusted R-squared in model 3. Thus, the analysis with introduction of the control variables resulted in more accurate model structure and demonstrated statistically significant coefficients. The evidence shows that emotionally stable individuals are more likely to have political ambitions and factors of age and gender noticeably effect intention to run for office. Thus, we have reliably confirmed that social and biographical factors influence the relation between Neuroticism and political ambitions.

Further, we ran the detailed analysis of gender, age and membership variables in order to reveal the effect they exert on different types of political participation with mediation of personality characteristics. First, we used ANOVAs to determine whether there are significant gender, age and membership status differences in political behavior. As for the gender, we did not find any evidence confirming that a man or a woman is more likely to take part in conventional or non-conventional political activities. Despite an expected effect of Conscientiousness and Emotional stability on females voting,

ANOVA testing for gender demonstrated non-significant difference between the groups.

As a next step, we checked whether the political participation is affected by the age of respondents. We found significant difference between age groups for conventional participation ($p = .002$). The highest mean for conventional behavior was detected for the age group of 40-50 years. Consistent with initial hypothesis, there was general upward trend with the older people displaying stronger intentions for conventional political behavior, although we observed modest drop in mean scores for the respondents in their thirties (27-32 years old). In contrast, the age factor did not affect the non-conventional political behavior ($p = .082$).

When taking into account the membership variable, our intention was to track the effect of social action group engagement on political participation. The difference between group means proved to be significant for non-conventional acts ($p = .004$) and non-significant for conventional behavior ($p = .077$). In line with study hypothesis, “members” displayed a stronger intention to engage in non-conventional activities (Mean difference = .94).

A second step of analysis was testing group difference for conventional political participation, controlling for age, with introduction of personality covariances (ANCOVA). As it was expected, the test showed that personality did not affect greatly the significance of the difference in conventional political participation, except for the introduction of the Conscientiousness covariance (Table 4). The Conscientiousness effect analysis revealed a highly significant p -value of .0003, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no condition may be rejected.

But how big the evidence in favor of the effect? To answer this question, we analyzed the data with JASP software using the Bayesian ANCOVA methodology proposed by Rouder and his colleagues^{53, 54}. Bayesian hypothesis’ testing presents attractive alternatives to classical inference. We believe, our study design would benefit from the introduction of Bayesian methodology as it could be used to quantify and monitor evidence both in favor and against the null hypothesis. It compares the predictive adequacy of two competing statistical models, thereby quantifying the change in belief that the data bring about for two models under consideration.⁵⁵

⁵³ Jeffrey N. Rouder, Richard D. Morey, Paul L. Speckman and Jordan M. Province, “Default Bayes factors for ANOVA designs,” *Journal of Mathematical Psychology* 56, no. 5 (2012): 356–374, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2012.08.001>.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey N. Rouder and Richard D. Morey, “Default Bayes factors for model selection in regression,” *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 47, no. 6 (2012): 877–903, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272036475_Default_Bayes_Factors_for_Model_Selection_in_Regression.

⁵⁵ Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Maarten Marsman, Tahira Jamil, Alexander Ly, Josine Verhagen, Jonathon Love, Ravi Selker, Quentin F.Gronau, Martin Šmíra, Sacha Epskamp et al., “Bayesian inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and

Our analysis concerns to which extend the dependent variable “conventional political participation” is associated with age and covariates with Conscientiousness. As demonstrated in Table 5, all models receive overwhelming evidence in comparison with the null model. The model that outperforms the null model the most is the two main effects model “Age+Conscientiousness”, which, by Lee and Wagenmakers’s descriptive scale, could be defined as extreme evidence against the null hypothesis ($BF_{10} = 2060.503$).⁵⁶ Interestingly, the model of “Conscientiousness” demonstrated relatively high Bayes factor as well, that is especially visible in comparison with “age” model. Nevertheless, the data was ten times likely under two main effects model than under the model that adds only Conscientiousness.

As it is demonstrated in Table 6, the strongest trends within conventional participation framework appear for voting and positive attitude towards elections. In other words, the likelihood of voting and trust for democratic elections would increase with age, if respondents are scored high in Conscientiousness. The “extreme” evidence against null hypothesis ($100 < BF$) was revealed for the effect of “Age+Conscientiousness”, when evaluating attitude towards elections ($BF_{10} = 121.707$, $B_{01} = 0.008$).

Similar ANCOVA analysis was undertaken for the unconventional political participation with regard to membership factor and personality traits (as covariance variable). Table 7 shows that Big Five personality traits did not affect the difference in non-conventional behavior with regard to membership factor. Both classical and Bayesian analysis did not prove assumption of meaningful effect of personality on group differences. Nevertheless, the models with intervention of group and personality trait (“Membership + Personality traits”) provided evidence for rejection of the null hypothesis. In this case Bayes factor for models with inclusion of Openness and Extraversion did not exceed the «anecdotal» range ($1 < BF < 3$) and models with Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism provided only «moderate» evidence in favor of rejection of the null hypothesis ($3 < BF < 10$). Although the effect is relatively low, the influence of personality on the difference between groups (members/not members) for non-conventional participation could be declared. In addition, the respondents engaged in civil associations are consistently higher in Neuroticism, that comes in line with initial hypothesis.

practical ramifications,” *Psychonomic bulletin & review* 25, no. 1 (2018): 35-57, doi:10.3758/s13423-017-1343-3.

⁵⁶ Michael D. Lee and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, *Bayesian cognitive modeling: A practical course* (New York, U.S.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087759>.

Conclusions

Throughout this empirical research and analysis of personality traits, namely, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness and Conscientiousness, we endeavored to depict the complexity of possible interactions between personality and politics. Within this article, we have opened a completely new line of considerations about pathways linking psychological dimension of personality and political participation.

With our first research question, we found that the people scored high in Conscientiousness are inclined to conventional political participation and, alternatively, are not likely to take part in non-conventional activities. We have found evidence that agreeable people are less likely to participate actively in politics; in particular, we have discovered a strong negative relation towards desire to run for office and participate in political discussions. In contrast, individuals with high scores on Conscientiousness are more likely to vote, show trust for political system and seek for office. Subsequently, a higher voting turnout is observed, when the respondents believe their voice is matter. Our findings on Neuroticism demonstrated, that emotionally stable respondents are more likely to report intention to run for office, and less likely to vote.

Although results on Extraversion and Openness did not demonstrate statistically significant relation to the activities under study, the obtained results within current study are largely consistent with those reported in prior studies of the Big Five and political participation. Nonetheless, the obtained results allowed revealing a number of psychological patterns in political behavior with regard to Agreeableness, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness that enabled us to confirm and expand previous findings.

Annexes

Table 1: List of items with scales used to measure political engagement

	Name of category	Items	Scales
Conventional participation scale	Voting Turnout	Can you tell me how often you vote in local and national elections?	Always (5) / Very Frequently(4) / Occasionally (3) / Rarely (2) / Never (1)
	Positive attitude towards elections	When thinking about political elections in Ukraine, I believe, that my voice matters and my vote can make a difference.	Strongly Agree (5) / Agree (4) / Neither agree, nor disagree (3) / Disagree (2) / Strongly disagree (1)
	Political Ambitions	In terms of your ambitions, to what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I imagine myself running for office in future”?	Strongly Agree (5) / Agree (4) / Neither agree, nor disagree (3) / Disagree (2) / Strongly disagree (1)
	Discussion of Politics	Thinking about political and social issues, how often do you discuss latest news with your family and friends?	Always (5) / Very Frequently (4) / Occasionally (3) / Rarely (2) / Never (1)
Non-conventional participation scale	Protests Habits	How often you participate in protests, marches, or demonstrations?	Always (5) / Very Frequently(4) / Occasionally (3) / Rarely (2) / Never (1)
	Protests Activity (last 5 years)	During the past five years, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration at least once?	Yes (1) / No (0)
	E-Petition (last 5 years)	Have you signed an online petition about social or political issues at least once in the last 5 years?	Yes (1) / No (0)

Table 2: Direct effect of personality characteristics on political / social activity

Political activity		Agreeableness	Neuroticism	Extraversion	Openness	Conscientiousness
Conventional	Voting Turnout	.030 (.019)	.043* (.021)	.006 (.016)	-.004 (.018)	.069** (.020)

participati on	Positive Attitude towards Elections	.011 (.017)	.006 (.019)	-.007 (.014)	.011 (.016)	.042* (.018)
	Political Ambitions	-.071** (.021)	-.043# (.023)	.010 (.017)	.002 (.020)	.044# (.023)
	Discussion of Politics	-.033# (.019)	.002 (.022)	.012 (.016)	.022 (.019)	.002 (.021)
	Conventional participation index	-.222 (.192)	.099 (.206)	.119 (.191)	.117 (.188)	.733** (.213)
Non- conventio nal participati on	Protests Habits	-.013 (.020)	.005 (.022)	.006 (.017)	.010 (.019)	-.015 (.022)
	Protests Activity (last 5 years)	-.064# (.036)	-.034 (.039)	.025 (.029)	.003 (.034)	-.006 (.040)
	E-Petition (last 5 years)	.000 (.030)	.046 (.033)	.006 (.025)	.027 (.029)	-.023 (.032)
	Non- conventional participation Index	-.203 (.160)	.069 (.176)	.122 (.163)	.128 (.160)	-.141 (.179)

Note. Each row reports the results from a separate model; the first entry in each row is the dependent variable. The cell entries are the linear regression coefficients with the exception of those for protests activity (last 5 years), E-Petition (last 5 years) – here a binomial logistic regression is applied. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistically significant results are marked as follows: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; # $p < .1$.

Table 3: Effect of the Big Five on political engagement: experiments with control variables

Relation between political behavior and personality traits	Regression coefficients			Adjusted R Square		
	M 1 (base line)	M 2 (age, gender)	M 3 (age, gender, membership)	M 1 (base line)	M 2 (age, gender)	M 3 (age, gender, membership)
Voting Turnout*Neu roti cism	.043*	.049*	.051*	.060	.054	.053
Voting Turnout*Con scien tiousness	.069**	.070**	.068**			
Positive Attitude towards Elections*Con scien	.042*	.042*	.040*	.014	.017	.14

tiousness						
Protests Activity (last 5 years)*Agreeableness	-0.064#	-.056	-.063	.47	.059	.105
Political Ambitions*Agreeableness	-.071*	-.068**	-.070**	.106	.108	.112
Political Ambitions*Neuroticism	-.043#	-.049*	-.046*			
Political Ambitions*Conscientiousness	.044#	.041#	.038#			
Discussion of Politics*Agreeableness	-.033#	-.043*	-.043*	.002	.045	.039

Note. This table provides exclusively statistically significant results. Each row reports the results from a separate model. The first entry in each row is the regression model from the Table 2, tested with control variables (only models demonstrated statistically significant or suggestive of significant effect results are included). The cell entries are the linear regression coefficients, with the exception of those for protest activity (last 5 years) – here a binomial logistic regression is applied. M1, M2, M3 are the regression models. M1 does not contain any control variables. M2 is built with the consideration of age and sex, M3=M2+control variable of membership. Statistically significant results are marked as follows: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; # p < .1.

Table 4: ANCOVA test results for the effect of age on conventional political participation with regard to Big Five personality traits

	Openness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Neuroticism
Effect of Age (p)	,001	,003	,001	,001	,002
Effect of Big Five Personality traits (p)	,072	,0003	,057	,158	,252
Effect of Big Five Personality traits (BF10)	0,50	201,5	0,59	0,27	0,29
Age+ Personality traits effect (BF10)	13,04	2056,48	14,33	7,40	6,1

Note. The first and second rows provide p-value indicators for ANCOVA test (SPSS output). The analysis was conducted with “conventional political participation” as dependent variable, “age” (5

groups) as fixed factor; the Big Five traits were introduced as covariance variables. The homogeneity assumption for ANCOVA was hold throughout all models. The third and fourth rows demonstrate results of Bayesian ANCOVA analysis (JASP output). The Bayes factor for “age” in all models stands at 19,78.

Table 5: Model Comparison for the effect of age on conventional political participation with Conscientiousness covariance (ANCOVA)

Models	P(M)	P(M data)	BF _M	BF ₁₀	error %
Null model	0.250	4.381e -4	0.001	1.000	
Agegroup	0.250	0.009	0.026	19.782	0.004
Conscientiousness	0.250	0.088	0.290	201.519	0.010
Agegroup + Conscientiousness	0.250	0.903	27.807	2060.503	0.857

Note. The JASP output table for the Bayesian ANCOVA. The analysis was conducted with «conventional political participation» as dependent variable, “age” (5 groups) as fixed factor, the “Conscientiousness” variable was introduced as covariance. The Bayes factor expressed as BF10 (and its inverse BF01 = 1/BF10), grading the intensity of the evidence that the data provide for H1 versus H.

Table 6: Bayesian ANCOVA test results for the effect of age on specified political participation acts (conventional scale) with regard to Big Five personality traits

Dependent variable	Models' elements	BF10	BF01
Voting Turnout	Age	2.081	0.481
	Conscientiousness	8.479	0.118
	Age + Conscientiousness	11.470	0.093
Positive Attitude towards Elections	Age	46.522	0.021
	Conscientiousness	3.332	0.300
	Age + Conscientiousness	121.707	0.008
Political Ambitions	Age	0.947	1.056
	Conscientiousness	7.657	0.131
	Age + Conscientiousness	4.729	0.208
Discussion of Politics	Age	0.261	3.839
	Conscientiousness	0.231	4.332
	Age + Conscientiousness	0.056	17.771

Note. The JASP output for the Bayesian ANCOVA. The analysis was conducted with the different types of conventional behavior as dependent variables, “age” as fixed factor, the “Conscientiousness” variable was introduced as covariance. The Bayes factor expressed as BF10 (and its inverse BF01 = 1/BF10), grading the intensity of the evidence that the data provide for H1 versus H.

Table 7: ANCOVA test results for the effect of membership on non-conventional political participation with regard to Big Five personality traits

	Openness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Neuroticism
Effect of membership(p)	,005	,002	,005	,003	,002
Effect of Big Five Personality traits (p)	,805	,145	,939	,079	,136
Effect of Big Five Personality traits (BF10)	0,23	0,23	0,20	0,48	0,23
Membership+ Personality traits effect (BF10)	1,42	3,42	1,40	5,56	3,69

Note. The first and second row provide p-value indicators for ANCOVA test (SPSS output). The analysis was conducted with «non-conventional political participation» as dependent variable, «membership» (0;1) as fixed factor; the Big Five traits were introduced as covariance variables. The homogeneity assumption for ANCOVA was hold throughout all models. The third and fourth rows demonstrate results of Bayesian ANCOVA analysis (JASP output). The Bayes factor for “membership” in all models stands at 7.92.

Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland and Ukraine

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Abstract

The article analyses Nord Stream 2 project in terms of the national interests of Poland and Ukraine. The authors carry out comparative analysis of risks and threats which are posed by the project to the national interests of both countries in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. The probable consequences of implementation of the Russian gas initiative are discussed. Scenarios of tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine are described. These steps would allow the countries to influence the process of Nord Stream 2 project implementation and, potentially, block it; as well as allow preparing their own energy systems to new conditions which might be formed after the launch of two lines of a new Russian gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.

Keywords: Nord Stream 2, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, EU, gas, influence.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the development and implementation of the Russian project of the northern gas pipeline, which was laid at the bottom of the Baltic Sea to connect Russian gas fields with the German energy market, have been the subject of an active discussion in the political and expert circles among the EU states and countries closely connected with the transportation

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process of the Russian gas. Most attention during the discussion of the project has been focused on Russia's initiative impact on European politics and economy, its compliance with the European legislation requirements and the fate of transit countries and importers of Russian gas. However, despite the contradictory nature of the project and the ambiguous reaction of stakeholders in 2010, the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and a number of European investors succeeded in starting the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline which was completed in 2012 and which launched the commercial exploitation of two gas lines.

The main reason for the relatively quiet implementation of the project was the rigid policy of Berlin's officials who managed to lobby Nord Stream within the EU. Moreover, Germany used the situation that the Third Energy Package (a set of legislative norms which came into force only in 2009 and which regulates the European gas market) was not sufficiently integrated within the EU and the national legislation of its member states. Therefore, the chances of blocking the Nord Stream project were minimized. The primary motivation for such Germany's standpoint was its economic interest in the Russian project since the construction of the gas pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea made it possible to avoid gas transit through the territories of Ukraine and Poland (during the first decade of the 2000s, the stability of the Ukrainian direction was repeatedly questioned). Furthermore, the project enabled Germany not to pay the transit cost of imported Russian gas which was included in the price.¹

As of 2013, the first year when two lines of the gas pipeline worked during the whole calendar year, the capacity of Nord Stream did not reach the level of the project plan, namely 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year. They operated at the level of 43% of the project capacity.² Therefore, the new gas line was not able to transmit a large part of Russian natural gas export to the EU which by the same year amounted to 161 bcm.³ The share of gas transported by Nord Stream remained at a level that did not make it possible to oust other regional energy lines. This factor allowed the transit countries of Russian gas, such as Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Belarus, not to consider the Russian initiative to be strategically threatening for their transit position.

Nowadays, a completely different reaction is observed regarding the expansion of Russian Nord Stream into two new lines of Nord Stream 2

¹ Hannes Adomeit, "Germany, the EU, and Russia: The Conflict over Nord Stream 2," *Centre for European Studies*, April 1, 2016, <https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/Adomeit-policy-brief.pdf>.

² Gabriel Collins, "Russia's Use of the "Energy Weapon" in Europe", *Baker Institute of Public Policy*, July 18, 2017, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ac785a2b/BI-Brief-071817-CES_Russia1.pdf.

³ Harald Hecking and Florian Weiser, "Impacts of Nord Stream 2 on the EU natural gas market," *EWI*, November 12, 2017, <https://www.ewi.research-scenarios.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/EWI-1163-17-Studie-Impacts-of-Nord-Stream-2-web.compressed.pdf>.

pipeline which will have an identical to Nord Stream capacity. The strong negative reaction of a number of the EU states, transit states of Russian gas and global gas suppliers is predominately caused by the international conditions in which the project is implemented. First of all, the radical changes of Russia's political, economic, security and geopolitical images in the world and in the EU have played a crucial role. This is mainly due to the Kremlin's aggressive actions in Ukraine, i.e. an illegal annexation of Crimea; a military invasion of Donbas region; occupation of certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the Russian troops; spy scandals; cyber-attacks on strategically important systems of the West; and active interference in the internal affairs of the leading countries of the world. The new image of Russia has changed the way Nord Stream 2, the construction of which started in 2016,⁴ is perceived and has shifted it from a purely economic dimension to geopolitical. This did not correspond to the interests of the Russian Federation and Germany, the countries most interested in implementing the gas initiative.

The economic dimension of the negative reaction of many states to Nord Stream 2 also remains important, as a substantial increase in the capacity of the northern gas pipeline threatens the current transit countries of Russian gas both inside and outside the EU. These threats comprise the redistribution of the energy market and non-lucrative for transit countries gas supply diversification for Europe. In addition, new international gas suppliers, including the United States and Qatar, are seeking to expand their energy presence in the European market which makes Nord Stream 2 a threatening project for their energy ambitions.⁵

In the context of the above-mentioned, special attention should be paid to the analysis of the impact of Nord Stream 2 on such states as Ukraine and Poland. The complexity and the multi-level nature of the challenges posed by the Russian gas project to the interests of Kyiv and Warsaw, public consensus on Russia's negative role in the international arena and friendly relations between the two countries explain the expediency of analysing these two states from the perspective of possible consequences of Nord Stream 2 implementation.

The research theme of Nord Stream 2 as a geopolitical, economic, political, security and environmental challenge to the international community is attracting considerable attention of scientists. This interest is stimulated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Federation has significantly increased its foreign policy activity on the international scene. Secondly, the Kremlin has posed real threats to international peace and security. Balázs Sziklai, László Kóczy and David Csercsik have made an important contribution into the

⁴ Nord Stream, accessed July 11, 2019, <https://www.nord-stream.com>.

⁵ Rania El Gamal and Erik Knecht, "U.S. wants Qatar to challenge Russian gas in Europe - U.S. official," *Reuters*, January 14, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-energy-gulf/us-wants-qatar-to-challenge-russian-gas-in-europe-us-official-idUSL8N1ZE1XG>.

scientific research of the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2.⁶ Using mathematical models, they have been able to analyse the geopolitical aspects of the Nord Stream 2 influence on the energy balance of power in the region. The geopolitical impact of the Russian energy project on the interests of Poland has been analysed by Łukasz Wojcieszak⁷ and Marco Giuly.⁸ Talking about the analysis of the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2 on Ukraine, we consider the works of Kai-Olaf Lang, Kirsten Westphal,⁹ Ariel Cohen¹⁰ and Pawel Rybacki¹¹ worth mentioning.

A significant contribution to the study of the economic impact of Nord Stream 2 on Poland's national interests has been made by Harald Hecking, Florian Weiser,¹² Péter Kotek, Adrienn Selei and Borbála Takácsné Toth.¹³ They have analysed the economic challenges and threats that the project presents for Poland in the context of the complex economic impact of the gas pipeline in the European energy market. As for the economic impact of Nord Stream 2 on the interests of Ukraine, works of Alan Riley¹⁴ and Simon Pirani¹⁵ deserve special attention. They have examined in detail the financial and economic implications of the implementation of the Russian Baltic energy project for Ukraine.

Research into the Nord Stream projects as a political instrument of influence on European states and especially on Poland has been conducted by

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- ⁶ Balázs Sziklai, László Kóczy and Dávid Csercsik, "The geopolitical impact of Nord Stream 2," *Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences*, October 14, 2018, <https://www.mtaki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MTDP1821.pdf>.
- ⁷ Łukasz Wojcieszak, "Nord Stream 2 Pipeline. Role of German-Russian Energy Cooperation for Poland," *American Journal of Sociological Research* 7, no 3 (2017): 85-89.
- ⁸ Marco Giuly, "Nord Stream 2: Rule no more, but still divide," *European Policy Centre*, June 25, 2018, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_8613_nordstream2.pdf?doc_id=2010.
- ⁹ Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, "Nord Stream 2 – A Political and Economic Contextualisation," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, March 13, 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP03_lng_wep.pdf.
- ¹⁰ Ariel Cohen, "Russia's Nord Stream II Pipeline Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare," *Forbes*, June 18, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/18/russias-nord-stream-ii-pipeline-is-ukraines-worst-nightmare/#556f7a0b3524>.
- ¹¹ Pawel Rybacki, "Nord Stream 2: Russia's Geopolitical Trap," *Harvard Political Review*, January 17, 2019, <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/nord-stream-2/>.
- ¹² Hecking and Weiser, "Impacts of Nord Stream 2."
- ¹³ Péter Kotek, Adrienn Selei and Borbála Takácsné Toth, "The impact of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline on gas prices and competition," *REKK*, February 24, 2017, https://rekk.hu/downloads/academic_publications/NordStream2_REKK.pdf.
- ¹⁴ Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences," *Atlantic Council*, June 20, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Nord_Stream_2_interactive.pdf.
- ¹⁵ Simon Pirani, "Russian gas transit," *The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, November 1, 2018, <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Russian-gas-transit-through-Ukraine-after-2019-Insight-41.pdf>.

Karel Beckman¹⁶ and Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny.¹⁷ Russia's politicization of this energy project has been deeply analysed in the work written by Gabriel Collins¹⁸ as one of the most important threats to the national interests of Ukraine.

Nowadays additional attention needs to be paid to studying the Nord Stream 2 impact on Ukraine and Poland in the context of challenges that this Russian energy project presents to both countries. The complexity of the challenges and threats posed by Nord Stream 2 to the interests of Ukraine and Poland; the importance of these two countries as energy sources for the EU, Russia and for the energy security in the region in general; and Ukraine-Poland partnership relations entail thorough analysis of the impact of the Russian energy project on two states.

This article aims to study the Russian gas initiative in the Baltic Sea in terms of national interests of Poland and Ukraine. Therefore, the authors of this article have identified the following research objectives: to explore the impact of the project on the national interests of Poland and Ukraine on economic, political and geopolitical levels; to compare the importance of each level of this influence for Poland and Ukraine; to discuss the probable economic, political and geopolitical consequences of the project implementation for both countries; to predict tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine in respond to the challenges posed by the Russian energy project.

The authors' approach is based on comparative analysis of risks and threats which are posed by Nord Stream 2 project to the national interests of Poland and Ukraine in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. The expediency of such a comparison is determined not only by the strong historical ties between the two states, but also by the fact that they both adhere to the inadmissibility of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction and advocate diversification of energy sources, as well as energy cooperation of Poland, the USA and Ukraine. At the same time, it can be assumed that the different political, security, economic conditions and the social situation in Poland and Ukraine lead to some differences in the approaches of the two countries to assessing the consequences of Nord Stream 2 project implementation in various spheres. Identification of similarities or differences in the positions of Warsaw and Kyiv and their characteristics will allow to comprehensively analyse the probable threats to these countries' national interests, which the implementation of this project represents.

¹⁶ Karel Beckman, "Politics and economics clash over Nord Stream 2," *Energypost.eu*, March 28, 2017, <https://energypost.eu/14574-2>.

¹⁷ Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny, "Landscapes of Paradox: Public Discourses and Policies in Poland's Relationship With the Nord Stream Pipeline," *Geopolitics* 15 (2010): 1-21.

¹⁸ Collins, "Russia's Use."

Poland

The standpoint of Warsaw concerning the Russian energy project has been clearly outlined almost since the start of the Nord Stream 2 initiative, and it remains unchanged. In Polish politics, there is a strong consensus on the assessment of the gas project, and the main political actors of Poland have unanimously manifested it.

Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly expressed his position regarding the harm and strategic negativity which is caused by the Russian gas initiative.¹⁹ This point of view corresponds to the position of the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, who underlined the clear political course of the project.²⁰ It is also worth mentioning that the parliament supports the Polish executive branch on this matter. The parliament has clearly outlined its position that the EU needs to intervene in the situation and block Nord Stream 2.²¹ As one can see, the reaction of the Polish authorities is almost unanimous, and it is supported by the public rejection of the Russian gas initiative.

This standpoint of Poland is largely predetermined by the political monolithicity of the current Polish government, namely the domination of the Right and Justice Party in the Polish political system. Due to the history and the electorate of this political force, which is represented by the conservative part of Polish society, its anti-Russian rhetoric and actions are aimed at reducing the influence of Russia in European integration structures. This policy is a sort of an identification card of this political force which has severely condemned Nord Stream 2 on the national level and attempted to block this project with the help of the EU mechanisms.²²

The reasons for such Poland's reaction to Nord Stream 2 should be considered at three levels, i.e. economic, political and geopolitical. This will give an opportunity to fully analyse the potential threats posed by the implementation of this energy project to the interests of Warsaw.

Economy

Let us regard those aspects of the Polish gas market that are threatened by the Nord Stream 2 launch. The data shows that the consumption of natural gas

¹⁹ Maciej Martewicz, "Poland Waves Goodbye to Russian Gas After 74 Years," *Bloomberg*, February 7, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-08/poland-bets-on-lng-norwegian-gas-as-divorce-with-russia-looms>.

²⁰ Martewicz, "Poland Waves Goodbye."

²¹ Marcin Czekanski, "Nord Stream 2 will hinder competition – Polish MP," *Montel*, September 19, 2018, <https://www.montelnews.com/en/story/nord-stream-2-will-hinder-competition--polish-mp/936208>.

²² Bartłomiej Czetowicz, "Zaremba o Nord Stream 2: 'to jest sowietyzacja prawa unijnego'," *Radio Szczecin*, November 26, 2018, <http://radioszczecin.pl/1,380838,zaremba-o-nord-stream-2-to-jest-sowietyzacja-pra&s=1&si=1&sp=1>.

in Poland in 2017 was 19.1 bcm per year;²³ 26% of it was from Poland's own gas production. While 63% of Poland's natural gas consumption was imported from the Russian Federation, and only 11% of natural gas was provided as a result of diversification policies, namely via a liquefied natural gas terminal (LNG-terminal) in Świnoujście in Northern Poland which was put into operation in 2015.²⁴ Not only was such dependence of Poland on Russian gas imports predetermined by the needs of the Polish economy and the limited choice of suppliers (due to the lack of the necessary communications infrastructure with the Norwegian, American and Middle Eastern natural energy markets) but it was also caused by the requirements of the 1997 agreement on Poland's purchase of Russian gas. The contract, signed between Gazprom and the Polish gas company PGNiG, was extended in 2010. Under this agreement, Poland was obliged to import at least 8 bcm of gas per year, and since 2011 it had to import 11 bcm of gas annually. This agreement will be in force until 2022, but in November 2019 PGNiG informed Russian Gazprom about the contract termination of December 31, 2022, confirming Warsaw's strategic decision to refuse Russian imports of gas.²⁵

Moreover, a transit contract between Poland and Russia expires in May 2020, and the Polish government is already emphasising a revision of tariff policy regarding the price increase of the Russian gas transit in Europe. It should be underlined that, despite the refusal to import gas, Poland does not consider the option of completely stopping the transit of Russian gas through its territory because Polish politics understands the threats to Europe's energy security if gas transit through the Yamal-Europe pipeline is terminated.²⁶

Therefore, in the context of the expiration of the agreements and the development of an alternative gas route to Western European markets, Poland has faced a threat of being outside the gas pipelines between the EU and Russia and hence of losing one of the key components of its energy importance in the European market. It should be noted that the loss of the transit role does not threaten Poland in the short term since Russia scheduled the launch of Nord Stream 2 only to mid-2020.²⁷ Moreover, given the complexity of this process,

²³ Martewicz, "Poland Waves Goodbye."

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Marcin Czekanski, "Poland will not extend 9bcm gas supply deal with Russia," *Montel*, November 15, 2019, <https://www.montelnews.com/en/story/poland-will-not-extend-9bcm-gas-supply-deal-with-russia/1060225>.

²⁶ "Poland plans to increase the tariff for Russian gas transit", *Kosatka.Media*, August 15, 2019, <https://kosatka.media/en/category/gaz/news/polsha-planiruet-povysit-tarif-za-tranzit-rossiyskogo-gaza>.

²⁷ Dmitrieva Anastasia, "Russia expects to delay Nord Stream 2 launch to mid-2020: report," *S&P Global*, 21 November, 2019, <https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/112119-russia-expects-to-delay-nord-stream-2-launch-to-mid-2020-report>.

the real commercial use of the two lines of the new gas pipeline can only begin in 2020-2021; therefore, this factor forces Moscow to adhere to a transit agreement with Poland. Nowadays the Kremlin via Gazprom does not regard the Polish transit route as strategic and has plans to redirect significant gas flows through Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 the total capacity of which under the condition of maximum withdrawal will be close to 110 bcm per year. According to the data of 2017, European states imported 192 bcm of gas from Russia (81% of it was purchased by Western European countries).²⁸ Taking into account the project capacity of the northern gas pipeline, with the launch of Nord Stream 2 the Kremlin will claim that the Baltic pipeline system will be able to take over more than 50% of all deliveries of Russian natural gas to Western Europe.

Thus, the strategic value of the Polish transit route has significantly decreased, and this threatens the Polish energy sector with significant financial losses and the need to find new sources of profit. This allows reaching an interim conclusion that the transit of Russian gas as a key component of Poland's energy importance in the European market is under the strategic threat from the Nord Stream 2 launch. This additional alternative gas pipeline does not depend on transit through the territories of other states and therefore does not impose a series of transit gas surcharges for end users; and as a result, it is more economically lucrative. In such conditions, diverting the gas flow from the classical route through Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Slovakia to the northern direction does not only promote the interests of the Russian Federation but also of importers in Western Europe.

Another important aspect of the negative impact of Nord Stream 2 on the Polish economy is the decline in the state's export capacity, caused by new gas conditions. Poland has declared the policy of diversification of gas supplies that resulted in signing contracts with gas companies of the USA, Qatar, Norway. Moreover, Warsaw has joined the implementation of the Baltic Pipe Project which should connect Poland and Denmark with the gas deposits of Norway.²⁹ Nevertheless, despite these facts, the complete refusal from Russian gas in the near future should not be expected. This is because Poland cannot quickly reduce the dependence of Polish economy upon natural gas volumes.

In the conditions of (1) the expiration of the agreement on the import of Russian gas, (2) the construction of Nord Stream 2, (3) the presence of significant gas demand on western and eastern borders of Poland which is potentially capable of partially satisfying, and (4) a low level of its own gas production, Warsaw is interested in the re-export of natural gas. The situation was also facilitated by the fact that in 2017 the Russian Federation, at the

²⁸ "Delivery statistics", *Gazprom export*, accessed December 20, 2019, <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/>

²⁹ Tom Dichristopher, "Poland's goal of ditching Russian natural gas bolsters American LNG and Trump's energy agenda," *CNBC*, December 19, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/19/polands-goal-of-ditching-russian-gas-yields-opportunity-for-us-Ing.html>.

request of the European Commission, agreed to lift the restrictions on the re-export of its own gas in the European market which allowed many importing states to become exporters and economically benefit from this.³⁰

Nord Stream 2 in this context creates significant obstacles for Poland to pursue its interests because the transit of gas to Germany via the Baltic pipeline will allow the latter to become a state with the best re-export potential. The gas purchased in Russia will be free of transit surcharges, and thus not only will the Federal Republic of Germany have an opportunity to import cheaper gas but also to create better competitive re-export positions in the European market (especially in Western Europe). Firstly, Germany beneficially uses the capacity of an onshore part of Nord Stream Pipeline OPAL which runs through Germany and connects the Northern Gas Corridor with the markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Secondly, it is building a new gas pipeline EUGAL which will also run through Germany and increase the supply to European countries. Therefore, Berlin will be able to become an extremely influential player in the European market and will significantly reduce the capacity of other EU states as gas re-exporters.³¹

One should not forget that Russia holds the right to choose the best transit options for gas supply and thus to put pressure on European countries. Therefore, several conditions influence Poland's policy. On the one hand, Germany has been a prior direction for delivering Russian gas to the EU states. On the other hand, the Kremlin has developed its energy sector in the south of Europe through the implementation of the TurkStream project. Thus, under these conditions, Poland faces a dilemma to minimize damage from the reduction of transit through its territory and also appears to be in a tight intra-European competitive environment, in which it will be extremely difficult to become a gas hub.

Politics

From the beginning of the Nord Stream 2 project discussion, the Polish politicians, experts and the public have repeatedly stated that the most important vector of the Russian gas initiative is the political one. The Polish society has regarded and continues to regard the political side of the project from the perspective of Russia's aggressive foreign policy on the international scene. Especially this concerns Russian actions in Ukraine since Ukraine's geographic vicinity to Poland, deep and strong economic ties between these neighbouring

³⁰ Алексей Топалов, "«Газпром» помирился с Европой," (Alexey Topalov, "Gazprom Reconciled with Europe"), *Gazeta.ru*, March 13, 2017, <https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2017/03/13/10574423.shtml>.

³¹ Agata Łoskot-Strachota and Paweł Popławski, "The EUGAL project: the German branch of Nord Stream 2," *OSW*, June 15, 2016, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-06-15/eugal-project-german-branch-nord-stream-2>.

states, employment of a large number of Ukrainians in Poland and close dialogues between two societies make Ukraine a priority for Polish foreign policy. Consequently, the threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty are also a challenge to the national security of Poland.

In this context, the Polish side has repeatedly emphasized that the Nord Stream project is a continuation of the strategy of hybrid warfare which Russia wages not only on Ukraine but on the world in general. Thus, Warsaw wants to shift the emphasis in the European political discourse concerning the Russian initiative. Poland does not view Nord Stream as a purely economic project (the Federal Republic of Germany actively promotes this idea in an effort to commercialize Nord Stream 2) but rather as a politicised by Russia project which this country seeks to use as an instrument of pressure on the EU and especially on particular member states of the economic bloc.³²

Keeping this in mind, Warsaw understands Moscow's efforts to influence the EU and its member states and to formalize the split inside the bloc. Therefore, the Polish side has repeatedly emphasized that the Russian energy project is also an attempt to deepen the solidarity crisis within the Union. According to Polish officials, the project has added the energy problem to existing in the EU problems of migration, Brexit and the violation of democratic principles in a number of European states.³³

It is worth noting that in Poland Nord Stream 2, or more precisely its business style and the specifics of this project implementation, is actively discussed as the Kremlin's attempt to seriously hit the regulatory framework of the energy sector of the EU, i.e. the Third Energy Package. During the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project, a number of the EU states have questioned the effectiveness of the Third Energy Package. Warsaw mostly criticises Brussels for its inability to use the Regulations of the Third Energy Package to block Nord Stream 2. By this, it is meant that an exporter of gas has no right to control the stage of gas transportation, whereas in the case of Nord Stream 2 the operator of the gas pipeline is Nord Stream 2 AG which is directly controlled and managed by the Russian state-owned enterprise Gazprom.³⁴

Despite the repeated attempts made by Warsaw to use the European bureaucratic mechanism to influence the development of the project in the Baltic Sea, Poland still cannot move the case along mainly because of Berlin's opposition. This aspect demonstrates yet another political dimension of the threat that Nord Stream 2 poses to the interests of Poland, namely the ineffectiveness of European institutions to shape common energy policy. Hence,

³² Czekanski, "Nord Stream 2."

³³ Tobias Buck, "Nord Stream 2: Gas pipeline from Russia that's dividing Europe," *The Irish Times*, July 21, 2018, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-from-russia-that-s-dividing-europe-1.3571552>.

³⁴ Czekanski, "Nord Stream 2."

the further political dominance of the largest EU political players and of their interests over the European rules continues. This cannot be in the interests of Poland which considers the EU mechanisms to be an opportunity to increase its own influence in the alliance and to prevent the domination of Berlin and Paris in Europe.

The problem of Nord Stream 2 in the context of the conflict between Warsaw and Brussels over judicial reform in Poland, which has been harshly criticized by Poland's European partners and the EU institutions, gains additional political importance. Being aware of the lack of alternatives to the European direction and realising how important it is to maintain effective and productive interactions within the bloc, Poland has made concessions to Brussels on the judicial system. This action has one more time demonstrated the significance of the EU for the interests of the Eastern European state.³⁵ In such circumstances, it becomes clear that the unity and power of European institutions are crucial elements in the development of Poland. Therefore, actions aimed at preserving solidarity in the EU are a major priority for the Polish side. Understanding the threats presented by Nord Stream 2 to the unity of the EU and the ability of Russia to manipulate this issue and to use gas as a means of pressure, Warsaw must do its utmost to stop the project which at a strategic level undermines the foundations of the European unity.

Thus, the political vector of Poland's standpoint regarding Nord Stream 2 is no less important than the economic one because (1) the Russian energy project in the context of Russia's aggressive foreign policy in Europe, (2) the serious internal contradictions within the EU and (3) complicated relations between Warsaw and Moscow as well as with Brussels present a threat to the political stability of the EU and a number of its neighbours.

Geopolitics

Considering the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream 2 for the national interests of Poland, we divide the geopolitical role of Warsaw into two vectors: energy competition with Germany; promotion of the energy interests of large gas states in the European market.

On the subject of the first one, it is worth starting with an analysis of Germany's energy macro indicators of the implementation of Russian energy projects in the Baltic Sea. In particular, consuming 90.2 bcm of gas in 2017, Germany imported from Russia's Gazprom about 53.4 bcm of gas.³⁶ This

³⁵ Rybacki, "Nord Stream 2."

³⁶ Stuart Elliott and Nastassia Astrausheskaya, "Analysis: Germany, Turkey lead 2017 Russian natural gas imports," *S&P Global*, January 20, 2018, <https://www.spglobal.com/>

indicates that Russia de facto controls more than a half of gas supplies to Germany and is a leading energy player in the domestic German market. It is necessary to underline that exports to Germany make up about 27.5% of Russia's total gas exports to other countries which makes Germany the highest energy priority for Russia.³⁷ As noted above, the project capacity of the two lines of Nord Stream is approximately 55 bcm per year (this gas pipeline worked with the maximum capacity for the first time in 2018),³⁸ and this gas pipeline alone is able to meet the domestic demand of Germany in Russian gas. The fact allows claiming that by the means of Germany the Nord Stream 2 project aims to reach a larger energy scene, thereby transforming Germany into an influential transit country and a potential re-exporter of Russian gas in the European market.

Such an energy deal between Moscow and Berlin is a serious challenge to Poland which seeks to preserve its status as one of the main transit countries of Russian gas to Europe and potentially to be an influential player in the European natural gas re-export market. The emergence of Germany in the EU energy market dramatically changes the energy balance of forces in the region. In fact, ten years ago, Germany was completely dependent on the transit of gas through the territory of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, and this imposed an additional financial burden on it. Poland took advantage of the situation since it understood that it was one of the few keys to the European gas market. Additional problems are created by the implementation of the TurkStream project by Russia and Turkey because it creates alternative ways of supplying Russian gas to the southern part of the EU.³⁹

These conditions which are still at the stage of strategic formation induce Poland to work on strengthening another aspect of the country's geopolitical role in the European and world energy markets, namely to search for new energy allies interested in using Poland as an energy hub and an access point to the EU gas market.

platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/030818-analysis-germany-turkey-lead-2017-russian-natural-gas-imports.

³⁷ Dave Keating, "How Dependent Is Germany On Russian Gas?," *Forbes*, July 19, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2018/07/19/how-dependent-is-germany-on-russian-gas/#396fec233b48>.

³⁸ Stuart Elliott and James Leech, "Nord Stream natural gas flows in 2018 reach almost 59 Bcm, well above capacity", *S&P Global*, January 22, 2019, <https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/012219-nord-stream-natural-gas-flows-in-2018-reach-almost-59-bcm-well-above-capacity>.

³⁹ Astakhova Olesya, Sezer Can Turkey, "Russia launch TurkStream pipeline carrying gas to Europe," *Reuters*, January 8, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-russia-pipeline/turkey-russia-launch-turkstream-pipeline-carrying-gas-to-europe-idUSKBN1Z71WP>.

Understanding why in the geo-energy sphere Russia chose Germany as its main ally in the EU and as the key energy partner in the European energy market, Poland, pursuing its ambitions, has begun to develop the necessary infrastructure which would allow transforming and redirecting its own market from the Russian direction to others. The greatest emphasis has been put on the implementation of two infrastructure projects: 1) the construction of an LNG terminal in the Baltic region; 2) the development of the Baltic Pipe Project.

Regarding the first one, a practical step was taken in 2015 when Prime Minister of Poland Beata Maria Szydło opened the LNG terminal in Świnoujście on the Baltic coast of the country. In future, the initial project capacity of 5 bcm is planned to be gradually increased by 2.5 bcm per year. This fact proves that Warsaw has strategic interests to actively use the terminal in Polish energy policy.⁴⁰ Moreover, Poland has provided powerful energy reinforcement of the initiative when Warsaw signed of contracts for the supply of liquefied natural gas with gas companies in the United States, Norway and Qatar which are the largest energy players in the world. Thus, Warsaw seeks to diversify its gas supplies, thereby reducing its dependence on Russian gas, and to be able to present the energy interests of the aforementioned states. In particular, Poland's role in maintaining the strategic interests of the leading energy countries of the world has been confirmed by US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry during his business trip to Poland. Moreover, the US delegation has stated that Poland and its LNG project should become an alternative to the Russian gas pipeline and reduce Europe's dependence on Gazprom.⁴¹

Thus, as it can be seen, Warsaw implements the project on a terminal for liquefied natural gas reception, plans a significant increase in its capacities and concludes relevant long-term gas supply agreements with leading energy countries (the United States, Qatar and Norway). In this way, Warsaw seeks to fill the energy vacuum that may arise because of Russia and Germany's implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project which qualitatively changes the energy balance of forces in the European gas market.

Such ambitions and plans of Poland are supported by the largest gas countries in the world. One of them is the United States which has been cut off from the European energy market for a long time due to Russia's dominance and its own unwillingness to come on geographically distant and economically risky markets. Meanwhile, the attitude of the EU and most of its member states towards the policy of the Russian Federation has sharply deteriorated; moreover, Europeans have recognised Nord Stream 2 as a powerful geopolitical component of the Kremlin's interests. These aspects have created favourable political conditions for new energy players to penetrate into the European gas market. The factor that the EU senior officials and the EU members regard the

⁴⁰ Rybacki, "Nord Stream 2."

⁴¹ Elliott and Leech, "Nord Stream natural gas."

Russian gas project as a political one enables the USA, Qatar and Norway to minimize some of the economic negativity which is represented by the prospect of a wide supply of gas from these countries to Europe, namely the high price and complex logistics of the process.

The development of the plan to build the Baltic Pipe is another important infrastructure project which Poland considers to be a key one in its strategy to turn the country into a powerful energy hub in Europe and to minimize the damage to Poland's interests caused by the launch of two new lines of Nord Stream 2. The launch of this project was announced in 2018, and it aims to connect Poland and Denmark with the Norwegian gas fields. The expected capacity of 10 bcm of gas per year will allow Poland to substantially increase Norwegian gas imports and potentially act as a transit country or a re-exporter of this gas to the European market.⁴² Thus, once again Warsaw confirms its desire to go into a powerful competition with Germany which is a Russian power hub in Europe (Germany may become one after the launch of Nord Stream 2). Warsaw can become a hub when it constructs an alternative gas pipeline that could be used by other leading global gas suppliers to enter the EU energy market.

Summing up the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream's influence on Poland's interests, we should stress that Polish officials almost immediately and preventively began to implement the strategy of rapid diversification of gas supplies to the state through the development of infrastructure and logistic routes for gas delivery. Poland is aware of strategic risks from the implementation of the Russian gas initiative which could potentially reduce Poland's role in transiting Russian gas. The country realises that there emerges a strong rival in the face of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the redistribution of the European gas market will not happen according to Warsaw's scenario. Thus, the Polish side clearly demonstrates that it does not renounce the idea of gaining the status of a powerful gas hub in Europe. However, Russia's choice of Germany as the main partner in the EU in gas supply makes Warsaw reorient and search for new gas suppliers for itself and for the European market among other leading gas companies in the world.

Ukraine

Ukraine, like Poland, has adopted a clear stance on Nord Stream 2 almost immediately after the Russian Federation announced its plans to implement this project. In particular, Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko has repeatedly emphasized that there exists a political motivation of the Russian energy project. He has been calling it a Trojan horse in European and world security. In addition, the President regards the Nord Stream 2 project and the fact that

⁴² Elliott and Leech, "Nord Stream natural gas."

Gazprom deliberately does not abide by the decisions of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce on gas contracts between Ukraine and Russia as evidence of Russia's politicization of energy policy.⁴³

A similar view has been expressed by Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Groysman who has repeatedly stated that Moscow uses this gas project as "a form of a disguised war of the Russian Federation against Europe" and as "geopolitical weapon of Russia."⁴⁴ He has emphasized that Nord Stream 2 is far from an exclusively economic initiative and is, above all, a political instrument of the Kremlin's influence on European states.⁴⁵

The unity of the political elite of Ukraine regarding the Russian-led Baltic project has been promoted by a resolution adopted by the parliament of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada. In the resolution, Ukraine called on foreign parliaments, governments and business communities not to participate in financing, preparation of, or lobbying for the construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline since Ukraine sees its implementation as an attempt to establish an absolute monopoly of Moscow in the gas market in Europe.⁴⁶

The election of President Zelenskyi and the reformation of the Ukrainian Parliament in 2019 did not change the approach of the Ukrainian authorities to the valuation of Nord Stream 2. In particular, in October 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyi stated that the Russian gas transportation project is "geopolitical" and "is strengthening Russia" and "weakening Europe".⁴⁷ This demonstrates the political inheritance of Ukraine's assessment of this energy issue at the present stage.

It should also be emphasized that the severe condemnation of this project comes not only from the politicians of Ukraine but also from the majority of Ukrainian society. Under conditions of Russia's military aggression and continuous provocations of the Kremlin, Ukrainians consider Nord Stream 2 to be another element of the hybrid war strategy which Russia uses against Ukraine. Thus, from the perspective of the Ukrainian society, the political and security aspects of this project dominate in Russia's gas initiative and push the economic aspect to the background.

The reasons for such Ukraine's reaction to Nord Stream 2, as in the case of Poland, are explained at various levels. However, in contrast to Poland, in the situation with Ukraine, there is a somewhat different priority of these levels:

⁴³ Beckman, "Politics and economics clash."

⁴⁴ "The success of Ukraine depends on the success of new Government, says Volodymyr Groysman," *Government portal*, 28 August, 2019, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-grojsman-vid-uspihu-roboti-novogo-uryadu-zalezhit-uspikh-vsiyeyi-krayini>.

⁴⁵ Giuly, "Nord Stream 2."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "Ukrainian President Says Nord Stream 2 "Strengthens Russia," *RadioFreeEurope*, October 31, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-president-says-nord-stream-2-strengthens-russia-/30246805.html>.

political, geopolitical and economic. This is predetermined by the different from Poland political, security, economic and general social situation in Ukraine.

Politics

An assessment of the political dimension of Ukraine's national interests, to which Nord Stream 2 represents the greatest threat, is impossible without understanding of the current internal and external political situation in Ukraine. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and as a result its occupation which continues to this day, Russia's military incursion into Donbas and repeated armed provocations have formed a clear understanding of the northern neighbour as an enemy and a state that is waging war against Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian society regards any foreign political activity of the Kremlin as a potential attempt to attack the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. This immediately transforms Russia into an entity that poses a threat to the basic principles of existence of the country and therefore to the interests of the highest priority such as the security of the state and its citizens.

Under such conditions, Russia's announcement about the launch of the Nord Stream 2 project and the subsequent start of the construction of the gas pipeline have caused a reaction of indignation and harsh condemnation in Ukraine. The desire of Moscow to increase its energy influence in Europe has been perceived by Ukrainian society as another attempt to expand Russia's aggression on the international scene and to occupy the EU energy sphere. Such a reaction has been especially acute because Kyiv considers the EU to be an important ally in the fight against Russian aggression. This is due to the fact that since the beginning of the aggressive actions of Moscow in Ukraine, the EU and its member states have repeatedly confirmed their support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. Moreover, they have provided financial, economic, diplomatic assistance to the country and actively participated in attempts to restrain the Russian Federation by introducing against it a number of personal and sectoral sanctions. Thus, Russia's attempt to penetrate the energy sphere of the EU has been perceived by Kyiv as a way to destabilize the main ally, to break the unity within the bloc, thereby weakening the international support for Ukraine.⁴⁸

In addition, in the political consciousness of Ukrainian society, Nord Stream 2 poses a threat to the unity of European states concerning prolonging sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. Kyiv considers the EU sanction regime on Russia to be one of the basic and most effective methods of deterring Russia since it prevents the expansion of Russian aggression in Ukraine and strategically influences Russia's geopolitical capacity to continue the aggressive

⁴⁸ Victor Hvoz, "Nord Stream 2" Project Prospects and Risks for Inventors," *Borysfen Intel*, September 18, 2018, http://bintel.com.ua/en/article/blog09_18_2/.

policy. Kyiv regards Nord Stream 2 as the Kremlin's attempt to use the energy lever of pressure on some European states in order to force them to abandon sanctions policy. It is worth noting that a consensus in the EU is needed to prolong or extend sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. This fact allows Moscow to have considerable hopes for its energy direction since it can potentially allow Russia to influence a country or a number of EU member states, thereby blocking the strategy of sanction pressure on the Russian Federation.⁴⁹

Moreover, another reason for Ukraine to worry is the fact that Russia's main partner in Nord Stream 2 construction is Germany, the political leaders of which continue to insist on a primarily commercial role of the project. This factor represents a serious threat to the national interests of Ukraine because Germany, i.e. chancellor Angela Merkel remains one of the largest protectors of Ukraine in the EU and one of the leaders who supports Ukraine in its attempts to restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty by returning temporarily occupied territories. In the context of an increase of Moscow's energy influence on Berlin, which is an inevitable consequence of the Nord Stream 2 project, there exists a serious threat that Russia will transform its energy influence on Germany into political pressure which in its turn will strengthen the pro-Russian political elites within Germany. Besides, because of the political importance of Germany in the EU, this pressure may change the EU's agenda for economic and financial sanctions against Russia.⁵⁰

Consequently, analysing the threats posed by Nord Stream 2 to the political dimension of Ukraine's national interests, one should realise that in public's perception Russia is Ukraine's enemy, and further Kyiv's assessment of Russia's actions on the international scene is based precisely on this primary ideological foundation. Kyiv is also aware that Nord Stream 2 is not only an attempt to sow discord within the European Union and therefore break the consensus of the European states regarding the need to maintain current sanctions against the Russian Federation but also an effort to directly influence the main political player of the bloc, i.e. Germany.

Geopolitics

The geopolitical aspect of the Nord Stream 2 impact on Ukraine's national interests has much in common with the above-analysed Polish case, in particular the important role of the United States. Washington's attempt to go to the European energy market and strict foreign policy of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump on the Russian Federation, namely the imposition of sanctions, political diplomatic pressure and military strengthening of the countries bordering Russia, have become the factors which make the United

⁴⁹ Hvozď, "Nord Stream 2."

⁵⁰ Adomeit, "Germany, the EU, and Russia."

States actively react to the beginning of Russia's Nord Stream 2 project implementation. However, for Ukraine and its interests, the important thing in the confrontation between Washington and Moscow is that US interests regarding Nord Stream 2 do not always coincide with the interests of European states and thus create an additional point of tension in the relations among the Western states. As a result of the Nord Stream 2 implementation and Donald Trump becoming the President of the USA, there have appeared other problematic aspects in relations between the EU and the United States, e.g. the issue of NATO funding, trade disputes, the climate question and a number of others. Kyiv has worried, and not without grounds, that the set of these problems could provoke deterioration in relations within the anti-Russian coalition of the Western countries which de facto was formed after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the military invasion of Donbas.⁵¹

Ukraine has been even more concerned about the fact that the US authorities have expressed readiness and intention to impose sanctions against European companies participating in the Nord Stream 2 project, causing a negative reaction in the EU and among its member states. Moreover, at the end of 2019, the US reaffirmed its intention to hinder the implementation of the Russian gas transportation project by imposing sanctions on companies involved in Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines construction.⁵² Despite the fact that a significant part of Ukrainian society and politics support Washington's desire to halt the implementation of the Russian gas project, those threats that are created by a potential imposition of US sanctions on the European companies cannot but bother Ukraine. Those threats form the geopolitical aspect that affects the national interests of Ukraine.⁵³

Another important geopolitical issue which poses a serious challenge to Ukraine's strategic interests in terms of its probable accession to the EU and NATO is the use of this energy initiative by Moscow as an element of an overall strategy of political fragmentation of the EU. It should be emphasized that this is referred not only to the internal political discussions which this project provokes in Germany but also to Russia's pan-European tactics for interfering in countries' internal affairs. The intervention is made by means of the financial support of pro-Russian forces or forces aimed at destabilizing the EU using cyberattacks and information resources as zones of its own influence and manipulation. These have been noticed in a number of European countries,

⁵¹ Hallie Detrick, "U.S. Threatens to Sanction German Firms Constructing Russian Gas Pipeline," *Fortune*, January 14, 2019, <http://fortune.com/2019/01/14/nord-stream-2-sanctions/>.

⁵² Holly Ellyatt, "US greenlights sanctions on mega Russia-EU gas pipeline, but it's probably too late," *CNBC*, December 18, 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/18/us-sanctions-on-nord-stream-2-pipeline.html>.

⁵³ Detrik, "U.S."

in particular Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany and others. Thus, the Nord Stream 2 project is another instrument in the Russian arsenal of influence on the internal political situation within the EU and in some member states. Seeing Nord Stream 2 a serious challenge to the unity of the European Union, Ukraine has repeatedly warned the EU about the scenario according to which Russia uses gas as a lever of influence.⁵⁴

It is impossible to analyse the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2 in Ukraine without taking into account Russia's concurrent implementation of the TurkStream project which connects Russia with the southern EU member states and uses Turkey as a transit area for a gas pipeline. The beginning of its construction in 2017 and the continuation of the project implementation at the present stage are clearly correlated with the Nord Stream 2 project. Therefore, these two gas pipelines become links in the same energy chain designed to diversify Russia's gas supplies to Europe, thereby reducing dependence on Ukrainian transit, which today remains a priority both for the gas exporter and for European buyers.⁵⁵ Due to the fact that the project capacity of the two branches of TurkStream is planned at the level of 31.5 bcm of gas per year⁵⁶ and that the total capacity of the two Nord Stream projects should be 110 bcm of gas per year, it is necessary to understand that the Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS) receives two powerful energy rivals. With an aggregate capacity of almost 142 bcm of gas per year, TurkStream and two Nord Stream projects reach the level of the transmission capacity in the European market as the Ukrainian GTS which at the European border has the capacity of 142.5 bcm of gas per year.⁵⁷ Thus, the construction of Nord Stream 2, the concurrent implementation of the TurkStream project and the maximum capacity of Nord Stream, which was achieved in 2018, pose a threat to the geopolitical importance of Ukraine which has been seen as a long-term non-alternative transit route for Russia's gas to the EU states.

The geopolitical danger from the simultaneous implementation of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream projects has been increased by the fact that in early 2018 the Russian Federation announced the launch of the termination process of the agreement on Russian gas transit through the territory of Ukraine. In such a way, Russia created legal conditions for redirecting large volumes of gas to other transit highways, especially to the south and north directions.⁵⁸ The Russian Federation is not able to abandon gas transit through Ukraine

⁵⁴ Henry Ridgwell, "Europe Split on Nord Stream 2 Pipeline as US Warns Against Dependence on Russian Gas," *Voice of America*, March 8, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/europe-nord-stream-2-russian-gas/4285576.html>.

⁵⁵ Collins, "Russia's Use."

⁵⁶ Sziklai, Kóczy and Csercsik, "The geopolitical impact."

⁵⁷ Ridgwell, "Europe Split on Nord Stream 2."

⁵⁸ Detrick, "U.S."

completely (which was confirmed by the signing of a new 5-year transit agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation at the end of 2019)⁵⁹ because approximately 45% of all European gas imports from Russia in 2017 were transported through Ukraine's territory.⁶⁰ Moreover, the North-South Gas Corridors are not ready to be used. Therefore, in the near future Ukraine is hardly expected to lose its geopolitical status as a powerful energy player. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, the strategic prospects for the Ukrainian GTS are disappointing.

Thus, it should be emphasized that not only do the geopolitical risks posed by Nord Stream 2 to the interests of Ukraine influence the energy sector, they also affect the strength and solidity of the pro-Ukrainian coalition with the Western countries. Moreover, the risks affect the unity of the EU which is the main partner of Ukraine in reforming and struggling with Russian aggression on the Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream 2 is amplified by the fact that Moscow concurrently implements another gas transit project that goes around Ukraine, thereby reducing the strategic value of Ukraine for the EU member states.

Economy

Despite the fact that in Ukrainian political and expert discourse Nord Stream 2 is predominantly regarded as a threat at political and geopolitical levels, the economic aspect of the project remains extremely important. In order to assess the economic impact of the Russian energy project on Ukrainian national interests qualitatively, it is necessary to understand the energy importance of Ukraine to Russia and to the importing countries of Russian gas in the EU.

The main element of the strategic value of Ukraine as an energy player is its transit role. In particular, in 2017, 93.5 bcm of the gas for European states were transported by the Ukrainian gas transportation system,⁶¹ while in general in 2017 Russian Gazprom exported 192.2 bcm of gas to Europe. Thus, using its own GTS, Ukraine transited almost half of Russia's gas exports to the EU. This suggests that from the economic point of view Ukraine is the most important transit route for Russian gas to Europe. In terms of value and load capacity, Ukraine outperforms the transit capacity of the Belarusian direction, i.e. the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Baltic Nord Stream project.

⁵⁹ "Russia, Ukraine sign gas transit deal ahead of deadline," *DW*, December 31, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-ukraine-sign-gas-transit-deal-ahead-of-deadline/a-51841576>.

⁶⁰ Detrick, "U.S."

⁶¹ Buck, "Nord Stream 2."

Moreover, since the end of 2015, Ukraine has not been buying natural gas from the Russian Federation, thereby increasing its value as a transit country of Russian gas. This is due to the fact that when Ukraine was buying Russian gas and transiting it to European buyers, Moscow was able to affect the transit role of Ukraine and did not allow Kyiv to use its influence.⁶²

Construction of Nord Stream 2, which will have a project capacity of 55 bcm of gas per year and which will become a serious increase of the existing Nord Stream pipeline with an identical capacity, creates an opportunity for Moscow to substantially export the gas through the northern route, thus depriving Ukraine of significant volumes of transited gas. In particular, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine calculated that the country could lose 2.5-3% of GDP if Nord Stream 2 is to be put into operation.⁶³

According to the top management of the oil and gas company Naftogaz of Ukraine, the northern gas pipeline project may cause serious damage in Ukraine. In particular, CEO of Naftogaz Andriy Kobolyev believes that losses can reach \$ 3 billion, thereby creating a high impact on the balance of payments of Ukraine and on the stability of the national currency.⁶⁴

Furthermore, in 2017 the company Naftogaz which transits Russian gas to the European market received a profit of almost \$ 1.3 billion from the transit of gas from Russia.⁶⁵ Therefore, even the partial loss of gas volumes transported by the Ukrainian gas transit system can lead to a significant deterioration in the financial situation of Naftogaz and provoke the state monopoly to raise the prices for natural gas for Ukrainian consumers. Thus, Nord Stream 2 has the potential to become a socio-economic threat to Ukraine.

Another important economic aspect is the need to modernize the Ukrainian GTS in conditions when the Russian Federation can potentially redirect significant volumes of transit to the northern and southern directions. Without the necessary loading of the gas transportation system of Ukraine which may result from the reduction of Russian gas transit, Ukraine could face a problem of a technological and infrastructural decline of its own energy power.

Naftogaz and Ukrtransgas propose to implement a 10-year plan to modernize the Ukrainian GTS. In fact, these companies are allowed to partially privatize the system with the help of domestic and foreign investors as an option to amortize the damage to the GTS from changes in the European energy market. Inter alia, such a move is due to Russia's energy plans to bypass Ukraine and lower its strategic energy value for Europe.⁶⁶

⁶² Elliott and Leech, "Nord Stream natural gas."

⁶³ Elliott and Leech, "Nord Stream natural gas."

⁶⁴ Detrick, "U.S."

⁶⁵ Giuly, "Nord Stream 2."

⁶⁶ Ridgwell, "Europe Split on Nord Stream 2."

Since 2014, attempting to improve the economic attractiveness of the Ukrainian GTS for European partners, Kyiv has been proposing the EU to change the format of Russian gas imports by purchasing gas on the Ukrainian-Russian border. This transfers the transit talk from the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle into a dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. This approach in the context of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine is politically and economically beneficial for Kyiv because it allows Gazprom to put an end to Russian blackmail. To date, Moscow continues to oppose such an option because it sees it as an attempt to deprive the Kremlin of its influence on Ukraine.⁶⁷

Thus, it should be emphasized that the economic aspect of the influence of Nord Stream 2 on the national interests of Ukraine is significant. In this context, it is important to realize that simultaneous implementation of North-South Gas Corridor project by Russia poses a threat to Ukraine's status of the main transit country of Russian gas to Europe. Moreover, a decrease in transit volumes can provoke serious socio-economic changes in the country which may result in disastrous political transformations in it as well as in permanent socio-political turbulence. Despite a number of Ukraine's proposals for amortization of the damage from Nord Stream 2, Moscow is still able to block Kyiv's attempts to change the format of transit relations with Russia. This situation, if the gas transit contract is rescinded, poses a complex threat to the Ukrainian economy.

Conclusions

Many European countries, transit states and global energy players consider the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project by the Russian Federation to be a challenge that needs to be faced. However, not so many countries perceive the gas initiative of the Kremlin as a potential threat to their own national interests. Ukraine and Poland are the two countries for which Gazprom's challenge, i.e. Nord Stream 2, due to its complexity, has become a threat not only to economic security but also to political and geopolitical interests.

At the economic level, Nord Stream 2 is a cause for serious concern of Ukraine and Poland because these countries may lose their transit roles in the European energy market. Being among the main transit countries of Russian gas to the European market, Ukraine and Poland regard the increase of the Northern Gas Corridor as a potential instrument of the Russian Federation to reduce the transit importance of these two states by means of diversifying gas supplies to

⁶⁷ Giuly, "Nord Stream 2."

Europe. This situation threatens the countries with significant financial losses and deterioration of their strategic energy position.

In addition, for Poland, the issue of Nord Stream 2 is particularly acute due to the potential loss of the ability to become a powerful re-exporter of gas in the EU. The emergence of such a powerful competitor as Germany will allow the latter to significantly expand its energy impact on the European market and offer better competitive opportunities for gas buyers than Poland which is importing expensive gas from Norway, the USA and Qatar. Concerning Ukraine, the threat is not so significant since the refusal to import natural gas from Russia and the conditions in gas contracts with Russia, which prohibit Ukraine to re-export Russian gas, actually deprived Ukraine of the opportunity to be a re-exporter of natural gas and become a significant player in the European market gas.

At the political level, the threat of Nord Stream 2 is considered in the context of Russia's aggressive policy on the international scene during the last five years. Thus, Poland and Ukraine perceive Nord Stream 2 as an instrument of Russia's pressure on the EU and as another strategy element of its hybrid warfare.

Warsaw and Kyiv agree that the Russian energy project in the Baltic Sea is an attempt to split the European community and the pro-Ukrainian coalition in the West. Therefore, both countries seek to change the way the Europeans regard Nord Stream 2, i.e. from purely commercial to political perception that best demonstrates the essence of the Russian project.

As for the geopolitical level, it is important to emphasize that the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project and the simultaneous construction of TurkStream threaten the common ambitions of Ukraine and Poland. The desire to be powerful energy players in the European market, i.e. to transit and potentially re-export (in the case of Poland) gas, conflicts with Russia's plans to bypass the territory of Poland and Ukraine and use other gas pipelines.

In this context, both countries count on the United States because Kyiv and Warsaw see it not only as a state that is capable of influencing and potentially blocking the Nord Stream 2 project but also as an energy player that can create an alternative to the Russian gas pipeline. In the case of Ukraine, one should also regard Ukraine's attempt to prevent Moscow from using the Nord Stream 2 project as a way to create an artificial conflict between the United States and the EU states, in particular Germany. Thus, the global significance of the Nord Stream 2 project is so important at the economic and political levels and the number of actors involved in the discussion about the suitability and security of the project is so considerable that the geopolitical aspect of the impact of the gas initiative on the interests of Poland and Ukraine is critically important.

Ukraine and Poland are aware of the level of threats and challenges presented by Nord Stream 2 to their interests. Therefore, these two countries

need to develop tactics and strategies to counteract the implementation of the project and to concurrently adapt their own energy systems to the new configuration of the European energy market. In this context, it is necessary to identify potential tactical measures which can be implemented by Poland and Ukraine to prevent the Nord Stream 2 launch:

- to use legal and regulatory mechanisms of the EU, in particular the Third Energy Package, as a means of legal influence on the process of the Nord Stream 2 construction;
- to strengthen diplomatic relations between Ukraine, Poland and the USA which should be aimed at encouraging more active policy of Washington to stop the Russian energy project;
- to continue conducting the information campaign among the EU states in order to persuade the public that the project is deeply politicized and poses significant risks to the security and stability of European democracies;
- to offer European partners alternative gas supply plans that could attract investors and potentially force them to deprioritize Nord Stream 2.

At the strategic level, Ukraine and Poland should prepare for new conditions of the international energy market which can appear after the launch of Nord Stream 2. In this context, both countries should adopt a number of measures that could undermine the damage caused by the northern gas pipeline to their interests, namely:

- to modernise the old and construct new energy infrastructure that would allow diversification of gas supplies to Poland and Ukraine and potentially use it to get into larger markets;
- to develop own natural gas deposits and reorient the consumer market to domestic gas which will allow these countries to become independent of Russia's influence;
- to search for new partners among the world's largest energy players as an opportunity to receive natural gas by alternative means and as a way to influence the Russian Federation and potentially weaken it in the European energy market.

Thus, the common threats and challenges that Nord Stream 2 poses to the interests of Poland and Ukraine logically require a joint position of these states regarding the project. Not only do they need to coordinate efforts to block the project implementation but also to further develop the region's energy security which is based on the principle of reducing the EU's dependence on Russia's gas lobby.

Regional Identity in Ukraine: Formation Factors and Functions

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Abstract

The main approaches to determining the regional division of Ukraine are analyzed. It is shown that regional identity in Ukraine is determined by a unique combination of the historical heritage of the region, features of the ethno-confessional composition of its population, socio-economic status, and specifics of lifestyle, traditions and culture. The functional analysis of regional identity justifies that, being considered one of the basic construction elements of a definition “region”, it plays an important role in the preservation and functioning of a regional socio-political space. Subjective factors influence the formation of regional identity models: interests of regional elites, geopolitical factors, current political processes, political parties and public organizations, the position and influence of the mainstream media. The politicization of regional differences in modern Ukraine has led to increase in the regionalization of electoral political sympathies, the aggravation of social differences around geopolitical and ethno-cultural values.

Ethnocultural regionalism creates additional difficulties in the formation of national identity, consolidation of the Ukrainian society according to the strategic social development goals: its democratization and modernization. Therefore, the formation at the state level, the policy of identity based on public consensus and democratic values, taking into account the ethnic, cultural, confessional and linguistic features of the Ukrainian regions, is acquiring particular relevance in modern Ukraine.

Keywords: region, identity, regional identity, ethnocultural features.

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Introduction

The issue of consolidated political identity is one of the most difficult in the period of independence of the Ukrainian state. This is due to the fact that the strengthening of the political nation, the solution of the tasks of democratic transformation is possible only on the basis of the common identifying guides of the majority of the population. At the same time, this process cannot be considered complete. The danger of the emergence and deepening of conflicts in society on the basis of noticeable discrepancies between residents of different regions related to the most important areas of internal and external development¹ remains.

On this basis, the priority direction of modern Ukrainian science is the search for effective principles for the development of identity, new forms and tools for consolidating citizens by forming a “project” identity and a corresponding public request for it. The main task of identity politics during this period is the formation of such a nationwide identity, which manifested itself not only in collective positioning relative to other nation-states as a basis for the integrity of a nation, but also as a matter of agreement on how such a community represents social goals and principles. It is in this sense that political identity serves as the basis and mechanism of social transformations.

Today, it is obvious that the Ukrainian path to democracy turned out to be non-linear and much more complicated than it seemed at the beginning of social reforms. It is accompanied by a deep systemic break in society and a crisis of the political identity of Ukrainian citizens. This eliminates the uniqueness and simplicity of scientific assessments of the consolidation of Ukrainian society, complicates the task of developing projects and models of its association.

Today the scientific discourse on the need to study the genesis of the specifics of the development of Ukrainian regions, taking into account the historical, socio-economic, civilizational, cultural, spiritual and political features of regional identity in the further development of the country is acquiring special importance. The number of scientific publications on the problems of regionalism in Ukraine, written in recent years, suggests that political regionalism at the turn of the XX - XXI centuries. It became a separate scientific direction of political science.²

¹ Oleksandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Changes, Trends, Regional Peculiarities,” *Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona*, no. 3-4 (2016): 112.

² Oleksandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, “The common identity of Ukrainian citizens: the peculiarities and problems of becoming,” *Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona*, no. 7 (2016): 56; Larysa Panasivna Nahorna, *Rehionalna identychnist: ukrainskyi kontekst* [Regional identity: Ukrainian context] (Kyiv, Ukraine:

The “main regionalist” was history, which determined the differences and peculiarities in the rhythms of the socio-economic and national life of the South-East, Western Ukraine and Dnieper region. The main factors of the “regionality” of the South-East and the West of Ukraine, in our opinion, are: firstly, different rates and means of assimilation, determined some features of these regions, the preference of those or other confessions, neighbouring cultures, differences in ideas about property and other; secondly, the “dissolution” of the Ukrainian of a number of regions by the foreign ethnic population of Russia, which was unswervingly carried out by the imperial power at the end of the XVIII - II half of the XIX century. In the process of industrialization of Donbas, as well as the Bolsheviks in the Soviet period, especially after 1939.

A consequence of the long and complex process of the formation of the ethnopolitical specificity of the regions of modern Ukraine, under the influence of various political, historical, socio-economic factors, was the formation of regional features of self-identification of citizens of Ukraine. As a result, today, Ukrainian citizens from different regions prefer a multi-vector political and

I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2008), 405; Larysa Panasivna Nahorna, *Sotsiokulturna identychnist: pastky tsinnisnykh rozmezhuvan* [Socio-cultural identity: traces of value differences] (Kyiv, Ukraine: I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2011), 272; Olha Mykolaivna Andrieieva, “Kryza ‘lokalnoho’ ta ‘universalnoho’ vymiriv ukrainskoi natsionalnoi identychnosti postradianskoho period” [“The crisis of ‘local’ and ‘universal’ dimensions of the Ukrainian national identity of the post-Soviet period”], *Bulletin of the National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”*. Series: Philosophy, Psychology, Pedagogy, no. 3 (2009): 7-14; Mai Panchuk, Volodymyr Yevtukh, Viktor Voinalovych et al., *Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukraini: rehionalni osoblyvosti* [Ethnopolitical processes in Ukraine: regional peculiarities] (Kyiv, Ukraine: I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2011), 396; Viktor Kotyhorenko, Oleh Kalakura, Lesia Kovach et al. *Donbas v etnopolitychnomu vymiri* [Donbas in the ethnopolitical dimension] (Kyiv, Ukraine: I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2013), 584; Olena Vitaliivna Kryvytska, *Demarkatsiini linii v etnopolitychnomu prostori Ukrainy* [Demarcation lines in the ethnopolitical space of Ukraine] (Kyiv, Ukraine: IPIEND I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2015), 328; Oleh Rafalskyi, Viktor Voinalovych, Larysa Nahorna et al., *Etnopolitychnyi kontekst sotsiokulturnykh transformatsii u suchasnii Ukraini* [Ethnopolitical Context of Socio-Cultural Transformations in Contemporary Ukraine] (Kyiv, Ukraine: IPIEND named after I.F. Kuras NAS of Ukraine, 2017), 512; Brent Carnin Smith, “If You Promise to Build It, Will They Come? The Interaction between Local Economic Development Policy and the Real Estate Market: Evidence from Tax Increment Finance Districts,” *Real Estate Economics*, 37 (2), 2009, 209–234, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00240.x; Lorenz Blume, “Local Economic Policies as Determinants of Local Business Climate: Empirical Results from a Cross-section Analysis among East German Municipalities,” *Regional Studies*, 40 (4), 2006, 321–333. doi: 10.1080/00343400600725178.

geopolitical direction, understand the past differently and see the future development of the country.³ All this complicates the political process and political relations in modern Ukraine.

The fact that in “split” societies, which contain several ethnic, religious or linguistic groups, the processes of consolidation and democratization are more painful and less successful, warn such famous authors as T. Carothers, R. Dahrendorf, A. Leiphart, S. Khantington et al.⁴

Indeed, an analysis of the formation of political identity in Ukraine showed that there are features, and for some problems, significant differences between the regions of Ukraine in many issues of social development. Most clearly, especially comparing the West and the East of Ukraine, they are manifested in electoral preferences, geopolitical orientations, in assessments of the historical past, in language problems, etc.⁵ Ethnocultural regionalism creates additional difficulties in the formation of national identity, consolidation of the Ukrainian society according to the strategic social development goals: its democratization and modernization.

Research Methodology

This work is based on the generalization of the official methodological information in Ukraine on the process of regional political identity, drawing attention to its imperfection. The methodology is based on three levels of knowledge: a general philosophical level (set of common views and knowledge about phenomena related to regional political identity); general scientific level (understanding of common approaches, principles of regional political identity) and specific methodology of sciences (aggregate knowledge of the regional political identity). The methodological basis of political identity is the systemic and situational approaches. According to the system approach, political identity should be regarded as a system consisting of certain interrelated elements that ensure its life activity, and elements of a larger system those functioning and development is determined by regularities and patterns characteristic.

³ Razumkov Center, “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens,” 112.

⁴ Tomas Karozers, *Oshibka teorii “poetapnoy demokratizatsii”* [E-book], 2007, Accessed 09, January, 2019, http://uisrussia.msu.ru/docs/nov/pec/2007/1/ProEtContra_2007_1_08.pdf; Ralf Darendorf, “Doroga k svobode: demokratizatsiya i eye problemy v Vostochnoy Evrope” [“The road to freedom: democratization and more problems in Eastern Europe”], *Voprosy filosofii* 9, 1990, 69-75; Arend Leypkhart, “Konstitutsionny dizayn dlya raskolotykh obshchestv” [“Constitutional design for split societies”] (Kharkiv, Ukraine: Publishing house “Oykumena”, 2009), 165-179; Samuel Khantington, *Kto my? Vyzovy amerikanskoj natsionalnoy identichnosti* [Who are we? Challenges of American National Identity] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo AST, ‘Tranzitkniga’, 2003), 635.

⁵ Razumkov Center, “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens,” 115.

According to the situational approach, political identity is a complex of socio systems, characterized by a number of their unique features. Also, the research is based on methods of comparison and analysis (in the context of practical experience in the political identity), is based on scientific and practical research of leading scientists.⁶

Results

Political practice shows that regional polarity is actualized in an era of crises and changes, when it is necessary to unite and mobilize society to solve socially significant tasks, it becomes an object of purposeful influence of the state, political elites and interest groups. Ethnic and regional identity in this period become the dominant processes of formation of political identity. An example of the use of regional differences for political purposes is the election campaigns of the 21st century. and the tragic events in the South-East of Ukraine, which began in 2014 over a decade and a half in Ukraine, the basis of the political struggle was not conceptual competition, but conflict technologies based on modelling the “enemy image”, dividing Ukraine into regional segments, the use of political managers of the “two Ukraine ‘constructs’.” In the conditions of the aggravation of the crisis in the economic and social sphere, such ideas gain particularly fertile ground and become a significant factor in the formation of ethnoregional political identity.⁷ Regional identification models are gaining strength and are actively being approved, including with the help of the political elite, and the emphasis of local socio-cultural differences and social class opposition is increasing.

The origin of the concept of “identity” is associated with the Latin word “identitas”, which means “authenticity”. From English (identity), French (identité) and German (Identität) languages is translated as “identity”, “authenticity”, “personality”, “individuality”. Thus, the category of ‘identity’ is closely connected not only with the concept of “identity”, but also with the emergence of the concept of “individual” in various disciplinary contexts, as

⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 272; Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity* (London: Global Modernities, 1995), 25-44; Petro Ivanovych Nadolishnii, Etnonatsionalnyi faktor administratyvnoi reformy v Ukraini: problemy teorii, metodolohii, praktyky [Ethnonational factor of administrative reform in Ukraine: problems of theory, methodology, practice] (Kyiv, Ukraine: Publishing house “UADU”, 1998), 264; Myhailo Nichoha, “Zitknennia tsyvilizatsii posered Ukrainy” [Clash of civilizations in the middle of Ukraine], *Pravda* magazine, June 11, 2010, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/06/11/5126765/>; Elizabeth Noel-Neumann, *Obshchestvennoe mnenye. Otkrytiye spirali molchaniya* [Public opinion. Opening the spiral of silence], trans. Mykhayl Nazarov (Moscow: Publishing house “Progress-Akademiya”, 1996), 427.

⁷ Panchuk, Yevtukh, Voinalovych et al., *Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukraini*, 396.

well as with the establishment in the European tradition of discourses “distinction”, “otherness”, “authenticity”, etc.⁸

In the social sciences, identity is defined as a multidimensional, variable category, constructed by sociocultural, historical, political, and other factors and subjects.

At the present stage of development of society, the mutual influence of global and local changes at different levels (the so-called glocalization) determines the process of closely intertwining universalistic and particularistic bases for studying the concept of identity and the need to apply a number of methodological approaches. For example, the Belarusian researcher G. Minenkov defines three main methodological approaches: primordialism, essentialism and constructivism.⁹

In the study of regional identity, primordialism and constructivism play a special role. In the framework of primordialism, emphasis is placed on group actions of a symbolic or ritual nature, as well as on the emotional significance of group affiliation. Ethnicity in this system of views looks like an intergenerational population of people with fairly stable linguistic and cultural, mental characteristics, their own self-consciousness. The “loss of permanent identity” syndrome is viewed as a personal drama of the individual and as a form of collective depression. The main features of primordialism is a mental construct, the purpose of which is to realize the need for belonging to a particular community and separation from other communities. Most constructivists do not perceive identity as a given, viewing it as a peculiar result of self-presentation — a phantom in reformatting and is not essential, not immanent, but correlative and contextual.¹⁰

Identity has a social character and is a product of social interaction. The most important forms of identity, according to M. Stepyko, are social: class, ethnic, national, civil, political, and the like. A common thing for them, the scientist believes, is the idea of a person about his belonging to a group, a community of “his own”, to “ours”, to those that arise in his consciousness as “we”. This positive side of the awareness of their belonging to a particular community at the same time implies distancing and affirming their ‘differentness’ in relation to other communities.¹¹

The most common and popular in the social sciences is the interpretation of Yu. Kachanov, who defines identity as an active process, which shows the

⁸ Nichoha, “Zitknennia .”

⁹ Hryhorii Minenkov, “Kontsept identichnosti: perspektivy opredeleniya” [The concept of ideality: the prospects for determining], *Live Journal*, January 11, 2015, <https://guralyuk.livejournal.com/547306.html>.

¹⁰ Nahorna, *Rehionalna identychnist*, 405.

¹¹ Mykhailo Tymofiiiovych Stepyko, “Ukrainian identity in terms of socio-political transformations,” *Strategic priorities*, no. 4 (25) (December 2012): 5-12.

subject's idea of himself and is accompanied by a sense of his own continuity, "which allows him to perceive his life as an experience of the duration and unity of consciousness and makes it possible to act consistently."¹² Identity in this case is a sign of the "entry" of the individual into a social position.

The main role in the formation of identity, according to many researchers, is played by cultural factors. In particular, M. Castells defines identity as "the process of constructing individual meaning (meaning) on the basis of a certain cultural trait or a related set of cultural traits that are preferred over other sources of individual meaning."¹³

The value of the cultural factor in the definition of identity is also emphasized by the well-known researcher in the field of Ukrainian regional studies L. Nahorna. The scientist refers to the term 'identity' cultural norm, reflects the emotional reactions of communities and individuals. In psychology, human identity is defined as a stable "I", an inner awareness of oneself as a member of a certain community. In the social sense, identity has the appearance of the most significant political, cultural, religious, and other orientations, which determine a network of human relations with groups, institutions, ideas, etc.¹⁴

Identity is based on the mechanisms of distinction and identification. Identity arises from the comparison of "I" and "Other", while the "Other" can be defined as the Enemy, as well as the Friend. Identity is the result of an identification process that performs the functions of self-description and self-determination. Thus, identity can be viewed as the result of the identification process, which shows the psychological and social mechanisms of identity formation, and in a broad sense can be defined as the process of formation, functioning and development of the subject's identity. The peculiarity of this subjectivity lies in the fact that it has a subjective-role, functional, constructed character.

The deep social shifts occurring during the modernization of modern societies, the processes of globalization and the development of the information society have led to the emergence of complex societies with a "hybrid", multiple, mixed identity of their citizens, that is, before the pluralization of identity.¹⁵ Therefore, identity in modern society is no longer self-evident and

¹² Yuri Kachanov, *Opyty o pole politiki* [Field policy experiences] (Moscow: Institute of experimental sociology, 1994), 159.

¹³ Volodymyr Yhorevych Pantin, Yryna Stanyslavovna Semenenko, "Problemy identichnosti i rossiyskaya modernizatsiya" [Eidentity issues and Russian modernization] in the *The search for national-civilizational identity and the concept of the "special way" in the Russian mass consciousness in the context of modernization*, ed. Viktor Lapkin (Moscow: E.M. Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), 34-39.

¹⁴ Nahorna, *Rehionalna identychnist*, 405.

¹⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Sotsiologiya* [Sociology], trans. Korry Berdsoul (Moscow: Publishing house "Editorial", 2005), 303; Viktor Serheevich Martianov, *Konflikt identichnostey v politicheskom proyekte "Moderna": multikulturalizm ili assilyatsiya* [Conflict of

predictable and may have a vague and sometimes even conflicting nature. Describing the state of identity in modern society, we can state the explosion of new identities that fragment society, emphasizing private and special interests as opposed to general interest. Identity as a multi-level, open, mobile system incorporates various types of identity.

Researchers identify three levels of identity. At the first level is the so-called basic identity – personal self-determination. The second contains a cluster of sociocultural identities – age, professional, territorial, gender, ethnic, religious, etc. The third is the national-civic identity that is fundamental for every society, as well as civilizational, transnational, global identity.¹⁶

Different types of social regional identity (ethnic, religious, demographic, professional, etc.) can be politicized under certain conditions and used by political actors (government, parties, political elites and leaders, as well as foreign agents of influence) as a political resource.

Political identity can be considered as a special case of social identity. By its nature, it is rational and reflexive at the same time. By taking a certain status position, a person relates his position, the system of political views and values with other individuals and political objects, namely, the state, parties, interest groups, mass movements, etc.

On the basis of summarizing various approaches to the definition of political identity, a general conclusion could be drawn that political identity is affirmed in the process of relating a person to other individuals and political institutions on the basis of his ideological and political values and sympathies. The most significant political positions and orientations for a person largely determine its electoral choice and other forms of political behaviour.

Formation of identity in a postmodern society is a more complex and pluralistic process, not only in comparison with a traditional society, but also with a disciplinary modernist society, in which the state and ideology played a special role in the construction of identity. Today in postmodern society, which is a network structure, ideology and the state are losing their former value, and the state-national identity is being eroded. Another characteristic tendency is to increase the national and cultural identity of ethnic and confessional minorities, subcultures, which increases the fragmentation of national-state communities. The coexistence of multiple identities within a single political system increases the risks of conflict between social groups, despite the attempt of modern states using different models of politics (for example, a “melting pot” or “multiculturalism”) to level out the opposition of social identities.

identities in the political project “Moderna”: multiculturalism or assimilation] (Moscow: E.M. Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2011), 36-42; Nikolas Vegas, *Geopolitics in the names* (Uzhgorod, Ukraine: Publishing House “Hoverla”, 2011), 216.

¹⁶ Nahorna, *Sotsiokulturna identychnist*, 272.

Therefore, the task of modern postmodern states is to construct such a universal model of political identity that would consolidate society on the basis of norms and values that are perceived by all members of society and would be the basis for collective self-identification of a national or supranational community. At the same time, the main mechanism for the formation of any model of identity is reliance on the cultural, civilizational and social priorities and practices that exist in society.

Regional identity refers to a collective type of political identity and is one of the basic elements of constructing a “region” as a specific socio-political space. Regional identity is constructed through the understanding of the connection between the community and the space in a historical and cultural political context.

In the Ukrainian scientific discourse, there are many approaches to the definition of a region. In general, the majority of scientists agree that declaring the totality of territories as a “region” is possible only if there are certain signs: common historical fate, only cultural characteristics of the group (material and spiritual), geographical unity of the territory, some general type of economy. This concept is quite multifaceted disclosed in the international legal practice of interstate relations. In particular, the Charter of Regionalism of the European Parliament (in 1998) treats the region as a homogeneous space, characterized by a physical-geographical, ethnic, cultural community, as well as a common economic structure and historical fate.¹⁷

According to various criteria in modern Ukraine there are from 3 to 11 regional entities. Exploring the regional features of the ethnopolitical processes in Ukraine, the team of authors (M. Panchuk (leader), V. Evtukh, V. Voynalovich, V. Kotigorenko, A. Kalakura, N. Kochan, N. Makarenko, T. Gorban, A. Lyashenko, L. Kovach) of the I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the monograph “Ethnopolitical Processes in Ukraine: Regional Peculiarities”¹⁸ highlighted the following four macroregions in the domestic public space: Western, Central, Southern and Eastern. Scientists attributed the eight most western regions to the Western macroregion – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi (these are 23.2% of the population according to the 2001 census). The central macroregion consists of Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kiev regions and the city of Kiev (30% of the population). The southern macroregion is comprised of Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Nikolaev,

¹⁷ Iryna Markivna Busygina, “Kontseptualnyye osnovy evropeyskogo regionalizma” [Conceptual foundations of European regionalism] in *Regions and regionalism in the countries of the West and Russia*, ed. Viktor Schukyn (Moscow: Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001), 10-15.

¹⁸ Panchuk, Yevtukh, Voinalovych et al., *Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukraini*, 274.

Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (27% of the population). To the Eastern macro-region, scientists attributed the three most eastern regions – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk (21% of the population).

The authors also appeal to the experience of sociocultural regions in Ukraine: Transcarpathian Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Volyn, Dnieper, Podilia, Slobozhanshchyna, Donbas, Crimea, and the Northern Black Sea Region.¹⁹

Researchers at the Oleksandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies in the study “Identity of Ukrainian citizens: changes, trends, regional characteristics” in 2015²⁰ used the following division of Ukraine into regions: *West*: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rovno, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; *Center*: the city of Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; *South*: Nikolaev, Odessa, Kherson regions; *East*: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv regions; *Donbas*: Donetsk, Luhansk regions.²¹

Differences in the historical experience of different regions of Ukraine affected the socio-cultural and linguistic structure of their inhabitants. As shown by the results of the interregional sociological research of 2014-2015. Linguistic and cultural differentiation is indeed close to regional and political differentiation. In this regard, the authors of the national report “Ukraine: the path to the consolidation of society” distinguish the following historical and cultural regions of Ukraine.²²

- Galicia and Volyn – with the dominance of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian-European (to a lesser extent in Volyn) cultural identity;
- Central and Northern Ukraine (Kiev, Chernihiv, Podilia, the turn, the Center and, to a lesser extent, Transcarpathia and Bukovina) – with a predominance of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian-European cultural identity;
- Southern and South-Eastern Ukraine – with a predominance of the Russian language and Slavic-Soviet cultural identity;
- Donbas – with the dominance of the Russian language and Slavic-Soviet cultural identity;
- The capital (Kiev) – with a predominance of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism, but a European-Ukrainian cultural identity, with the result that it does not belong to one of the types in a cultural sense.

Politically and culturally, political scientists and sociologists usually single out the Western Ukrainian, Central Ukrainian, and South-Eastern or

¹⁹ Ibid., 152.

²⁰ Razumkov Center, “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens,” 100.

²¹ Ibid., 103.

²² Serhii Ivanovych Pirozhkov, Yurii Petrovych Bogutskiy, Ella Marlenivna Libanova et al., *Ukraine: the path to consolidation companies* (Kyiv, Ukraine: National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2017), 336.

Northeast regions of Ukraine.²³ According to L. Uhryn, apart from Western and Eastern Ukraine, it is impossible not to take into account the existence of two more large regions – the Center and the South, characterized by both common and distinctive features with the West and the East, and the Center has a huge potential to consolidate and synthesize the regional diversity of Ukraine. In addition, both the East and the West are also regionally differentiated, for example, in the West there are four more subregions – Galicia, Volyn, Transcarpathia and Bukovina. Nevertheless, the regional identities of Western and Eastern Ukraine are the most accented, emblematic in mass consciousness, the media, political discourse, scientific literature, and the most influenced and influence the socio-political processes in modern Ukraine.²⁴

Interesting the P. Nadolishny approach. The author applies the concept of ‘ethnoregions’ and defines it as a corresponding territory, which, by the totality of interrelated ethnic elements, differs from other territories in the nature and intensity of ethnic processes and can act as a separate (independent) object of state ethnonational politics. Such, according to P. Nadolishny, are:

- a group of Central and Northern regions;
- Western regions (with the exception of the Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions);
- Eastern and Southern regions (with the exception of the Odessa region);
- Transcarpathian, Odessa and Chernivtsi regions;
- Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.²⁵

However, as a rule, two important regional centers – Donbas and Galicia – personify the East and West of Ukraine. Each of these regions is characterized by a peculiar geopolitical location, special historical and political experience, and sociocultural originality. They actually personify the characteristic regional political cultures of our state. As N. Makarenko stresses, the “historically conditioned’ nationalization” of the West and the “internationalization” of the East are the most influential and equally diverse trends that have shaped the peculiarities of the national mentality among the Ukrainian population, increased differentiation within a single geographical space’.²⁶

The experience gained by the inhabitants of these regions in the process of

²³ Valerii Bortnykov, “Rozmezhuвання” в Україні в контексті ціннісної ідентифікації населення” [“Restriction” in Ukraine in the context of value identification of the population], *Politychnyi menedzhment*, no. 1 (February 2007): 37-47.

²⁴ Lesiia Yaroslavivna Uhryn, “Vplyv rehionalnykh ідентичностей на політичний процес в Україні” [Influence of regional identities on the political process in Ukraine], *WestUkr Journal*, March 2007, http://westukr.itgo.com/ugryn_cpd_conf_0701.html.

²⁵ Nadolishnii, *Etnonatsionalnyi faktor*, 220.

²⁶ Nataliia Makarenko, “Natsionalna ідентичність: особливості регіонального виміру” [National identity: features of regional dimension], *Scientific Notes of the I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine*, no. 2 (46) (April 2010): 100-116.

historical development was characterized by significant periods of lack of statehood and being in various states and empires.²⁷ For almost a thousand years of history, with the exception of the era of Kievan Rus, the short-term existence of the state of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the UPR, the Ukrainian community, its segments geographically in different periods were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and finally the Soviet Union (de facto was the next model of the Russian Empire).

As the researcher T. Gorban notes:

“the processes that took place during the Soviet era on the territory of Southern, Eastern and Central Ukraine, completed the formation of ethno-political peculiarities with which the regions were named entered in 1991. In the period of independence of the Ukrainian state. And although the factors that determined these peculiarities caused by the statelessness of the Ukrainian lands became historical past, it is obvious that their consequences for a long time have a significant impact on the course of socio-political processes both in individual regions and in the state as a whole”.²⁸

The religious factor also plays an influential role in the social and political life of the Ukrainian regions.²⁹

There are the following “religious and geographical regions”:

- Volynsky (Volyn, Rivne, north of the Ternopil region), dominated by Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchate;
- Galitsky (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, part of the Ternopil region), for which “complete predominance of Catholicism, especially Greek Catholicism”³⁰ is characteristic, and among Orthodox churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate have the greatest influence;
- Transcarpathian (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, Roman Catholic Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, reformers);
- Podolsko-Bukovinsky (Khmelnitsky, Vinnitsa and Chernovtsy regions), dominated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchate;
- Central (Kiev, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovograd regions), which is also dominated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchate;
- South-East (Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk regions), which is dominated by the Ukrainian Orthodox

²⁷ Uhryn, “Vplyv rehionalnykh identychnosti”.

²⁸ Panchuk, Yevtukh, Voinalovych et al., *Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukraini*, 160.

²⁹ Mariia Karmazina, *Contradictions of identities in modern Ukraine: grounds, manifestations, risks* (Kyiv, Ukraine: I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2015), 160.

³⁰ Kotyhorenko, Kalakura, Kovach et al. *Donbas v etnopolitychnomu vymiri*, 456-57.

Church of Moscow Patriarchate;

- Southern (Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev regions and Crimea), where the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate predominates.

But, the level of religiosity and the degree of importance of religion for the population of the regions is different. So, in the east of the country at the beginning of 2013, 59% declared themselves believers (versus 66% in 2010), whereas in the West, respectively, 86% (in 2010 – 89%).³¹ Empirical evidence confirms that the readiness to support the geopolitical orientation of their country largely depends on the confessional identity of the citizens of Ukraine.³²

A number of factors of geographical, historical, socio-economic, political and cultural importance influencing the formation of regional identity in Ukraine are distinguished by L. Nahorna:

- 1) natural and climatic features caused by the terrain, resource endowment, specificity of the settlement culture;
- 2) geopolitical influences - wars and related migration processes, divisions and redistribution of the territory;
- 3) targeted political measures of metropolitan states aimed at the integration of the territory and the assimilation of the population, as well as the introduction of their own management schemes and identification models;
- 4) the specificity of social stratification, including due to religious and interfaith confrontation, according to the state of the educational system;
- 5) traditional or assimilated in the process of colonization legal ideas and ways of self-organization;
- 6) the political interests of local elites.³³

The researcher believes that Ukraine can be a typical example of how painful and uneasy the process of development of local, local identities that have developed in the absence of statehood and dismemberment, into a national identity, and how, after independence, has become irreversible dynamics in the opposite direction - design regional identity. The search for identification models turned out to be difficult and still unfinished. The natural desire of the regions to ensure their own self-sufficiency, not to mention possible federalist and even separatist tendencies on the ground, to stimulate the growth of regional self-awareness and crystallization of territorial interests.³⁴

The main focus of L. Nahorna is on understanding the risks and threats generated by a traumatized historical memory, the antonymic of political orientations and the diversification of public consciousness that has developed

³¹ Ibid.

³² My`kola Olenksandrovy`ch Shulha, *Heopolitychni oriientatsii naseleння i bezpeka Ukrainy. Za danymy sotsiologiv* [Geopolitical orientations of the population and the security of Ukraine. According to sociologists] (Kyiv, Ukraine: Publishing house "Business-polihraf", 2019), 80.

³³ Nahorna, *Rehionalna identychnist*, 405.

³⁴ Ibid.

on this basis. She emphasizes that ‘without developing an integral system of basic values and fundamental principles capable of cementing society, Ukraine will continue to be doomed to orientation bifurcation, confrontation in political thinking and behaviour, a “crisis of ideals.”³⁵ Today, the author believes, it is necessary to realize that the future of Ukraine as an independent state depends on which principles, national civil or local ethnic, to shape the framework of identification practices.³⁶

Thus, the factors of regional identification are: territorial relations arising on the basis of common or neighbouring residence of members of social groups of different scale and cultural identification, symbols, images, narratives, myths about borders and the uniqueness of a region and prospects for regional development. These grounds for the consolidation of the regional community are actively supported by regional elites and the media, becoming an essential aspect of regional policy.

The main mechanisms for constructing political identity through the media is the introduction of certain attitudes, stereotypes, sewage of certain public moods and modelling of public opinion into the public consciousness. Unfortunately, regional media do not always adhere to the policy of consolidation, political consensus and tolerance during election campaigns, highlighting events occurring in the state, contributes to an even greater polarization of Ukrainian society. For example, research discourse analysis of the national press 2004-2005. Around the content and forms of the national idea in Ukraine, they demonstrated that “the mass media, with the exception of the liberal ones, during the difficult times of the escalation of the confrontations did not reveal sufficient consolidation. Remaining overwhelmingly the mouthpiece of the moods that dominated in each of the regions, they voluntarily or involuntarily fuelled confrontation.”³⁷

Extreme threat in this sense is the spread of all sorts of phobias in the spheres of ethnopolitics, based on the distortion of historical facts and events of our time. Particularly common confrontation of stakeholders in the field of mass media discourse usually occurs in the border regions in discourses on interethnic, inter-ethnic conflicts, the formation of the settlement structure of the population of multi-ethnic regions and regional identity. Moreover, the media not only covers certain events, but also acts as a means of ensuring their offensive and development in the desired course for political leadership.³⁸ With

³⁵ Nahorna, *Sotsiokulturna identychnist*, 268-69.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 270.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Valerii Tishkov, “Etnicheskiy konflikt v kontekste obshchestvovedcheskikh teoriy” [Ethnic conflict in contexts of social science theories], *Social conflicts: expertise, forecasting, technology*, no. 1 (January 1992): 35-6; Kotyhorenko, Kalakura, Kovach et al. *Donbas v etnopolitychnomu vymiri*, 510-11.

the rapid spread of the latest means of transmitting information based on the use of computer equipment and the Internet, the regional media increasingly see the role of one of the means of promoting certain authorities of certain financial and industrial groups in power.³⁹

In the context of the subject of the research, it is necessary to mention the scientific discourse that is popular today on the problem of the limitropic (border, peripheral) location of Ukraine, which also took shape historically. In particular, S. Troyan believes that “on the one hand, the eastern borders of Ukraine are the line of demarcation between Europe and Russia as a separate Russian-Eurasian civilization, on the other, Russia considers the western borders of Ukraine to be the line of demarcation between NATO and the CIS space, which considers zone of their special interests.”⁴⁰ The author believes that:

“Ukraine is a Limitro in three dimensions. In geopolitical, it was between NATO and Russia. In economic terms, between countries with a predominantly market economy, a Western economy, and a state-monopoly economy under the control of the new ruling class economy of Russia. In the spiritual and moral - between the totalitarian mono ideological past and the largely uncertain future in the form of actually only the idea of a legal, democratic, socially oriented state.”⁴¹

Limitrophic position S. Troyan defines as an intermediate: “If the people of the “limitrofa” do not take root in the structure of a regional civilization, then their self-affirmation in the form of an independent state remains problematic, as it is problematic to implement and create its consolidated local civilization.”⁴²

Based on S. Khantington, who believed that Ukraine is at the crossroads of world civilizations that combine different ethnic and religious subcultures, scientists analyze how “The clashes of civilizations” within Ukraine reflect on the state of Ukrainian society.⁴³ S. Khantington noted that segments of Ukrainian society, “the repulsive forces split into pieces and attracted them to the civilization magnets of other societies. This formed a feeling in them that they are different nations and belonging to different territories.”⁴⁴ For example, M. Nichoga claims that the cause of the crisis of national identity in Ukraine is the civilizational split, which carries in itself first conflict to conflict of cultures, nations and civilizations. The author emphasizes that the conflict that splits

³⁹ Kotyhorenko, Kalakura, Kovach et al. *Donbas v etnopolitychnomu vymiri*, 512.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Serhii Troyan, “Suchasna Ukraina: vid lokalnoi tsyvilizatsii do konsolidatsii suspilstva” [Modern Ukraine: From Local Civilization to Consolidation of Society] in *20 years of Ukraine's independence: gains, losses and strategies for the future*, ed. Serhii Ivanov (Kyiv, Ukraine: National Academy of Management, 2011), 188-90.

⁴² Troyan, “Suchasna Ukraina,” 189.

⁴³ Khantington, *Kto my*, 636.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Ukraine is a conflict between Western and Orthodox civilizations.⁴⁵ Supports the view of the civilization split in the territory of Ukraine and S. Troyan. The scientist believes that Ukraine

“is at the crossroads of three large and powerful civilization spaces - Western European, Eurasian, Islamic, therefore, in Ukrainian society there are obvious differences and even opposition on cultural and civilizational orientations. The belonging of Ukraine to the peripheral zones of several civilizations makes it possible to determine its belonging to the split civilizations.”⁴⁶

Indeed, in the religious space of Ukraine, Orthodoxy dominates (Eastern Christianity), but at the same time the Western region of the country is under the influence of Greek Catholicism (Christianity). The confessional affiliation of Ukrainian citizens largely, according to sociological research, determines their geopolitical orientations.⁴⁷

Realizing that there are countries that are on the verge of various civilizations and even civilization worlds (for example, France, Japan, Turkey, Mexico), it can be concluded that the position of Ukraine is not unique. Another thing is that in our country today not just a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic and Orthodox (and partly Muslim) civilizations takes place, but the line of collision of the dominant civilizations of the Christian world - the North Atlantic (Protestant) and the Eurasian (Moscow-Orthodox). This leads to the civilizational split of the Ukrainian society, which is manifested by the regional and individual mentality, an indicator of which is the discrepancy between the declarative orientation to the civilizational model of the developed West and the ideas about those practices that are inherent in the chosen civilization contour.⁴⁸

The fact that for many centuries the Ukrainian territory was a “civilization crossroads”, a territory of intersection of many cultures and religions, directly affects our present - both in the internal, Ukrainian, and in the external, common European dimension, T. Gorban considers.⁴⁹ According to L. Horizontov, the problem of establishing the macroregional identity of the Ukrainian and, consequently, the place of Ukraine in the modern European space is complicated by the fact that “the historically mobile zone of intersection of European macroregions passes precisely through the territory of Ukraine.”⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Nichoha, “Zitknennia .”

⁴⁶ Troyan, “Suchasna Ukraina,” 190.

⁴⁷ Shulha, *Heopolitychni orïentatsii naseleennia i bezpeka Ukrainy*, 81.

⁴⁸ Pirozhkov, Bogutskiy, Libanova et al. *Ukraine*, 301.

⁴⁹ Panchuk, Yevtukh, Voinalovych et al., *Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukraini*, 397.

⁵⁰ Leonid Yefremovych Horyzontov, “Ukraina v zerkale regionalistiki” [Ukraine in the mirror of regionalism] in *The Regions and Borders of Ukraine in retrospective*

Regional identity today is due not only to objective factors: the history of settlement and formation of the region, economic development, ethnocultural characteristics, etc. A large role is played by factors of the subjective order: goals and activities of the regional elite, administration, political parties and public organizations, position and influence mainstream media.

As S. Rymarenko stresses, regional interests and values play a prominent role in the formation of regional political identity.⁵¹ The presence of regional interests is due to the specific socio-economic, political problems of modern Ukraine:

- interests of various social groups (professional, age, religious, etc.);
- the interests of political groups in the region, at an appropriate level, should represent the interests of groups of the population;
- interests of the regional elite, which controls the power structures and seeks to institutionalize their relations with the Centre;
- interests of the regional leader and his team, which may conflict with the priorities of the population.

Moreover, the author believes that it is possible to speak of regional political regimes, since the regions of Ukraine are divided into spheres of influence of financial-industrial groups with their party superstructures – parties.

A similar position in the Ukrainian sociologist A. Stehni, who shares the factors under the influence of which territorial identities are formed, into long- and short-term ones. The former depends on the characteristics of the settlement network, the degree of economic development of the region, the ethnic composition of the population and its migration experience, historical memory, orientation towards “freedom” or “order”, unitarism or autonomy. The latter are shaped by the situational interests of regional elites, geopolitical factors, and current political processes. On this basis, a ‘regional development pattern’ can emerge – as a historically established type of reproduction of regional identity, a kind of ‘sociocultural code’ that determines the direction of sociocultural dynamics.⁵²

Different historical experience of the Ukrainian regions, feelings and experiences enshrined in historical memory, archetypes and myths, led to other parameters of differentiation – mentality, values, attitudes, lifestyle. So, the mentality of Western Ukraine is characterized by the values of individualism, human autonomy, and for Eastern Ukraine, egalitarianism in political and economic relations is dominant.

Peculiarities of world perception by residents of different regions of

perspective, ed. Leonid Horyzontov (Moscow: Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005), 36-7.

⁵¹ Rafalskyi, Voinalovych, Nahorna et al., *Etnopolitychnyi kontekst sotsiokulturnykh transformatsii u suchasni Ukraini*, 395.

⁵² Oleksandr Stehni, “Rehionalnyi chynnyk rozvytku politychnoi kultury naselennia Ukrainy” [Regional factor of development of political culture of the population of Ukraine], *Sociology: theory, methods, marketing*, no. 3 (April 2005): 94-122.

Ukraine significantly influence the values of political culture. Researchers note the existence of regional differences in political culture not only along the East-West axis. In particular, N. Pohorila puts forward a hypothesis about the existence of a “horizontal” (West-East) and a “vertical” (North-South) cultural division of Ukraine. Analyzing political culture as a combination of political competence, trust in politicians and political activity, N. Pohorila notes the absence of a linear connection of elements of political culture with the axis “West-East”. Moreover, in her opinion, the opposition of political cultures of the “civil-alienated” type is most likely characteristic of the Centre and the South.⁵³

In modern Ukraine, regional political cultures that accumulate the entire historical experience of the territories have become the main determinants of their political experience. In Ukraine, there are objectively arrays of sustainable imposition of the region on political sympathies.⁵⁴

Political culture as the most important element of the regional policy of any society links together political institutions and processes with political consciousness through patterns of behaviour, values, emotions, attitudes, lifestyle, and world perception. Therefore, the regional mentality influences the heterogeneity of political culture, due to interfaith differences, peculiarities of dogma and religious practices of Orthodoxy and Uniatism. So, the Greek Catholics, mainly concentrated in the West of Ukraine, by their dogmatics to Western European Christianity, associated with Roman law and the concept of private property, to the device of a free personal life. For the Orthodox population of the East of Ukraine are characterized by a collectivist attitude to life problems, the aspiration of a superpersonal goal, mercy, compassion for the needy, condescension to human handicaps, and the like. Orthodox is more subject to discipline under the influence of external circumstances, and the Greek Catholic - internal. In general, according to V. Sychova, one can speak of a greater readiness of the Greek Catholic West of the country, unlike the Orthodox East, for the liberalization of society, privatization of the economy, market competition.⁵⁵

Ukrainian regional identity, according to modern authors, has its own peculiarities, compared to other European countries. So, L. Ugrin believes that

⁵³ Nataliia Pohorila, *Rehionalni podily v Ukraini: na prykladi politychnoi kultury* [Regional divisions in Ukraine: an example of political culture] (Kyiv, Ukraine: Publisher “PARAPAN”, 2004), 63-64.

⁵⁴ Rafalskyi, Voinalovych, Nahorna et al., *Etnopolitychnyi kontekst sotsiokulturnykh transformatsii u suchasni Ukraini*, 394.

⁵⁵ Viktoriia Sychova, “Rol partii u formuvanni politychnoi kultury yak chynnyka samorehuliatzii hromadianskoho suspilstva” [The role of the party in shaping political culture as a factor in the self-regulation of civil society] in *Politychni partii v nezalezhnii Ukraini: rol ta mistse u politychnii transformatsii suspilstva* [Political parties in independent Ukraine: the role and place in political transformation of society], ed. Myhailo Hrets (Kharkiv, Ukraine: Publishing house “Atlanta”, 2001), 70-71.

regional differences in Ukraine are deeper than in European countries and acquire features of a civilizational nature. In addition, the author notes that:

- regional identities were formed earlier than the emerged state;
- prevalence (especially in the East and the South) of regional and local identity over national and state identity;
- simplified perception of regional diversity;
- dichotomy of regional identities of the West and the East, especially at the ideological and political levels, elements of alienity into mutual perception;
- interdependence of regional and political identities;
- attempts to construct ethnic differences (Ukrainian and Russian) as the basis of western and eastern identity;
- the influence of external factors on the reproduction and design of regional identities in Ukraine.⁵⁶

The functional analysis of regional identity shows that, being considered one of the basic elements of constructing a “region”, plays a large role in the preservation and functioning of a regional socio-political space. On its basis, a system of knowledge about the region develops, a feeling of a “small homeland”, a kind of “regional patriotism” is formed.

Regional identity provides an appropriate degree of cohesion of the regional community, determines the ways and mechanisms of social interaction between its members.

At the same time, with its help, if necessary (or its imitation), a psychological communicative distance is built up, which separates this community from others according to the principle “We” – “They”.

The psychological component of regional identity is also manifested under the influence of globalization processes. Identity in the course of globalization is changing due to the increasing interaction of cultures, it becomes more pluralistic. The problem of identity in the process of globalization includes the designation of its place in the transnational economic, cultural identity, personal identity and the like. As a result, the “national”, by countries of origin, identity is being eroded, it loses its solid benchmarks. The state has competitors in the form of network communities, transnational corporations, supranational structures.

But globalization does not mean reducing the role of the local. The English sociologist R. Robertson coined the term “globalization”, which means that globalization and localization processes occur simultaneously, that the local is an aspect of globalization, the global creates the local.⁵⁷

Psychological compensation for the influence of the global becomes a local or regional identity associated with a small homeland. The interaction

⁵⁶ Uhryn, “Vplyv rehionalnykh identychnosti”.

⁵⁷ Robertson, *Globalization*, 37.

between the global and the local in the modern world is described by the well-known Polish-English sociologist S. Bauman in his book “The Individualized Society”: “Our dependencies are now completely global, and our actions are, however, previously local.”⁵⁸

According to sociological studies conducted in 2005 by the Alexander Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies⁵⁹ citizens of Ukraine ‘first and foremost’ associated themselves with their place of residence, that is, local (local) identity (44.4% of respondents). Almost a third (31.3%) showed an all-Ukrainian identity; 14.8% – regional. Other measurements indicated insignificant groups of respondents (from 2.9% - the Soviet Union, to 0.8% – Europe).

In December 2015 the same number (40%) of respondents showed that they “first of all” associate themselves with Ukraine and with a specific settlement (city, village) where they live. 11.4% of respondents indicated that they are associating themselves with the region of residence. With other communities, insignificant shares of respondents showed their identity (2.1% with the Soviet Union, 1.5% with Europe, 0.6% with Russia).⁶⁰

At the same time, the process of consolidation of the Ukrainian regions is difficult. The formation of a political nation faces a number of problems that inhibit its formation. This process became even more aggravated in the context of an open military conflict in the Donbas. The fears of the threat of an external enemy attack rose sharply in the population’s consciousness (from 9.5% in 2013 to 52% in 2015), which led to civilian consolidation and an increase in the number of those who identified themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Thus, according to the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the number of those who identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine increased from 2013 to 2015 by 6.5% – from 51% to 57.5%.⁶¹ But a deeper analysis shows that the identification of residents of regions with Ukrainian citizenship is not uniform. If among the residents of the west and center of the country, they identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine, 65% and 64%, respectively, then those among the inhabitants of the South – 45%, and Donbas, only 39% (we are talking about the territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities).

These examples show two trends. Firstly, the number of citizens identifying themselves with Ukraine is increasing, and secondly, local, local

⁵⁸ Bauman, *The Individualized Society*, 270.

⁵⁹ Razumkov Center, “The common identity of Ukrainian citizens”, 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Olena Zlobina, Mykola Shulha, Lyubov Bevzenko et al., *Sotsialno-psykholohichni chynnyky intehratsii ukrainskoho sotsiumu* [Socio-psychological factors of integration of Ukrainian society] (Kyiv, Ukraine: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2016), <http://i-soc.com.ua/assets/files/journal/leshch-socio-psy-factors-a5-16-01-2017.pdf>.

identity retains its value. This is due, in our opinion, not only to the erosion of national identity under the influence of global factors, but, in the particular Ukrainian version, this is also due to the increasing trend of regional divisions (linguistic, cultural, geopolitical, etc.) in Ukraine.⁶² On the one hand, the regional split is due to objective factors (history of regional development, ethnocultural differences, peculiarities of the economic structure of regions), on the other hand, this topic is actively stimulated by the political elite and politicians in order to obtain electoral sympathies and other political dividends.

Given the psychological component of political identity, the researchers draw attention to its psychotherapeutic role. According to E. Noel-Neumann, general significance, publicity is such a state when individuals do not want to isolate themselves and lose their face.⁶³ Meeting the need for recognition, E. Noel-Neumann believes, can play the role of motivating political behaviour, helps to transform needs for action, helps people navigate the political space, and allows them to evaluate what is happening. The emotional component of regional identity creates a sense of belonging to the regional community and, with its help, being protected from the blows of fate. In the same direction, a compensatory function acts, the role of which is decisive in “traumatized” societies. Due to regional identity, certain aspects of the crisis development of the political system are compensated (ensuring an adequate level of political participation of the population and the legitimacy of the government through the popularization of, for example, national identity).

Regional identity is of great instrumental value. It creates mechanisms for securing a positive identity in one's consciousness, a disposition towards the priority of one's own values, and self-esteem education. But it is equally capable of stimulating the curved images of other identities, megalomania and xenophobia.⁶⁴

As social practice shows, complex relations with the centre and infringement (or the presence of mass ideas about such restrictions) of regional political, socio-economic, spiritual interests can become factors of hypertrophic politicization of regional identity. In this case, in the ranking of identities, it is precisely regional identity that comes to the fore, which significantly harms the national one.

The potential of regional identities depends not only on the attractive force of attraction, but also on the strength or weakness of the national-civic identity. These two identities can be complementary, but under certain conditions they can also resist each other. So, in the case of inadequate capacity of state institutions, there is a hypothetical possibility of the development of regionalism according to a destructive scenario. Ethnocultural factors play a special role in conflicts of

⁶² Nataliia Pashyna, “Etnomovnyi chynnyk politychnoi identychnosti v Donbasi” [Ethnological factor of political identity in the Donbas], *Political management*, no. 1 (January 2005): 24-34.

⁶³ Noel-Neumann, *Obshchestvennoe mnenye*, 325.

⁶⁴ Nahorna, *Rehionalna identychnist*, 405.

identities, therefore modern political science is increasingly focusing its attention on the “ethnocultural dimension” of identity politics.

It should be noted that mixed identification is typical for most people. For example, a resident of Mariupol may feel at the same time a resident of the city, the Donbas, a citizen of Ukraine, a member of any party. The ratio of significance of identification objects for an individual depends on the hierarchy of these objects in his political picture of the world, which is formed depending on many subjective and objective factors, in particular on his dispositions in the sociocultural, economic and political space (its habitus), as well as on the level of formation objects of identification: state, nation, party, region, etc.

Conclusions

Thus, the formation of a collective national identity in the conditions of regions of complex ethnic and confessional composition is one of the urgent problems of modern Ukraine. The group national-cultural identity of the regions of Ukraine cannot be explained only by current economic and political processes, it has deep historical roots. Ethnocultural factors play a special role in regional identity. Regional identity, which is based on ethno-cultural factors, translates into political sentiments and orientations of the inhabitants of the region, is actively manifested in elections at the regional and national levels.

Despite the rather large interest of Ukrainian scientists in the problems of regional identity, the topic has not exhausted itself. This is due to the fact that regional identity in each region of Ukraine is determined by a unique combination of the historical heritage of the region, features of the ethnic and religious composition of its population, socio-economic status, specifics of lifestyle, traditions, culture, ethnic groups and many other factors that constitute a specific set of circumstances. In addition, the politicization of regional differences led to the intensification of the regionalization of electoral political sympathies, the aggravation of social differences around geopolitical and ethno-cultural values. Therefore, the problem of regional identity has a high identification dynamism and requires constant scientific monitoring from those new perspectives that are actualized by political practice.

A significant role in the process of identification of social subjects and the formation of collective identities is played by the policy of identity, which is carried out by various actors of the political process. The policy of identity in a democratic society does not exclude the presence of a multitude of identities, including political ones, which are in a certain hierarchy of meanings for social subjects. It is aimed at creating a foundation for reconciling different, differentiated interests, the basis of collective self-identification of society. Thus, national identity should be considered as a basis for consolidating

citizens, an important resource for stabilizing the political system and social development.

The experience of the development of modern states shows that the policy of identity can be quite effective, and regional differences are not an absolute obstacle to the formation of a collective national identity. Therefore, long-term planning and software of identity politics at the state level, based on public consensus and democratic values, taking into account the ethno-cultural, confessional and linguistic features of the Ukrainian regions, are of particular relevance in modern Ukraine. The task of the modern Ukrainian state is to develop such a model of regional and socio-cultural policy, in which the poly-ethnicity and multiculturalism of the Ukrainian regions will be considered as non-intrusive value and source of wealth of the Ukrainian society.

The development of an effective strategy for regional interaction and consolidation, forecasting and preventing political risks, involves studying the entire palette of historical and cultural factors in the formation of regional identities and their influence on modern politics.

Studying the specifics of regional identities based on historical, sociocultural, ethnocultural and linguistic features will help to better understand the interrelation of ethnic and political in regional electoral moods, predict the prospects and conditions for regional interaction and consolidation in Ukraine.

RECENSIONES

DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN

Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Romania. Civic engagement and elites' behavior after 1989

(Berlin: Peter Lang, 2019), 158 pp.

The story of Romanian democracy is nowadays that of a successful transition. According to this narrative, Klaus Iohannis's presidential election in 2014 marked a turning point in the path of 'accepting' ethnic and religious minorities. The 2016 elections caused a shift in voting behavior from negative to prospective choices. Moreover, the 'conservative revolution' ('anti-European populism') which brought many ECE countries closer to an illiberal democracy model has had a limited impact. An active and highly determined public resisted and effectively opposed democratic backsliding. Such optimistic accounts of the Romanian post-communist trajectory are the starting point of Dragoș Dragoman's recent book on "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Romania. Civic engagement and elites' behavior after 1989". The argument is articulated around three chronological junctures: the analysis of social capital in the beginning of the 2000s, the articulation of various forms of participation in 2005, and, finally, the rise of unaccountable populism during Traian Băsescu's presidency (2005-2012). The succession of empirical snapshots of citizens' expectations and elites' empowerment suggests some degree of cyclicity: public apathy encouraged political elite embeddedness and closure, which, in turn, created a backlash effect, namely people's rebellion against the populist turn. Despite the ostensible optimism in the opening of this book, Romanian democracy has rarely received such a gloomy and accurate depiction.

In Dragoman's reading, what would seem to be the main virtues of the current political system are also its main vulnerabilities. Popular forms of opposition, articulated through protest movements, seem destined to grow in intensity and to remain open to both legitimate and illegitimate attempts to confiscate/manipulate them, condemned to further radicalization, in a continuous search for "enemies from within". The decline of 'intermediary actors' coupled with the muddling of the public sphere discourses by uncritical, self-interested, neo-liberal intellectuals could in effect lead to the creation of a lesser civic-minded public. Alternatively, citizens might become receptive to a discourse of "conformism" and "rigidity", with "authoritarian" undertones. In the authors' view, the recent political awakening, relying on protests, could turn to be a potential sign of a new democratic ethos (with the prospective of rebuilding intermediary actors from grassroots levels), but, for the moment at least, it is rather indicative of a deeper transformation: the symbolic death of the former actors of civil society, and, with this, the demise of any form of viable political linkages and dialogue.

In order to retrace the origins of the latent flaws in the Romanian democracy, the book proceeds to the analysis of the cultural factors – shared values and beliefs - shaping the transitional regime both at the citizens and the elite levels. In the early 2000s, Romanians declared themselves (opinion polls) as strong supporters of democracy, although some autocratic leanings lay buried underneath the surface, in the preference for strong leaders or technocratic solutions. Despite low levels of social capital (small levels of generalized trust and participation), democratic consolidation did occur, and with this came a more civically-engaged type of citizen. Starting from the pre-accession phase, a division between more conventional forms of participation -such as voting- and more unconventional ones, namely, protest movements, came to the fore. Voting depended on church attendance, self-empowering attitudes, and trust in institutions. Conversely, civic activism, educational attainment, income, and political interest were the main drivers for attending street rallies. According to Dragoman, this division would currently translate in the opposition between urban and rural areas and would, at least in part, explain the social divisions which cut deep through the recent political conflicts. At the same time, the book places the recent citizens' awakening in a context of the economic crisis and poor governance. People reacted and sanctioned the populist turn of Traian Băsescu's mandates, which transformed the political regime in a Sartorian 'demolatory', a system discussing ad nauseam about people, but disregarding people's choices or interests. Anti-parliamentarism (following the 2007 presidential impeachment), the transformation of leadership styles in sync with the main themes of "manele" (Romanian pop-folk music), and the concentration of executive power through institutional engineering brought high-levels of political polarization. All elements of the classical definition of populism came out in orderly sequence: majoritarian reforms, referendums meant to weaken the parliamentary power, extensive executive powers (e.g. governing through emergency ordinances, fast-track adoption of sensitive bills, requests for the introduction/implementation of constraining disciplinary procedures against MPs, Constitutional court packing combined with bootstrapping of CCR's prerogatives).

However, one should wonder whether the chronological choice of presenting governmental centralism as an incremental process, leading to a post-accession form of decline is not only a part of the story. The concentration of power in the executive has been a recurrent feature during the entire transition and continued undefeated and unfazed after 2009. For example, the inflation in the overall numbers of emergency ordinances was the outcome of 'learning by doing' during the pre-accession phase (e. g – 297 emergency ordinances issued in 1999, 209 in 2002). Moreover, Emil Boc's propensity to use such shortcuts falls a bit behind that of subsequent governments (when weighted against government duration): Ungureanu, Ponta, Cioloș, etc. By the

same token, political instrumentalism runs deep in the Romanian post-communism. In 2012, on the occasion of the presidential impeachment, a case extensively cited in the book, institutional manipulation characterized both PDL/Traian Băsescu and the Social-Liberal Union's initiatives. In this context, it was only the speed but not the essence of the USL attempts to reshape key institutions that justified the external actors' (EU, Venice Commission, etc.) decision to take action and sides (as there are no particular indications that European Commission or the foreign embassies were misled or misinformed).

The author identifies two main reasons for the lack of public outcry against PDL's defective practices. First, while citizens abandoned the individualistic referential in order to rally against the government, the change came only late in time, under the influence of very specific factors (salary cuts, corruption cases, hospital and school closures, etc.). Differently from the first years of transition, traditional agents of civil society did not channel or initiate the new protest movements. The organized forms of civil society had been atrophied from the early 2000s (only ¼ of the citizens were members of different organizations and the duration of affiliation was on average less than 2 years). Moreover, as the author observes, there was no particular rebirth of such intermediary actors, rather the opposite: protesters systematically rejected the 'formalized civil society' (NGOs, known civic activists). Second, public intellectuals, the putative last bastion of resistance to governmental abuses, supported the Democrats/Liberal-democrats and President Băsescu, either because of ideological conformity (charmed by the prospect of finally accomplishing the end-of-transition dream of the post-communist intelligentsia, the symbolic condemnation of the communist regime) or due to sheer self-interest. Their failure to criticize abuses or their sheer silence could thus also be an explanation for the people's outbreak. However, note should be made, that Traian Băsescu and the PDL's agenda, relying on rule of law and anticorruption narratives, received continuous and enthusiastic blessings not only from EPP leaders but also from EU institutions, notably the EC (indirectly, through positive assessments in CVM annual reports). In this context, opium for the intellectual masses was mostly the ideal of contributing, through a neoliberal agenda, to an undefined but strongly idealized view of fulfilling the 'European destiny' of the country.

If there is a weak spot in the author's analysis of the Romanian transition, it lies in the lack of emphasis on the role of post-accession oversight and transnational forms of cooperation in shaping and validating not only the anticorruption hegemonic discourse but also the so-called neoliberal solutions. The main paradox of the 'silent intellectuals' from that period is that they acted, more than ever before, as 'successful intermediary actors. The agenda they have promoted in 2005-2012 had shaped a definition of "Europeanisation" which is still prevalent in the Romanian imperfect democracy. Against all odds, the

economic crisis's negative outcomes, the liberal democrats' electoral defeat or subsequent contestations did not raise doubts concerning the validity as such of dominant model on 'modernizing' the country. I would be inclined to argue that it is not by chance that some of the more recent protesters are clamoring for a similar direction and framing the rule of law and anticorruption in relation to traditional social divides usually associated to a neo-liberal approach (private-public sectors, urban-rural, highly educated-poorly educated, etc.).

The volume contributes substantively to a better understanding of the democratic consolidation in Romania and the hidden weaknesses of the political system. Through the provocative thesis pointing to the dangers of too much unstructured activism, the author accounts for the main transformations both in what concerns the slower articulation of our political culture and the recent emergence of a populist turn (which, in time, became embedded in governmental routines).

The author provides enriching and thorough analyses of the cultural and political dimensions as well as a comparative account of parallel processes in the region. According to Dragoş Dragoman, in the Romanian case, rebuilding intermediary actors, strengthening civic education, broadening the social sphere seem to be the solutions addressing the lack of political accountability. The book is an insightful and enjoyable interdisciplinary journey into the past and present-day politics of Romania.

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FLORA A.N.J. GOUDAPPEL AND ERNST M.H. HIRSCH BALLIN (EDS.)

Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union. Essays in Honour of Jaap W. de Zwaan

(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), 232 pp.

This recently published volume summarizes most of the latest evolutions of the European Union's (EU) rule of law. It is, above all, conceived as a contribution to the memory of Jaap W. de Zwaan, which had a long career in the legal profession and served almost 20 years at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently Professor of Law of the European Union at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, and his research areas include public law, democratic

politics and European integration. Flora Goudappel is currently Professor, Chair of EU Law at the University of Curaçao Dr. Moises da Costa Gomez. Her research interest is mainly concerned with the political and judicial system of the European Union. Ernst M.H. Ballin is Professor of Dutch and European Constitutional Law at Tilburg University, and his principal publications deal with human rights, the rule of law, and European citizenship. Through this collective volume, both editors want to demonstrate that the European Union has a dynamic institutional system, which tries to keep the standards of democracy at the highest possible level. Different conceptions on the rule of law, at the state and European level, prove there it may be a more profound crisis linked to the lack of a shared view on the ways in which juridical principles could be integrated in the political regime.

The three parts of the volume (Constitutional Foundations, Procedures, Policy Areas) include applied studies on concrete situations and facts. These sections are specific to the research methods of juridical studies and are shaped by the two central subjects, the democratic regime of the European Union, and the rule of law. The first term is traditionally used in political science, while the second belongs to the legal sciences, the main approach of this book.

The *Introduction* to the volume emphasizes the importance of the rule of law in the democratic decision-making process. A central idea underlined by the editors is that the rule of law must not be limited to the formal aspect, so it must be a real principle of the good governance: “the rule of law is procedural as well as substantive, which justifies the emerging EU practice of assimilation between the notions derived from different legal traditions” (XXII).

The legal changes in the European Union – made by the treaties – are presented in the articles of the first section. This begins with an attempt made by Mortimer Sellers to (re)define the rule of law in the actual European context (4-5). The author brings to our attention the independence of the judiciary as a main feature of a democracy. Another article, which underlines the importance of the rule of law in the judicial and political system of the European Union is written by Helena Raulus (24-26). Then there are – particularly - discussed by Ton van den Brink, other similar themes, such as the relationships between the national parliaments and the EU governance in order to improve European legitimacy (14); the rise of the EU citizenship as a legal and political instrument to ensure more rights and civil liberties to all the individuals in the Union (Fiona Murray, 37-38); finally, the integration process is analysed from the perspective of the role of national courts by Urszula Jaremba (45-46). Marc van der Woude has a case-study with some interesting predictions about a possible road to a European Council of the Judiciary and he reflects on the administrations of the EU Courts (59).

The main themes analysed in the second part are the ordinary legislative procedure from the perspective of the European Parliament (87), the EU

development policies based on the European values, democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights (103-105), and the impact of the enlargement (121). These contributions aim to reaffirm the role of rules and judicial procedures in a consolidated democracy –ensuring the citizens’ equality and implementing an efficient and unbiased judicial system.

In the third part, the reader’s attention is retained by six topics related to the domains of action of the EU institutions and policies: the European ruling on pensions in the case of Netherlands (137-147); trends in the EU external policy (148-158); the confiscation of earnings from crime as a possible challenge for criminal justice (159-169); the European Union’s readmission policy in the post-Stockholm programme era (170-181); the regional private law and its coordination in the EU (182-183), and a selection of legal and policy implications arising from the EU-ICC Agreement of 2006 (191).

Laurens Jan Brinkhorst emphasizes the contributions of Jaap W. de Zwaan in the EU legal researches and reinforces the advantages of a democracy centred on the rule of law. Final considerations assess the current issues inside the European institutional system and offer a large perspective on the context by recalling the role of human rights, the reception of these principles in the Member States, the lack of confidence in the European Union, and the implications of the subsidiarity and sovereignty as two apparently opposed concepts which create tensions between the EU political order and some national interests (213-214).

The rule of law and democracy are the central pillars of investigation, but each author has his/her own interpretation of this issue. As readers will notice, the EU is not a perfect institutional and social system; it has some dilemmas related to its definition as an international entity and, more than that, current issues on the public agenda involve the political directions in the future. “At first sight, one would expect that the political support for the Union would have become stronger. In fact, the opposite is the case. There is an increased sense of frustration that competences are being removed from the Member States and taken over by ‘Brussels’” (215).

Mortimer Sellers defines the rule of law by reference to the public goods and interests and the objective of limiting the political power to arrive to a substantial democracy: “The rule of law is not simply one or a few or the most important of the techniques sometimes used to secure the ‘empire of laws and not of men’, but rather the ‘imperium legum’ itself. There is no rule of law unless the law itself rules, and regulates the private interests of those with power, so that they cannot act against the common good of society as a whole” (3). Helena Raulus shows that “according to Article 2 TEU, EU is based on the values of protection of the rule of law and democracy; however, it has traditionally had very limited ways of dealing with the protection of the rule of

law, and very limited means to supervise the Member States if they breach it” (33).

Another major point of the volume is that similarly with the promotion of democracy and the rule of law for its Member States, the European Union wants to have a say in global politics. Actions in that direction are related to the refugee crisis but not only limited to this aspect. Monica den Boer presents “the unavoidable interconnectedness of experiences of injustice inside and outside the rule of law. Her examples are compelling: terrorism, human trafficking and other forms of criminal behaviour require action at the European level” (XXVI).

The volume can be criticized for at least three reasons. First, it does not mention the recent legislative initiatives of the European Commission regarding the creation of a unique mechanism for the rule of law. Secondly, the opinions of the Venice Commission on democracy through law, which are invoked by the EU’s institutions as arguments for their own politics, are not discussed. Finally, the importance of other procedures for the European democracy, such as the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, in the concrete cases of Bulgaria and Romania, could have completed the researches.

The rule of law as a pillar of democracy remains a simple common expression if it is not associated with the concrete initiatives and projects proposed by the European officials. The procedure provided by the Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) - and explained by Helena Raulus in her study on the Hungarian case - is useful but not sufficient, and the other proposals of the EU officials to correct these deficiencies are not found inside. For example, before the publication of the book reviewed here, the EU published the *Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law*, which included a series of arguments for the necessity to reinforce democracy through law in the Member States.¹ It refers to a set of principles and standards including “legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; and equality before the law.”²

The articles in this volume could have addressed the interpretations provided by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), which is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. These legal opinions are invoked by the executive of the European Union (namely the European Commission) in its *Communication* (see

¹ European Commission, *Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law*, Brussels, 11.03.2014, COM(2014) 158 final, 4; accessed April 7, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158&from=EN>.

² Ibid., 3.

above). The European Commission formulates arguments to establish a mechanism to protect the rule of law as a central value of the democratic politics in the European Union, and one of these reasons refers to the experience of the Council of Europe: “From a broader European perspective, the framework is meant to contribute to reaching the objectives of the Council of Europe, including on the basis of the expertise of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).”³ The warnings formulated by the Venice Commission on the disrespect for the rule of law in Poland and Hungary have preceded the activation of Article 7 TEU by the European Union, in the case of both countries.

The section of Procedures included in the volume could have debated the resilience of corruption in Romania and Bulgaria and the consequences on democracy standards in these former communist countries. It is an actual issue and it can be analysed as a case of non-alignment to the EU standards of democracy through law. In 2015 the Report for Romania stated that the “CVM has played an important role in the consolidation of the rule of law in Romania as a key facet of European integration” and underlined the fact that “consistency in track record is one of the key ways to demonstrate sustainability in progress towards the CVM objectives, one of the conditions to show that a mechanism like the CVM would no longer be required.”⁴

This volume analyses in a comprehensive manner a range of topics that aim essentially to discover the ways in which judicial principles and values can be applied and respected by political institutions to create a valid and consensual democratic paradigm in the European Union. The rule of law as a concept and practice in the European Union are finely defined and correlated with concrete institutional procedures. A possible second edition could include themes such as the impact of populism in Europe and how to counteract it using judicial values, the evolutions of Balkan candidate-states (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) in their relationships with the EU in respect to the rule of law, and a research on the role of human rights promoted by the Union in the context of cultural relativism.

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³ Ibid., 3.

⁴ European Commission, *Report from The Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism*, Brussels, 28.1.2015. COM(2015) 35 final; accessed April 8, 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-35-EN-F1-1.PDF>.

FRANÇOIS BAFOIL (ED.)**L'énergie éolienne en Europe: Conflits, démocratie, acceptabilité sociale**

(Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2016), 314 pp.

Volumul *L'énergie éolienne en Europe: Conflits, démocratie, acceptabilité sociale* este printre cele care (re)aduc în prim plan, pe continentul european, problematica relației dintre lumea materială și mediul socio-politic.

Înțelegerea emergenței unui obiect tehnic sau științific (material sau conceptual) ca produs social al unei rețele de actori atât umani cât și non-umani a fost inițiată în Franța post-structuralistă de către autori precum Bruno Latour și Michel Callon.¹ Potrivit acestora, rețeaua de actori se construiește în jurul controverselor asupra unui obiect, iar negocierea și luptele de putere dintre aceștia conduc, în final, către convergența de idei și interese.² Denumită teoria actorului-rețea (Actor-Network Theory) această abordare s-a dezvoltat, ulterior, mai degrabă pe continentul american, în special, în legătură cu infrastructura de utilități și comunicații și cu politica resurselor de mediu precum cea a apei.³ Fără a se revendica, propriu-zis, din teoria actorului-rețea, cartea evidențiază complementaritatea dintre construcția social-politică a unui obiect tehnic, cel al energiei eoliene și remodelarea rețelei de actori care iau parte la decizia publică în acest domeniu.

Coordonatorul lucrării, François Bafoil este cercetător la CERISciences Po, Paris al CNRS și membru al unor comitete științifice precum cel al Institutului pentru Politică Europeană din Berlin, al Centrului pentru Studii Sociale din Varșovia și al Institutului European de Înalte Studii Internaționale din Berlin și Nisa.⁴ Acesta a avut o traiectorie profesională care a favorizat înțelegerea comparativă a diverselor regimuri decizional-politice din Europa și în particular din Europa Centrală și de Est, dar și din Asia, locul activității sale pendulând între Franța, Germania și Polonia, iar sporadic chiar și China sau Turcia. Principalele sale titluri sunt publicate la Paris prin Presses de Sciences

¹ Volumul *Sociologie de la traduction: textes fondateurs* (Paris: Les Presses des Mines, 2006) sub coordonarea autorilor Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon și Bruno Latour reia textele care au pus bazele acestei teorii în anii '80.

² Michel Callon, „Sociologie de l'acteur réseau,” în *Sociologie de la traduction: textes fondateurs*, ed. Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon și Bruno Latour (Paris: Les Presses des Mines, 2006), 267-276.

³ Ca lucrări exemplificatoare amintim: Seanna Davidson, Jamie Linton și Warren Mabee, ed., *Water as a Social Opportunity* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015); Patrick Carroll, „Water and technoscientific state formation in California,” *Social Studies of Science* 42, nr. 4 (2012), 489-516.

⁴ CERISciences Po, „François Bafoil,” accesat Mai 3, 2019, <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/cerispire-user/7166/495>.

Po dintre care amintim: în 2006 - *Europe centrale et orientale. Mondialisation, européanisation et changement social*, iar în 2012 - *Capitalismes émergents. Economies politiques comparées. Europe de l'Est et Asie du Sud-Est*. Ulterior coordonează o serie de lucrări care au ca subiect politica energiei din care face parte și cartea pe care o prezentăm.⁵

Bafoil găsește în tranziția energetică un câmp propice pentru revizitarea comparativă a diverselor regimuri decizionale europene. Deși pornește de la studierea problemelor de acceptabilitate socială a energiilor regenerabile în Europa, această carte ne conduce, de fapt, către chestionarea procesului de primenire a democrației reprezentative europene, urmărind principala provocare cu care se confruntă acesta: „integrarea cetățenilor (...) în procesele de decizie politice, juridice și economice care structurează guvernanta fiecărei țări” (21).⁶ Ce alt loc mai potrivit pentru un astfel de demers decât unul în care mize globale de mediu, dar și geopolitice – de independență și securitate energetică sunt puse la încercare de opoziții locale?

Una dintre cele mai contestate componente ale tranziției energetice, energia eoliană, este și cea care a adus, în mare măsură, producția de energie în societate, a teritorializat-o și chiar a democratizat-o, cel puțin în termeni cantitativi. Modul răspândit de poziționare a turbinelor, vizibilitatea acestora și includerea sectorului privat au făcut ca în procesul de producție să fie implicați, direct sau indirect (prin conștientizare), din ce în ce mai mulți indivizi. Această vizibilitate a condus, însă, și la numeroase conflicte și reacții de respingere bazate pe motivații considerate, de cele mai multe ori legitime și care vizează trei dimensiuni problematice: riscurile de mediu - precum degradarea vizuală a peisajului, deșertificarea, afectarea speciilor de mamifere sau păsări, poluarea sonoră sau chiar riscuri mecanice; polarizarea economică și perturbarea proceselor de decizie. Aceste controverse au fost, după cum era de așteptat, instrumentalizate politic.

Paradoxala reușită românească în acest domeniu devine cu atât mai interesantă în contextul problematicilor ridicate de această carte. România era la sfârșitul anului 2016, conform EurObserv'ER, pe locul 11 în Europa în ceea ce privește puterea instalată în producția de energie eoliană.⁷ Aceasta își îndeplinise deja ținta de 24%, fixată de Comisia Europeană pentru anul 2020, cu privire la ponderea energiei regenerabile din totalul producției de energie.⁸ Mai

⁵ Coordonează, alături de Ferenc Fodor și Rachel Guyet, numărul special al revistei *L'Europe en Formation* - “Penser la justice énergétique en Europe et en Asie,” nr. 378 (4/2015), iar împreună cu Ferenc Fodor și Dominique Le Roux cartea - *Accès à l'énergie en Europe. Les précaires invisibles* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2014).

⁶ Traducerea autoarei.

⁷ EurObserv'ER, „Baromètre éolien,” (Februarie 2017): 12, <https://www.eurobserv-er.org/barometre-eolien-2017/>.

⁸ Comisia Europeană, „Raport al Comisiei către Parlamentul European, Consiliu, Comitetul economic și Social European și Comitetul Regiunilor. Raport privind progresele

mult, unul dintre investitori afirmă că deține în România, cel mai mare parc eolian terestru de pe continent.⁹

Claritatea demersului metodologic descris pedagogic, atât în introducere, cât și pe parcursul celor opt capitole, dă acestei lucrări o valoare de ghid de analiză atât a problemelor de acceptabilitate socială cu care se confruntă tranziția energetică în diverse țări, cât mai ales a funcționării sistemelor decizionale care se întâlnesc în Europa, a dinamicii și a mutațiilor acestora. De remarcat că, în ciuda înțelegerii localizate a controversei din jurul energiei eoliene, miza lucrării este de a arăta că, de fapt, teritorializarea producției de energie provoacă dezbaterile legitimităților și a intereselor generale și conduce la inovare pe multiple paliere. Toate acestea antrenează convergența modelelor europene de acțiune locală, „europenizarea” acestora, printr-o mai bună implicare a cetățeanului în procesele de decizie.

Pentru cele cinci studii de caz analizate, fiecare într-un capitol aparte, conflictele dezvoltate în jurul energiilor regenerabile devin un fir al Ariadnei prin diversele „arhitecturi ale guvernantei” (13) având la un capăt obiectivele Uniunii Europene, iar la celălalt opozițiile locale. Lucrarea atinge toate dimensiunile fenomenului, dedicând pe lângă cele cinci capitole în care tratează studiile de caz, un capitol construcției reprezentărilor sociale prin intermediul media și unul construcției sensului comun între științele sociale și cele ingineresti.

O contribuție interesantă a lucrării se desprinde din capitolul sintezei comparative. Acesta conchide că tipul de guvernare nu explică, de fapt, procedura aleasă de fiecare țară pentru rezolvarea controverselor ci, căile de soluționare sunt, mai degrabă, identitar-naționale. Indiferent de cadrul de acțiune inițial al actorilor, particularitățile procesului de decizie se construiesc în relație cu modul în care este integrat discursul politic dominant pe această temă. Brandenburg, un „Energiland” (Tărâm al Energiei) minier al Germaniei încrustat în inerții postcomuniste și de reunificare, devine pionier al acceptabilității prin inovații financiare care cointerează cetățeanul și dezamorsează spaimile unui complot falimentar. Olanda-Septentrională cu al său imaginar al morii de vânt, dar și al unui trecut patrimonial se îndreaptă, mai degrabă, către inovații instituționale împrumutate din modelul tradițional de construcție a polderului. Aici se dezvoltă foruri de dezbateri permanente a legitimităților și interesului general. În timp ce, retorica independenței Partidului Național Scoțian (SNP) sau oamenii „bonetelor roșii”, din departamentul francez Finistère, autodefiniți de lupta cu „cei de sus,” precum și descentralizarea locală încă neconsolidată din Polonia conduc mai degrabă către radicalizarea opozițiilor dintre asociațiile civile și puterea centrală. În astfel de

înregistrate în domeniul energiei din surse regenerabile,” Eur-Lex, Aprilie 9, 2019, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0057>.

⁹ CEZ, „Despre grupul CEZ în România,” accesat Mai 3, 2019, <https://www.cez.ro/ro/despre-noi/informatii-generale/companiile-cez/despre-grupul-cez-in-romania.html>.

cazuri, puterea locală ajunge chiar să facă pact cu asociațiile de opozanți blocând inovațiile și implicit posibilitățile de soluționare a conflictelor. Cercetarea demonstrează cum, acolo unde regionalizarea este mai pronunțată, federalizată chiar, capacitatea de inovare este mai mare, centralizarea antrenând, dimpotrivă, radicalizarea opozițiilor.

Este necesar să observăm, însă, că importanța conceptului de „acceptabilitate” pentru demersul de cercetare, face esențial modul în care acesta este definit. Înscrierea lui între limite care se întind de la o acceptare compensatorie a situației până la un compromis negociat și condiționat, adică, de la o înăbușire pecuniară a problemelor ridicate (ca de exemplu cointeresarea prin participarea cetățeanului ca investitor) la o recunoaștere în așteptare a acestora (inițiative de foruri de consultare permanentă – mult mai reduse ca număr) așază toate inovațiile în aceeași sferă de „grandoare,” ceea ce conduce la concluzii mai puțin nuanțate decât ar fi cazul.

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STEVEN BLOCKMANS AND SOPHIA RUSSACK (EDS.)

Direct Democracy in the EU. The Myth of a Citizens' Union

(Brussels and London: CEPS and Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), 454 pp.

The premises from which this collective volume *Direct Democracy in the EU. The Myth of a Citizens' Union* starts are those of a crisis situation as “the prevailing sense is that the EU has a democracy problem” (1). It is being dealt with in a research project called ‘Towards the Citizens' Union (2CU)’¹ as it tries to answer to “two-pronged question of i) how the relationship between citizen, state and EU has changed, and ii) whether and how direct democracy (this volume), representative democracy (volume 2, published in 2019) and the accountability of democratic institutions (volume 3, forthcoming in 2020) can be improved in a multi-layered EU” (3).

¹ Background of the project: 20 renowned think tanks from the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) have joined forces in a three-year (2017–2020) research project supported by the European Commission under its Erasmus+ programme (Project No. 587830-EPP-1-2017-1-BE-EPPJMO-NETWORK).

This premise is being enhanced by the growing number of national or local political narratives that are driving the citizens away from the ideal of the European integration and toward a divided national mind-set. We are dealing here with a classical division between the EU leaders hopes of reviving “output legitimacy” (based on policy objectives delivery) and the “democratic legitimacy” which in the author’s opinion “has in effect been left to fester” (3). Having this in mind “this first volume asks whether and, if so, how a sense of solidarity and European identity can be rescued from the bottom up by politically empowering citizens to ‘take back control’ of *their* EU” (4). In order to have a scientific coherence the authors used the concept of “participatory democracy” at EU level as it “puts a prime on the active participation of the civil society in public decision-making” (5). On a very technical level we are dealing with “a process of collective decision-making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals through referendums, civilian assemblies, public consultations, initiatives, petitions, etc. (...) and politicians assume the role of policy implementation” (5).

As regards the structure of the book it begins with the presentation of the EU-level Mechanisms by presenting the way in which the citizens engage in EU Policymaking (the first part). An important section is dedicated to the transversal aspects and thematic issues from the way in which the *Conventions Démocratiques* took place across Europe to the prospective analysis on the impact of the Digital Revolution in Democracy and Decision-Making. From there the analysis revolves around the need of a new narrative for Europe and on the role of civil society in the EU Decision-Making (Latvian case study) (the second part). Finally, the 14 countries reports provide a relevant EU cross-section analysis, the book having also a country report dedicated to Romania and the untapped potential of direct democracy (the third part). The final part of the book focuses on getting Europe’s direct democracy right (the fourth part).

In writing the first part concerning the pathways for citizens to engage in EU policymaking, the CEPS researcher Sophia Russack starts by identifying the five EU instruments that can be classified as participatory: European Citizens’ Initiative; petitioning the European Parliament; formal complaints to the Ombudsman; public consultations and Citizens’ Dialogues that are the subject of her analysis (9). They have been classified in “bottom-up” instruments (the European Citizens’ Initiative, petitions to the European Parliament, and complaints to the European Ombudsman) which provide to the citizens the opportunity to trigger various processes and in “top-down” instruments (Citizens’ consultations and Citizens’ dialogues) which are weaker and aim for support for existing policies (10). Later on, in the chapter they are analyzed from the point of view of effectiveness and impact on the democratic quality of the EU. The conclusion of the analysis of these participatory instruments is that

they “do not allow citizens much influence over the EU decision-making process” (37). The reasons are the following: they do not address or involve ‘ordinary’ citizens; the Commission supports and promotes top-down more than bottom-up instruments. This suggests that it considers allowing citizens to bring in their own policy preferences as less important than improving existing policymaking; the Commission’s default position is still a technocratic one, triggering a natural constraint towards citizens’ (bottom-up) participation and finally the output trumps input as the input is almost entirely limited to the consultative phase of policymaking (37-39).

An important point tackled in the second part of the book is among others that of “Europe’s Conventions Démocratiques” written by Dídac Gutiérrez-Peris, Pol Morillas and Héctor Sánchez Margalef. This chapter looks at the experiences of the European Convention in 2004 and the Citizens’ Dialogues since 2012 and retraces how the Democratic Conventions take inspiration from Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign. The Democratic Conventions have an important top down approach and depend a lot on the quality of political leadership to transform public expression into public appropriation (49). The authors also emphasized the Emmanuel Macron’s strategy based on based on three key decisions: the decision to create a movement that did not require ‘a membership fee’; the movement allowed double party membership and the central direction granted absolute autonomy to all local communities (52-53).

As we live in the digital age, the question of the internet and social media impact on the populations’ behavior pop up in this book through the chapter written by Wojciech Białożyty and Arkadiusz Legieć. In their opinion the digital revolution put an extra pressure on the governments and public administrations internal logic as it triggers a transformative process “towards a more transparent, open and mutually beneficial relationship between citizens and governments” (66). We are assisting toward the disruption of traditional legal and political frameworks. The permanent and direct communication with the citizens requires a series of adaptations of the government processes in order to become digitally efficient, the factors that can defined this model being, in the authors opinion, the following: “Access: citizens need to have access to technologies and be able to use them; Participation: citizens need to keep involved and remain in touch with government representatives; Tools: the need for a proper format or delivery on proper platforms” (67-68). In the Digital Era Governance we are heading toward a “networked government” where the citizens and NGO’s are in the center of policy making using the new tools respectively toward an “experimental government” where the experiments involving citizens are common (69-70). There are three level of e-participation in the new digital governance: eEnabling (information), eEngaging (consultation) and eEmpowering (active participation) which is “based on partnership with government in which citizens actively engage in defining the

process and content of policy- and decision-making” (71). All these advantages came with a price – the increase need for cyber security in order to guarantee that malicious forces do not interfere with the democratic processes.

The third part of the book deals with a series of countries reports that analyse the status of direct democracy, one of which being dedicated to Romania. The chapter on Romania was written by Mihai Sebe and Eliza Vaș, experts within the European Institute of Romania, a public institution coordinated by the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry is called “The untapped potential of direct democracy in Romania” (349-371). It begins with a short analysis of the transition from communism to democracy (1989 – 2007) which emphasises the gradual democratisation of the country as well as gradual dedication toward the “Euro-Atlantic integration project which was basically the most common denominator of all political parties, regardless of their left-right orientation” (350). An important part of the chapter is dedicated to the direct democracy instruments and citizens’ participation in Romania (2007 – 2018). The referendums analysis section is a well-developed one as it presents the legislative framework regulating them, the main topics, the rate of participation of the citizens and other relevant aspects for an outside reader for all the six referendums of that timeframe. The authors present the three main purposes of the national referendums: “to impeach the president, to vote on matters of national interest and to give citizens a voice on issues regarding the Constitution” (358). There are also mentioned some of the local referendums on specific issues in order to provide the full spectrum of this topic. The same analytical framework is applied to the topic of Citizens’ initiative. As case studies the authors focus on two controversial issues at the time of writing the report: the first one concerns the *Coalition for Family* initiative that wanted to define what is a family and the second one was the *Save Romania Union (USR)* initiative which has politicians’ criminal records in its sights called *Without convicted people in public offices* (359-360). The Civic movements subsection addressed the protests that shook Romania in 2017 concerning the revisions of the Criminal Code and also the 2015 *Colective Revolution* protests and the environment protests of that period. The final subsection is the one addressing the Petitions and how they are handled.

The authors also analyse the EU topics and the influence of direct democracy on national politics as they identify the fact that “how to deal with the past and move forward radically divides public opinion in Romania. As such, some of the main bones of contention in the current political scene are the following: the reform of the legal system; Romania’s role in the EU; electoral reform; the best economic model for the country; deep divisions in the body politic and the ‘traditional family’ debate” (364). Following this analysis directed toward a general audiences who is not familiar with the Romanian specificities the authors state that “in Romania’s case, we can see that in recent

years the instruments of participatory democracy (namely the civic movements) have been actively used by citizens and have contributed to an increase in civic participation” (368-369). Moreover, they identify in the case of Romania “another regional peculiarity the importance of national minorities in political life” (369).

The fourth part of the book is written by Richard Youngs and deals with “Getting Europe’s Direct Democracy Right” as, in the author’s opinion it is a fundamental issue. This is even more relevant “as citizens make what experts consider to be ‘wrong’ populist-fuelled choices, sympathy has resurged for the classical concept of epistocracy or elite-mediated governance” (443). The direct democracy is evolving and is becoming much more present in the everyday life of the citizens, with a significant presence at the local level then at the European level.

There is a common perception that the “citizens use referendums simply to gainsay and punish elites for reasons unrelated to the subject matter ostensibly under consideration” (447). This in exchange generates more administrative roadblocks erected by national governments in the way of referendum while it generates a vicious circle “political parties and state institutions increasingly try to reach deals on EU issues that avoid having to call a referendum” (448). Faced with the increase of local citizens’ initiatives and the surge of populist who use the direct democracy instruments we should focus more on the question of the quality of the democratic participation. In Richard Young opinion “good direct democracy is not just about allowing citizens to trigger a referendum. It is about the quality and inclusiveness of the process that shadows direct popular votes” (450). Basically, is about not allowing the direct democracy to affect the protection of minorities. In the end is all balancing acts between the rights of the individuals and the will of the communities.

“Direct democracy is neither a panacea nor an unmitigated ill to be shunned. At most, it merits a modestly widened usage if used in the right way and if combined with other areas of democratic reform” (452).

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CHRISTINE BARD, MELISSA BLAIS ET FRANCIS DUPUIS-DERI (DIR.)**Antiféminismes et masculinismes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui**

(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2019), 507 pp.

La compréhension du féminisme a beaucoup progressé grâce à une production littéraire en croissance exponentielle qui a restitué une profondeur historique et idéologique à ce qui n'est plus perçu uniquement comme un phénomène strictement militant mais bel et bien un système de pensée intellectuellement articulé et un champ valide de recherche en sciences sociales.

Un travail similaire doit être fait aujourd'hui avec l'antiféminisme, pour arriver à une compréhension équivalente de ce contre-mouvement qui, quoique loin d'être absolument novateur, se déploie sous les formes mouvantes d'un *récit culturel alternatif* résolument moderne. La nébuleuse antiféministe est encore une énigme. La questionner revient à questionner plus globalement notre époque, et surtout à s'interroger sur l'essoufflement de la grande méta-narration du progrès qui fait de l'élan émancipateur la force motrice de la modernité.

Le phénomène est impossible à saisir au singulier : les antiféminismes sont effectivement multiples et parfois construits sur des prémisses idéologiques divergentes.

De sensibilité d'extrême droite ou libéral ? Discours périphérique émanant des franges radicales antisystème ou discours consensuel-conservateur de sauvegarde du *statut quo*, visant à discréditer et évacuer la radicalité féministe ? Fasciné par la « magnifique brute blonde » ou par le bon père bourgeois de famille ? La cartographie de l'antiféminisme est complexe et demande une approche académique rigoureuse. Tout comme d'autres phénomènes idéologiques tels que la xénophobie, le racisme, l'antisémitisme et le nationalisme, l'antiféminisme peut et doit être replacé dans une histoire des idées politique, car il y participe, seul ou en tant que composant dans des synthèses idéologiques plus amples. La dernière grande monographie en date – *Un siècle d'antiféminisme*¹ – remontant à 1999, l'utilité voire même l'urgence épistémologique d'une telle entreprise qui puisse à la fois apporter une profondeur historique et embrasser les mutations les plus récentes de l'antiféminisme du XXI siècle apparaissait comme une évidence; l'élection de Donald Trump, l'essor des communautés virtuelles masculinistes, l'offensive contre le théorie du genre les ABC de l'égalité, les ambiguïtés de l'écologie « intégrale » constituent autant de nouveaux enjeux et défis.

L'ouvrage collectif dirigé par Christine Bard, Mélissa Blais et Francis Dupuis-Déri se propose de les relever, et de dresser un tableau actualisé de la réflexion et de la pratique antiféministe dans la culture politique occidentale. L'initiative réunit certains des noms pionniers de l'étude de la nébuleuse

¹ Christine Bard (dir.), *Un siècle d'antiféminisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

masculiniste; la réelle diversité des profils intellectuels permet de faire apparaître en filigrane la morphologie d'un champ de recherche en plein essor, où plusieurs traditions et sensibilités intellectuelles se croisent et s'enchevêtrent. La dimension interdisciplinaire est revendiquée dès l'introduction, et constitue une force de l'ouvrage.

Formellement, *Antiféministes et masculinistes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* semble hésiter entre deux principes organisateurs : un principe chronologique propre aux sciences historiques (comme dans *Un siècle d'antiféminisme*) et un principe thématique plus proche de la démarche sociologique. L'axe chronologique semble structurer la première partie, qui enchaîne plusieurs séquences historiques: l'antiféminisme des mouvements socialistes et anarchistes au XIX^e siècle avec la contribution de Dupuis-Déri sur la réflexion vitriolique de Proudhon sur les femmes, l'antiféminisme de l'extrême droite maurassienne avec celle de Camille Cléret, prolongée utilement par l'extension de l'analyse par Fiona Casey aux milieux conservateurs, familialistes et natalistes qui dépassent largement dans l'entre-deux-guerres l'univers de l'extrême droite fascisante ou nationaliste, pour innover jusqu'au républicanisme de gauche. Cette première partie qui semble régie par une logique historique se clos sur la contribution de Christine Bard qui se penche sur l'imbrication des tropes antiféministes et de l'imaginaire raciste, homophobe et nationaliste dans l'hebdomadaire satirique d'extrême droite *Minute* entre 1990 et 2015. La seconde partie (même si un tel découpage n'est pas explicitement réalisé par les éditeurs de l'ouvrage) abandonne le fil directeur de l'axe chronologique pour aborder diverses facettes du discours antiféministe actuel.

La force de cette entreprise intellectuelle réside à la fois dans la richesse des différentes approches que dans la diversité et la réelle pluralité thématiques ; sans prétendre bien sûr à l'exhaustivité, *Antiféministes et masculinistes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* réalise une cartographie précise des différentes matrices du discours antiféministes, illustrant efficacement le caractère protéiforme du *backlash* que suscite le féminisme. Deux contributions portent sur la religion comme espace symbolique protégeant encore des manifestations potentiellement hostiles à l'égalité homme-femme, malgré la volonté de réforme manifestée par les autorités religieuses. Josselin Tricou se penche dans sa remarquable contribution sur la valorisation d'un entre-soi masculin au sein du catholicisme français contemporain, mettant en exergue la nouveauté et le défi que représente pour le catholicisme romain cet exercice idéologique – qui dépasse le cadre strictement théologique – de penser la « masculinité » dans la période post-loi Taubira. Après la mobilisation des milieux catholiques autour des thèmes de la théorie du genre et du mariage homosexuel, il était impensable d'appréhender l'antiféminisme sans son rapport avec la culture chrétienne, et plus particulièrement catholique. Mais Tricou offre un éclairage inédit et enrichissant sur un zone d'ombre de la recherche sur la pensée « anti-gender », à savoir l'incubation dans l'univers catholique d'une

forme de masculinisme. L'émergence d'une telle réflexion sur la masculinité, démontre l'auteur, n'était nullement évidente. Pour la théologie vaticane, la masculinité était littéralement un continent submergé, qui n'a auparavant pratiquement jamais fait l'objet d'une systématisation théorique : « Jusqu'à là, l'Eglise catholique n'avait jamais vraiment thématé dans ses textes officiels le *génie masculin*, contrairement à la féminité discutée de longue date et thématée depuis Jean Paul II selon le procédé de *surévaluation compensatrice* » (284-285). Cette attention au masculin est d'autant plus difficile à légitimer par le seul recours à la tradition catholique puisque les sacrements sont administrés sans distinction des sexes : l'Eglise, quand il s'agit des laïques, n'érige pas la non-mixité en principe théologique. Toutefois, c'est au sein de la nébuleuse des « communautés nouvelles » (dites aussi *tradismatiques*, et issues du croisement entre une logique « charismatique » inspirée par la spontanéité et l'émotivité du néo-protestantisme états-unien et les expressions néo-traditionnelles du catholicisme d'identité) qu'infusera un discours alternatif sur la masculinité, qui complète le dispositif essentialiste et antiféministe déjà mis en place dans les années 1990 par le Vatican. Ce discours n'est par ailleurs ni monolithique, ni exempt d'une réelle tension entre la tentation viriliste (une conception volontariste de la masculinité ancrée dans les valeurs de la lutte, de l'ambition et de la conquête, comme chez l'évangéliste néo-protestant John Eldredge) et une acceptation d'une masculinité soumise à Dieu, « domestiquée » et placée sous le patronage paradoxal d'une figure féminine, celle de la Vierge Marie. Les conclusions de Josselin Tricou offrent un éclairage sur la stratégie des milieux catholiques qui a le mérite de dépasser largement la problématique choisie, s'appliquant à bien d'autres questions controversées de société pour lesquelles l'Eglise veut devenir un interlocuteur légitime. En s'appropriant un sujet de société excédant des enjeux purement théologiques – dans ce cas la masculinité, mais cela est aussi vrai pour la bioéthique, le mariage homosexuel, l'avortement, la procréation médicalement assistée ou la fin de vie – l'Eglise tient à se replacer au centre des débats sociaux et des « guerres culturelles » afin de rendre audible son discours. Discours qui connaît aussi, sur la forme et parfois sur le fond, des mutations et des évolutions notables : cette stratégie d'« élargissement horizontal des compétences » (p. 289) du clergé passe par le déploiement d'un discours « laïcisé » (qui par ailleurs offre une place centrale à des personnalités de la « société civile » telles que des médecins, des psychologues, des coach de développement personnel, sensés détenir un savoir technique et une expertise précise), qui mettra en exergue davantage la dimension anthropologique ou civilisationnelle que celle de la morale chrétienne.

L'ouvrage de Christine Bard, Mélissa Blais et Francis Dupuis-Déri ne tombe pourtant pas dans l'écueil de rendre exclusif ce focus sur le catholicisme : l'islam et le judaïsme deviennent également objet d'une réflexion par le biais d'un entretien croisé de trois figures féministes impliquées dans les leurs communautés religieuses pour faire avancer la cause des femmes. Ce format a un double

mérite : celui de briser l'image d'un unanimisme conservateur des religions et de tenter une approche comparatiste. On peut regretter toutefois que cette dimension comparatiste ne soient pas davantage développée, et que les parallélismes constatés ne soient pas cristallisés réellement en une grille de compréhension plus poussée des mécanismes et des causes profondes de la survivance au sein des cultes d'îlots de discrimination sexiste.

Sara Garbagnoli livre une synthèse efficace de ses recherches sur les campagnes anti-genre en Europe, en accordant également une place centrale aux mobilisations religieuses et aux implications de leur projet conservateur. Rejoignant l'analyse de Josselin Tricou, elle insiste sur la dimension « gramscienne » revendiquée du conservatisme actuel qui est décidé de mener une bataille culturelle et métapolitique contre la modernité. Les principaux clivages du discours anti-genre (science contre idéologie, liberté contre totalitarisme, humanisme contre transhumanisme et « culture de mort ») s'émancipent par rapport à la rhétorique traditionnelle catholique du péché et fonctionnent de façon autonome en opérant parfois une forme de mimétisme à l'égard de leur adversaires progressistes : ainsi, la dichotomie entre un « féminisme intégral », ou « alter-féminisme » (référence aux mouvements altermondialistes, dont la connotation antisystème et subversive plaît bien à un mouvement attaché à une narration contestataire antimoderne qui fonde leur identité politique) et le féminisme « troisième vague », constructiviste et « subventionné » (donc subordonné aux « lobbys » et à leurs intérêts) sert à désamorcer les accusations de sexisme et de misogynie qui pourraient être formulées.

Un autre pôle de recherche concerne le droit, et surtout le droit pénal (pour les violences conjugales) et le droit de la famille (législation concernant le divorce et la garde de l'enfant). L'antiféminisme s'y manifeste par l'apparition de nouveaux concepts et d'un travail de reformulation de la grammaire juridique : utilisation de terminologies alternatives telles que « conflit de couple » ou « couple violent » ou « conflictuel » pour désigner des situations de violence conjugale, émergence de concepts juridiques nouveaux tel quel le « syndrome d'aliénation parentale », déplacement du focus juridique sur l'enfant au détriment parfois de la femme, etc. Les trois contributions, portant sur les mouvements des droits des pères, sur le concept controversé du « syndrome d'aliénation parental » (qui a un ancrage robuste dans l'imaginaire antiféministe) et la remise en question du cadre d'appréhension de la violence de genre en Europe Occidentale, offrent une image d'ensemble sur l'évolution d'un champ d'action de l'antiféminisme moins systématiquement exploré.

L'émergence de la figure de l'homme-martyr, père de famille divorcé et privé de tous droits, est un tournant significatif dans l'évolution du discours masculiniste au cours des 20 dernières années. L'arsenal sémantique de l'oppression, de l'inégalité et de l'injustice est détourné et réinvesti dans le cadre d'une contre-narration victimaire qui est directement concurrentielle avec celle du féminisme : l'homme serait pris dans le carcan d'une hiérarchie sexuelle qui lui est *systémiquement* hostile, et dont la société et l'ordre juridique sont la réflexion. A rebours de l'esthétique d'une hypermasculinité conquérante

qui caractérise souvent un certain antiféminisme, ce masculinisme n'hésite pas à construire son imaginaire autour de la figure d'un homme-victime, émasculé, dépossédé de ses attributs de « mâle » ; dans cette dramatisation de la misère masculine, même la violence criminelle (féminicide, filicide, violence conjugale) perd son « volontarisme » viril, et est justifiée par un excès de désespoir et imputés aux femmes plutôt qu'aux perpétrateurs; ceux-ci ne serait donc même plus les acteurs de leur propre violence – on est aux antipodes de la « magnifique brute » nietzschéenne, du barbare, dont le fantasme fébrile traverse traditionnellement l'antiféminisme. Accompagnant cette rénovation de son lexique et de son imaginaire, la politisation du juridique par le masculinisme est un phénomène relativement récent, dont la transformation en objet de recherche peut enrichir de façon significative la compréhension du *backlash* antiféministe.

L'ouvrage se pose aussi la question de la matrice politique de l'antiféminisme. Si *Un siècle d'antiféminisme* s'était remarqué par son insistance sur la transversalité de ce discours que l'on retrouve à la fois à gauche et à droite, la présente recherche est très nettement recentrée sur son socle conservateur. Une seule contribution se pose la question « Comment peut-on être progressiste et antiféminisme ? », à propos du penseur anarchiste Pierre Joseph Proudhon, et aboutit sur une réponse qui tente d'évacuer l'antiféminisme de son système de pensée (l'anarchisme, qui ne pourrait pas *logiquement* être antiféministe, conclut Dupuis-Déri) pour la cantonner à une défense égoïste de ses intérêts de classe par l'individu mâle Proudhon. Il faut avouer que cette théorie est assez indigente pour expliquer pourquoi la gauche, malgré la proclamation d'idéaux d'émancipation, a reçu longtemps le féminisme avec une certaine froideur. Cela fait également l'impasse sur la mobilisation d'un topos gauchisant dans la cadre d'un antiféminisme « plébéien » comme celui d'un Alain Soral ou d'un Eric Zemmour. Comme pour l'antisémitisme, le filon antiféministe innerve l'ensemble du spectre politique, et sa percée à gauche n'est pas réductible aux simples préjugés intimes des acteurs politiques : il est de fait intégré pleinement à leur système de pensée et il est naïf de l'appréhender comme une simple aberration intellectuelle qui s'expliquerait par l'incapacité individuelle d'un homme à s'élever à la hauteur de sa magnanime doctrine.

Ces limitations mises à part, *Antiféminismes et masculinismes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* a le potentiel véritable de devenir un ouvrage de référence. Le mélange entre analyse conceptuelle, histoire des idées politique, investigation historique et sociologie constitue un creuset méthodologique parfaitement adapté à cette entreprise intellectuelle. Celle-ci est particulièrement incisive et pertinent lorsqu'il s'agit de mettre en exergue les nouvelles dynamiques de l'antiféminisme contemporain, tout en accordant un réel soin à restituer une profondeur historique au phénomène. La grammaire politique changeante des sociétés occidentales a donné naissance à un nouvel antiféminisme, incubé bien entendu dans la matrice intellectuelle d'une longue tradition historique d'opposition aux valeurs modernes de la « démocratie sexuelle », mais

présentant des traits originaux qui sont le fruit d'évolutions difficiles à prédire il y a encore 20 ans. Le tableau ainsi rendu par le présent recueil, qui tient compte des plus récentes expressions de cette rénovation doctrinale, n'est certes pas exhaustif, mais cette image d'ensemble avance de façon significative la compréhension des stratégies multiformes déployées par l'antiféminisme pour ancrer leur légitimité dans un univers social et politique en rapide mutation.

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**ABEL POLESE, OLEKSANDRA SELIVERSTOVA,
EMILIA PAWLUSZ AND JEREMY MORRIS
(EDS.)**

**Informal Nationalism After Communism: The Everyday
Construction of Post-Socialist Identities**

(London and New York: Tauris, 2018), 213 pp.

**LILIYA BEREZHNYAYA AND HEIDI HEIN-
KIRCHNER (EDS.)**

**Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European
Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism**

(New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 416 pp.

From Bulwark Myths to Everyday Nationalism: Constructing
Everyday Identities in Central and Eastern Europe

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signalled the rise of nationalisms. As Beissinger mentions, we cannot understand nationalism as the unique force responsible for the Union's disintegration, but we have to bear in mind nationalism's cruciality.¹ As a result, we had the reappearance of some

¹ Mark R. Beissinger, "Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Communism," *Contemporary European History*, 18, no 3 (2009): 331-335.

states in Eastern Europe, which after the War had become part of the USSR,² while some others, which remained visible under communism, had to reassess their political path and their view of the past.³ We have to remember that, during the transformation process, Eastern Europe was a place with a powerful religious identity, where numerous ethnic groups lived.

Nevertheless, during the last three decades, research has focused on the macro-level, attempting to understand how the states have formed their institutions after the transition, the characteristics of the new political parties and in what way those actors have adopted nationalism. What is missing is the study of ‘the people’. By focusing on the micro-level, what is known as micro-history, we are given the opportunity to search for an explanation in the daily life of those societies, and not in classic economic and cultural factors.⁴

During the last few years, we witnessed a rise in the studies of banal nationalism, as it is known,⁵ where this essay has put itself. Following a chronological order, the volume edited by Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kircher, *Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism*, can be placed before the volume edited by Polese et al., *Informal Nationalism After Communism: The Everyday Construction of Post-Socialist Identities*. By examining the content of these volumes, we can understand their connection and contribution to both Eastern European history and the study of nationalism.

Starting our study from Berezhnaya and Kircher’s volume, on the *Rampart Nations*, we can see that the volume is divided into four parts. The first part sets the background of the study, which is visible in the first chapter. In this chapter, the editors highlight the materials needed to construct a rampart nation. Thus, they introduce us to the meaning of bulwark or antemurale myths, according to which a nation has a specific mission to fulfil for the civilisation. To achieve an in-depth comprehension, the authors introduce us to the category of political myths, of which bulwark myths are deemed to be a subcategory. Kerstin Weiland’s chapter discusses the origins of antemurale myths; regarding

² Daunis Auers, *Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 30-32.

³ Simona Mitroiu, “Recuperative memory in Romanian post-Communist society,” *Nationalities Papers*, 44, no. 5 (2016): 753–756.

⁴ Claire Zalc and Bruttman Tal. “Toward a Microhistory of the Holocaust.” In *Microhistories of the Holocaust*, edited by Claire Zalc and Tal Bruttman (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 2-3.

⁵ For the meaning of banal nationalism: Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 43-46. For more studies: Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta. *Food, National Identity and Nationalism: From Everyday to Global Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich, *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Christianism; by investigating how that discourse emerged in Western Europe, its content and the central role Hungary and Poland played from the fifteenth century in the formation of an antemurale imagination.

The second part of the book named *(De-) Sacralizing and Nationalizing Borderlands* offers us the one pillar, which forms the basis of the current volume. According to its title, in this part, we will examine how the borderlands were nationalised and (de-) sacralised in different cases and periods. As a confirmation to that, it is from the second chapter that the case studies begin. Ciprian Ghisa examines the formation of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania, questioning whether or not it can be considered an example of a bulwark myth. To conclude, the author supports that we can view the formation and development of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church as a part of the historical conflict between Orthodox and Catholics, that period ending with an agreement and cooperation in favour of the Romanian nation. Heidi Heinkirchner's focus, in the third chapter, is on the town of Lviv, in Poland. Specifically, it is the image of the town through its travel guides that directs her research. What we observe as readers, is how Lviv constructed its bulwark identity, gaining a central role in the Polish nationalism. From a study of antemurale myths, ghettos could not be missing. Jürgen Heyde understands the beginning of the ghettos' in the sixteenth century, to be an answer to the dangers the "Other" presents for the community. As he points out, the development of ghettos' is tightly connected to the history of Jewish communities and the rise of anti-Semitism in Central and Eastern Europe.

Russia stars in the construction of bulwark myths. Its bond with Orthodoxy remains a powerful one, while its crucial geographical position between East and West, strengthened the idea of conquering its holy grounds. Kerstin S. Jobst describes us that process focusing on what would be transformed into Russia's holy ground: Crimea. He mentions how clerics and politicians worked in that direction. Lilya Berezhnaya has provided more clarifications in her chapter about the monasteries in the East European Borderlands. By observing the interaction between monasteries and political ideology, the author was able to highlight the rising importance of monasticism during the 19th century and how it was used to promote specific ideologies and aspects of bulwark myths. Turkey's case completes the second part of the book, as Zaur Gasimov has focused on the anti-communist and anti-Russian myths of modern Turkey. By turning his interest to the cases of some intellectuals who were born in Russia in the early 20th century, Gasimov shows us, how those men contributed to strengthening the anti-communist thought in Turkey. Moreover, it is crucial for Gasimov to present how the same intellectuals shaped the idea of Turkey as the defender of Turkishness, promoting ethno-cultural characteristics against the classic bulwark myth of the conflict between Islam and Christianity.

The third part discusses the promotion of antemurale discourses, again through specific case studies. Early nineteenth-century Ukraine is deemed to be, according to Volodymyr Kravchenko, a case in which antemurale mythology failed to expand. As Kravchenko explains, studying Ukraine during the nineteenth century offers us some interesting facts-regarding the development of modern Ukraine and the role of national myths. Myths worked as a coherent material in a period when new states were created, something that did not happen in the case of Ukraine. Answers can be found in the misuse of those historical narratives that came from the Cossacks and of the power the discourse of fatal geography displayed against the creation of centre-periphery categories in it. Acknowledging the importance of myths in shaping national borders, Philipp Hofeneder focuses on how Polish and Ukrainian schoolbooks presented myths during the Habsburg Monarchy. Specifically, Hofeneder's interest lies on the way those myths were communicated, mainly on how the actors each time communicated them. According to Hofeneder, myths' diffusion through schoolbooks acted advantageously for the creation of the Ukrainian national identity, cutting, for the first time, the bonds with Russia.

Another interesting study regarding the bulwark myths is that of the maps. Steven Seegel highlights maps' importance in shaping identity politics, reflecting how history could be mixed with geography and geopolitics during the end of the nineteenth century and until WWII. Attempting to question what hides behind the creation of these maps, Seegel's approach is a transnational one, with a focus on the German origin of the geographers he chose for his research. If we want to delve deeper into the role those men played, Seegel stresses the perspective of their social role as public servants, playing a critical role in the age of nationalisms. Geographers mapped for the first time what was sensitive for the nation, the topography of a region, in order to help military purposes, and attempted to portray the boundaries, no matter whether they were fixed or not. The next chapter deals with the construction of anti-bolshevism in Poland and Hungary during the Interwar period. As Paul Srodecki supports, and as we have seen in previous chapters of the volume, both countries have formed a powerful imagination, according to which they are "bulwark nations" for Europe against the danger of Bolshevism. What is of importance is the fact that by imagining themselves as "bulwark nations", both nations have developed a strong sense of messianism. In the end of the third part of the volume, we have a chapter dealing with the relationship between a painting and the bulwark myths in Russia. Stephen M. Norris has found in Viktor Vasnetsov's painting, named *Warriors*, the core of the political myth in the case of Russia. The significance of this chapter lies in the fact that it stands against the main arguments of the volume's previous chapters: while most of the times Russia was the "Other", now it is Russia that presents its bulwark myth.

The volume's last part returns to today, in an attempt to clarify what happens with the bulwark myths. Pål Kolstø draws from Huntington's theory on the clash of civilisations to build his model of *antemurale* myth as a boundary-defining mechanism. To support the hypothesis he formed, regarding the appeal of the *antemurale* myths in weaker rather than in stronger ethnic groups, he turns his interest to the way in which the *antemurale* thinking is constructed in Russia (the strongest actor), and Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus (the weakest actors), as they are connected due to their orthodox religion. Paul Srodecki and Stephen M. Norris' concluding chapter puts bulwark rhetoric in the contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, by drawing lines between the past and the present. Having read how the bulwark myths have been constructed through centuries, it is of no surprise to read how the authors are trying to import into the field of bulwark myths the most significant political facts of the last decade in Europe. Thus, the discussion is extended not only to the Ukrainian conflict and the European Refugee Crisis, but also to the rise of Euroscepticism in Central Europe.

An informal version of nationalism, in the post-communist world, represents the target of the volume edited by Polese, Seliverstova, Pawlusz and Morris. By applying several case studies, the authors attempted to avoid the classical, state-centred, approach to nationalism and national identity construction. As the editors described in the first chapter, it is only recently that we observed a shift in the academic debates and studies, from the 'nation-building' to the 'people' dimension. This emerges as an acknowledgement of the importance of the 'people' in recognising ethnic diversity and of what happens in society, far from the main political scene, where the decisions are taken. Keeping that in mind, in the second chapter, Dilyara Suleymanova has focused on how the adolescents from minority ethnic groups in Russia integrate or not into the nation, with the help of school. To achieve that, she has shifted her interest away from more 'classic' analyses of textbooks and other learning material, to a more participatory observation, in a specific town known for its ethnic diversity. Her achievement can be summarised in the dynamic presentation of adolescents as actors who can manage and renegotiate through their participation in a specific ethnic group.

Moldova remains a thoroughly characteristic example of the current volume's targets. By setting light on the building paths that were followed by the state and the nation, Patakfalvi- Czirják and Csaba *Zahorán*, have attempted to highlight the connection between the nationhood and the everyday life, both in linguistic level and in the terms of transformation of the public spaces. Geographically situated between Russia and Romania, Moldova has been affected by both of its' neighbours, resulting in uncertainty when it comes to the connection between the state and the citizens. The next chapter focuses on school textbooks, as a way to teach the national in Serbia and Croatia. In this

chapter, Tamara Pavasović Trošt examines how the nation is defined through geography and nature textbooks, an approach that differs for the classic ones, where the subject of analysis is the history textbook. What she discovers *emphasises* the importance of examining each nation's textbooks, not only to comprehend how the nation forms the national identity of young people, but also for the need of deep ethnographic researches as the appropriate methodology for banal nationalism in the school level.

Marharyta Fabrykant's contribution, in the fourth chapter deals with nationalism and economy in Russia and Belarus. Her focus is on the relationship between advertising and national identity symbols, being driven by the absence Fabrykant has found in the field regarding the study of prerequisites. Another topic the current volume approaches is that of geopolitics in Post-Soviet Russia, again as part of the everyday nationalism. By examining language, symbols, frames and even cuisine, Elizaveta Gaufman weaves a very thick web, in order to complete a bottom-driven analysis of Russian foreign policy, avoiding to approach it as a governmental policy.

Banal nationalism is further connected to art, and music is one of the most characteristic examples. The interest in Petra-Štastná's research has to do with the use of turbo-folk as a way of national identification. Consequently, she offers us an in-depth study of the origins of turbo-folk and its effect both in the Balkan countries and the diaspora. Moreover, diaspora is where she did her field research on, in order to understand in what way turbo-folk can bring national identification to those who listen to it. Except for music, cuisine can present exciting results, when we talk about nationalism. As Rayna Gavrilova describes in her chapter, behind the way different restaurants present their menus, different historical discourses can be hidden, which drive us to Gavrilova's main target: to map how the identities are divided, performed and declared and what this means for the Bulgarian meaning of "dinner."

There are two more chapters before the end of the volume. Although the last one is the volume's conclusion, the previous one offers us a view of the post-communist world, outside Europe. Timofey Agarin and Līga Rudzīte, turn their focus to the case of Mongolia and how gender affects the everyday nation-building; in a country that has been living in the shadow of its neighbours for centuries, despite its historical past. It is due to the weight of such a past that nation-building remains a case for the male population. The conclusion, like the introduction, is signed by the editors. There, they present their thoughts on the importance of their work, in the field of everyday identities.

Keeping in mind the above, we can draw some conclusions. Foremost, we have two volumes based on a fruitful ethnographic and historical research. Their achievement can be found in how effectively they have been placed away from the classical historical studies, offering in the fields of microhistory and banal nationalism. By using case studies to strengthen their main positions – the

apprehension of the importance that everyday nationalism offers us in order to delve into the nationalist rise in post-communist countries, as well as the attempt to focus on a number of bulwark myths to better understand how East European societies have been transformed during the age of nationalism – both editors offer us a remarkably profound study of various aspects and episodes of life in those countries. Except for covering research gaps of significant importance, these two books can be studied simultaneously from those who want to understand hidden aspects of the political discourse. As politics is to a large extent driven by nationalism in Eastern Europe, irredentism and nostalgia for the glorious past and glimpses to specific events from the past are common in the discourse of political actors.

In detail, it means that from *Rampart Nations* to *Informal Nationalism* there is a straight line, in which we observe how historical events have entered nations' imagination, resulting in the creation of national identity and their self-view as Christianity's and Europe's defenders. Another use of these two volumes can combine them with political science. After the transition to democracy, we had the appearance of a bibliography with a focus on the historical legacies of the region.⁶ That bibliography found its extension by an attempt to be implemented in the study of the radical right in Eastern Europe. The problem both of the books have bears a strong resemblance to that of every case study: for each case selected there is always another case that remains untouched. Thus, we cannot know whether some facts were as crucial as the authors describe or if the examining of textbooks in Serbia and Croatia could offer us similar results to some other countries. Another fact is the lack of interviews. It could be intriguing to observe how the officials in the studied cases understand those bulwark myths, or what thoughts they have about the field researches that cover the volume on *Informal Nationalism*. Having that in mind, we do not want to reduce the importance of these works. What we have to emphasise is that the field can offer us many more studies in order to understand each nation's acceptance of its past and everyday life.

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⁶ Michael Minkenberg, "Leninist beneficiaries? Pre-1989 legacies and the radical right in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe: Some introductory observations," in *Historical Legacies and the Radical Right in the Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Michael Minkenberg (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2010) 11-28; John Ishiyama. "Historical legacies and the size of the red-brown vote in post-communist politics," in *Historical Legacies and the Radical Right in the Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Michael Minkenberg (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2010), 63-90.

CRISTINA A. BEJAN**Intellectuals and Fascism in Interwar Romania: The Criterion Association**

(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 323 pp.

Over the past few decades, a growing number of social scientists in various fields have dedicated extensive studies to the intellectual landscape of interwar Romania. Their works have provided an increasingly clearer image of the controversial role played by the Romanian cultural elite in fascism and the Holocaust. The hereby reviewed book adds a noteworthy contribution to history of the convoluted paths followed by the “Young Generation” of the late 1920s and early 1930s. It offers a compelling depiction of a particularly relevant nucleus of the Bucharest intelligentsia: the Criterion association. Cristina A. Bejan, an author whose past and present research projects focus on the cultural background of radical phenomena in 20th century Romania,¹ provides a deeper understanding of the inner dynamics, profound complexities and intricate nuances that defined a heterogeneous intellectual scene, for which the Criterion project represents an often overlooked epitome. Delivering both a biographical account of the organization and an incursion into the individual biographies of its key members, the book patiently uncovers the diverging worldviews of those brought together within the ranks of the association. The figures under scrutiny are revealed to be a mixed bag of characters, including relentless democrats, converted communists and unrepentant fascists, staunch secularists and religious thinkers, militant Westernizers and hardline Easterners. Criterion is thus rendered as a remarkably eclectic phenomenon, not confined to the theoretical field of political ideology, but encompassing highly relevant cultural, artistic, social and philosophical manifestations.

As stated in the introduction of the book, the early political behavior, discourse and convictions of the intellectuals who would later gain canonical status in Romanian culture remain up to the present day matters of persistent controversy. Significantly, heated debates are still being fueled by an accumulation of historical (re)interpretations varying from fierce condemnations of totalitarian (mainly fascist) allegiances to veiled tendencies of posthumous biographical whitewashing (xvii). Acknowledging the overcharged background on which critical representations of these contentious themes build upon, the thoroughly documented analysis provided by Bejan effectively comes across as an inquiry into a matter situated beyond the immediate limits of the issue at hand.

¹ The author has so far contributed to the “United States Holocaust Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos”, Vol. 3, Indiana University Press, 2018, and is currently working on a book project titled “Regimenting Culture: The Romanian National Theatre under Totalitarianism, 1938-1989”.

Ultimately, it tackles the universally problematic subject of the political involvement of intellectuals, especially their malign fascination with ideological extremism in times of proliferating radicalism, a generic theme interpreted through the lens of a specific case study. In pursuit of this overarching purpose, the author uses a generational approach on Criterion as a representative section of the “brilliant modernizing force to be reckoned with” (12) spectacularly rising on the internal scene in the interval between the two world wars. This force was embodied by the young elite claiming the arduous mission of rebuilding the Romanian nation, an intellectual group whose prominent figureheads ended up embracing the politically mystical and philosophically irrational cause of fascism. In the course of her constant references to the grandiose ideal pertaining to the metamorphosis of the modern world, a notion central to the worldview of the studied intellectual group, the author carefully conceptualizes this forceful transformative drive. Following Jeffrey Herf, she describes it as a permutation of “reactionary modernism”, defining it as an impetus towards the edification of a utopian future coupled with a pervasive rootedness in a mythical past (12-13).

These wide thematic lines are investigated through an adequate diachronic narrative divided into eight main chapters (excluding the conclusive one), steadily tracing the gradual crystallization, the full development and the abrupt demise of the Criterion project. Delving into the origins of the association, the first chapter identifies one of its foundational marks in the political and philosophical contributions of Nae Ionescu, who actively exerted his role as mentor of the future spearheads of the “Young Generation”. Fatefully, the latter commenced their intellectual careers under his guise and closely followed their teacher on his rise to prominence as an ideologue of the far right and a close collaborator of the fascist Legion of the “Archangel Michael”. Contemplating this trajectory, Bejan convincingly argues that the elitist youth maturing under these radicalizing influences, far from lacking belief, purpose or direction as other historical accounts have repeatedly claimed, instead had quite “too much to believe in” (33). Certainly, its powerful revolutionary aspirations and their deeply felt consequences reinforce such a statement. Concomitantly, not limiting the analytic scope to proximate and already extensively researched intellectual sources, a compelling argument is made for the substantial formative influence, complementary to autochthonous strands, of the perpetual external contacts cultivated by some of the analyzed characters, mainly through study experiences abroad. Some of the most significant examples include the journeys of Petru Comarnescu in the United States, Mircea Eliade in India, or Emil Cioran in Germany.

After identifying the main intellectual roots of those who became an integral part of the Criterion story, the next couple of chapters deal with the strenuous beginnings of the association, described as coming into existence in 1932 as “a fruition of the Young Generation’s cultural ambition” (60). Promptly, the latter established a strikingly diverse intellectual network and

cultivated a wide range of cultural expressions with resounding echoes in the high circles of interwar Bucharest: social gatherings, artistic events, informal debates, formal lectures, conference cycles etc. These eclectic intellectual experiments are comprehensively examined not merely as clashes of ideas, thoughts and discourses, but also as logistically and administratively challenging maneuvers, depending on a particular social mechanic responsible for the identity of Criterion throughout its existence. Constructed as a vibrant forum where artistic symposia, ideological interventions and cultural expressions were intertwined, the association is revealed as an attempt to “ignite some meaningful social, political, economic and cultural change” (86) in the Romanian national framework and to introduce “new paradigms” (129) of thought in a relentless search for the radical reevaluation of modernity and the revolutionary transformation of the present. The initiators of this far reaching national rejuvenation project are vividly portrayed as a prevalently cosmopolitan assembly, concentrating the disparate intellectual forces of independent figures into common endeavors. These involved raising public awareness to pressing contemporary concerns such as the “idols” of the day, the future of politics or the nature of national identity, and were promptly confronted by a barrage of vicious accusations from their detractors, with the wave of criticism ranging from the communist affiliations to the alleged anti-national interests of the Criterionists.

Nevertheless, as the following chapters indicate, Criterion meandered through the fierce political scene of interwar Romania, developing and refining its means of cultural expression and advancing its campaign of intellectual proselytism via lectures, conferences and publications. These manifestations carried on despite the increasing crackdown of the authorities on dissenting voices, in a time when free speech, the right of association and the dissemination of ideas deemed as dangerous for the regime were significantly restrained. As the author keenly observes, regardless of their contrasting backgrounds, the public stances of various members of the association were similar in their perception of an ongoing state of crisis and in their prophetic announcements of imminent collective dangers, such as the looming threat of war, hence the missionary call of the rising “Young Generation” for spiritual regeneration, anthropological revolution and the shift towards an alternative model of modernity. However, these common claims for renovation notwithstanding, diverging forces proved stronger than the ground the Criterion thinkers shared. When the sudden dissolution of the association came into effect in 1935, it was a clear sign that high aspirations such as the “primacy of the spiritual”, envisioned by the likes of Eliade as absolute priorities for this young intellectual elite, were definitively undermined by the “extreme political allegiances and activity” of their idealistic promoters (177). As the second half of the book aptly illustrates, the downfall and subsequent disenchantment with the Criterion project was as abrupt as it was predictable. The public scandals that ended up destroying it from within – which provide the author with the

opportunity to shed remarkable insight into the personal and social profiles of the figures at their forefront, such as Petru Comarnescu – unveiled the long lasting damaging effects of the bitter rivalries that characterized the competing intellectual nuclei of interwar Romania.

Following the aftermath of the fall of Criterion, the final chapters investigate the diverging historical destinies of its protagonists, dissecting the process of “rhinocerization” – as conceptualized by Eugene Ionesco – forcefully experienced by a significant margin of them, as well as by a sizeable portion of Romanian society as a whole. This massive conversion to totalitarian thinking was strikingly observable in the “herd-like” behavior (211-212) of a large section of the intellectual elite. The fascination with fascism, beyond dooming the Criterion project, partially discredited some of the most brilliant exponents of the “Young Generation”, with the ones who remained faithful to the democratic cause being directly confronted with their former associates in a heterogeneous battle of ideas, depicted by the author through the comparative analysis of several individual portraits. As the argument compellingly highlights, the plurality of tragic paths followed by the former members of Criterion, from alienating exile and painful confrontation (or lack thereof) of an infamous past to complete subjugation or active collaboration with the Communist regime, could not simply erase the complicated legacy of the phenomenon. That was only natural given the contribution of Criterion to the cultural developments of interwar Romania, although its achievements as well as its shortcomings were most certainly distorted with time.

Towards the end of the book, an inevitable question is addressed, as to whether the Criterion project failed or succeeded, and the provided answer is quite easy to anticipate. Ultimately, an objective research of the topic can only reach an ambivalent response, given the fact that the association itself was an entity into which valuable cultural undertakings and intellectual effervescence became entangled with ominous ideological decay and questionable morality. Its undoubted effusion of creativity dramatically degenerated into the entropy of fascist allegiance, with this complex picture being further darkened by the nefarious influence of several decades of violent Communist suppression of the memory of the past. All in all, the convoluted narrative of the rise and demise of the association is a story meant to move beyond the particular traits of a Romanian phenomenon, as the author explicitly states in her conclusive remarks. Represented through proper historical lenses, Criterion can indeed be regarded as an illustration of the perilous risks taken by those intellectuals who, in the famous words of Julien Benda, at one point become “treacherous” to their vocation and choose to abandon their calling in order to pursue fateful political chimeras.

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ABSTRACTS

DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN (Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu), SABINA-ADINA LUCA (Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu),

Young People and Political Activism in Moldova: Why Online Mobilization is Not Enough for Democratic Consolidation

The election of a socialist and pro-Russian candidate in December 2016 as president of Moldova marked a new turn in Moldovan politics. This election contrasts with the pro-Western attitudes of the previous government. Governing instability in Moldova and changing international orientations of many prominent political actors, as emphasized by this article, are partly due to political alternative victories of parties supported by different social groups. Focusing on young people activism, this article underlines the differentiation between the political success of pro-Western parties, made possible by the street protests of April 2009, and the political failure of December 2016. The findings of this research may add a new explanation to Moldova's permanent instability. The factor we emphasize here is the change in political values, attitudes and actions due to profound generational transformations. Since democracy is a life-long learning process, a continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to the varying political environment, different generations rely not only on different past experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different meanings given to rights and freedoms, social standards and economic conditions.

Keywords: Moldova, street protests, elections, young people, democratization.

PASKAL ZHELEV (University of National and World Economy), ANNA GARASHCHUK (University of Malaga),

Prospects for Free Trade Between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union After the Sanctions

With growing US protectionism and uncertainties in the transatlantic relationship it is time for the EU to consider diversifying its external ties and look for other allies that support the idea of free trade gains and have a common interest in maintaining the international rules-based trading system. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which shares a common neighbourhood and is a crucial supplier of raw materials interested in getting technology transfer represents a natural trading partner of the EU.

While there are currently no political (sanctions against Russia) and legal (Belarus is not yet a WTO member) preconditions for starting free trade negotiations, given the high economic significance and positive security implications such a possibility should be considered. This paper undertakes a comprehensive assessment of the potential welfare effects of a possible future EU-EEU FTA based on the Sussex Framework. Such an analysis provides important information on bilateral trade patterns and insights on the economic implications that would be useful once sanctions are removed and bilateral trade relations normalized. The results show that in the long term the aim should be a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement that goes beyond mere removal of trade barriers which could however be a feasible first step.

Keywords: free trade agreements, Eurasian Economic Union, EU, trade indicators, Sussex Framework.

PASQUALE CERBONE (Universidad UTE), MARÍA PEREIRA LÓPEZ (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela),

Understanding Populism in Ecuador. How the Ecuadorian Population Perceives Presidents Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno

This article explores the perception of Ecuadorian population concerning the political style of Presidents Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno and their links to populism, one of the most interesting features of the Ecuadorian political arena. The analysis is based on a survey designed and applied by the authors at a national level. The quantitative data was interpreted using linear multiple regression models, to understand which of the variables analyzed can explain the perception of the interviewees. The results were extrapolated by using a descriptive statistical analysis (means, standard deviation and correlation matrix). The article shows that a difference between Correa and Moreno's styles exists and this difference is clearly perceived by Ecuadorian population. While populist features are strongly identified in Correa's political style, they are less remarked in Moreno's rhetoric and action. This difference marks a discontinuity in the use of populism in the political style of the two presidents.

Keywords: Populism, Rafael Correa, Lenín Moreno, Ecuador.

RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU (University of Bucharest),

Agents Politiques et Discursifs de La Modernité Roumaine. Origines, Hésitations, Malentendus

Representing states and citizens in the political rhetoric and construction of the XIX century means investigating the origins of such discourses in the political thought. In the Romanian case, one should get a closer look into the ways of intellectual nurturing in the rising of a Modern political elite in the XIX century, especially in the aftermath of 1848 Revolution and of the 1859 Union. The political agents of this period are to be analyzed in a broad theoretical and rhetorical framework, conditioned by philosophical and historiographical discontinuities between the periods. One should see and interpret in that sense the intellectual sources, the political and institutional framework of that time, that could draw a more accurate image of what political power and agents' discourse meant at that time and how it influenced, for that matter, the further construction of modernity during the XX and XXI centuries.

Keywords: Modernity, Democracy, Romanian Political Thought, XIXth Century Narratives.

VALENTIN STOIAN ("Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy),

Policy Integration Across Multiple Dimensions: the European Response to Hybrid Warfare

The article analyzes the European Union's response to hybrid warfare and argues that a proper interpretation of the policies adopted offers cautious support for a rational choice intuitionist approach. It begins with the presentation of the main theories of European decision-making, among which rational choice and constructivist institutionalism and it derives a hypothesis which it tests in the third part of the article. Several policy documents are analyzed in order to provide the empirical material for the analysis. The article concludes that EU institutions prefer to undertake supra-national action in technical fields which are less politically controversial and where supra-nationalization is more easily accepted.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, constructivism, institutionalism, spill-over.

ANDREYANNA IVANCHENKO (Kharkiv Institute “Interregional Academy of Personnel Management”), IRYNA IGNATIEVA (National University “Odessa Law Academy”), VASILIIY LEFTEROV (National University “Odessa Law Academy”), OLEXANDER TIMCHENKO (Kharkiv National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine),

Personality traits as determinants of political behavior: Ukrainian electoral and voting tendencies

Now there is a sharp increase of interest in politics, especially among young people. Meanwhile, the psychological mechanisms of the person’s political behavior (its manifesting and regulating), as well as interaction of his cognitive, emotional, motivation and value factors with the political system remain insufficiently studied. The aim of this research is to study the influence of personality traits on political behavior in order to find out the connection between person’s individual-psychological characteristics and the degree of his participation in political life within the territory of Ukraine. The Five-Factor NEO-PI-R (NEO Personality Inventory-Revised) model was used for analyzing the respondents’ tendency to politically significant behavior. The survey was conducted in 2017 in Ukraine (n=1247, age: 15-50 years). A positive correlation of the political participation indicators with the personal indicator Conscientiousness and the negative correlation with the Agreeableness parameter were revealed. We have established that emotionally balanced respondents more often show a desire to run for office and rarely participate in voting. High results for Agreeableness and Neuroticism determine the low level of political ambitions. These findings constitute a new step forward in understanding how personality traits form responses in the people’s political engagement while demonstrating the Ukrainian political tendencies.

Keywords: personality traits, political behavior, Five-Factor model, Big Five, NEO Personality Inventory-Revised.

TETIANA SYDORUK (National University of Ostroh Academy), PAVLO STEPANETS (National University of Ostroh Academy), IRYNA TYMEICHUK (National University of Ostroh Academy),

Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland and Ukraine

The article analyses Nord Stream 2 project in terms of the national interests of Poland and Ukraine. The authors carry out comparative analysis of risks and threats which are posed by the project to the national interests of both countries in economic, political and geopolitical spheres.

The probable consequences of implementation of the Russian gas initiative are discussed. Scenarios of tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine are described. These steps would allow the countries to influence the process of Nord Stream 2 project implementation and, potentially, block it; as well as allow preparing their own energy systems to new conditions which might be formed after the launch of two lines of a new Russian gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.

Keywords: Nord Stream 2, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, EU, gas, influence.

KOSTIANTYN BALABANOV (Mariupol State University), NATALIIA PASHYNA (Mariupol State University), VICTORIIA LYSAK (Mariupol State University),

Regional Identity in Ukraine: Formation Factors and Functions

The main approaches to determining the regional division of Ukraine are analyzed. It is shown that regional identity in Ukraine is determined by a unique combination of the historical heritage of the region, features of the ethno-confessional composition of its population, socio-economic status, and specifics of lifestyle, traditions and culture. The functional analysis of regional identity justifies that, being considered one of the basic construction elements of a definition "region", it plays an important role in the preservation and functioning of a regional socio-political space. Subjective factors influence the formation of regional identity models: interests of regional elites, geopolitical factors, current political processes, political parties and public organizations, the position and influence of the mainstream media. The politicization of regional differences in modern Ukraine has led to increase in the regionalization of electoral political sympathies, the aggravation of social differences around geopolitical and ethno-cultural values.

Ethnocultural regionalism creates additional difficulties in the formation of national identity, consolidation of the Ukrainian society according to the strategic social development goals: its democratization and modernization. Therefore, the formation at the state level, the policy of identity based on public consensus and democratic values, taking into account the ethnic, cultural, confessional and linguistic features of the Ukrainian regions, is acquiring particular relevance in modern Ukraine.

Keywords: region, identity, regional identity, ethnocultural features.

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